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This thesis explores issues of embodiment and experiences that serve
to orchestrate the lives of brain injured children and their families. In
discerning the myriad ramifications that affect childhood disability the body is
treated as both a semiological system that presents disability in a conspicuous
manner and the 'object' on which therapeutics (orthodox and alternative) are
enacted. It is with reference to the brain injured child's body that explanations
concerning personal disability, familial trauma and the hope for future
amelioration are discussed.
An anthropology, examining embodiment and experience, is initially
developed through an analysis of the social construction that led to the
development of childhood as an ideological state. The thesis argues that this
category of childhood was, in part, constituted by the institutional powers that
Foucault (1973) et al saw as the monitoring and control (primarily through the
objectifying of the body) of individuals within society. 'The Orchestrated
Body' discusses brain injured children's embodiment as an assimilation of
divergent social states which describe the child's body with a series of
competing notions. For example, the bio-medical approach gives primacy to
an organic pathology that resists habilitation, while the consequence of this
'failure to cure' lends support to the notion that brain injury represents
Goffmans' (1963) deviance model.
The alternative therapy centre is yet another 'orchestration' of the
child's body. However, here the ideology which underpins treatment is in
contrast to that advocated by medical professionals. That cultural perceptions
are involved in interpreting the behaviours that manifest an altered physical
state for brain injured children is analysed with reference to their similarities
with possession cults where the body, once again, comes into sharp focus as an
aetiological feature of personal chaos. As disrupted motor function acts as a
social emblem of disability, this thesis asks can such manifestations be
reinterpreted to the benefit of the child and his or her family? Finally, brain
injured children are posited as self performers being personally responsible for
'orchestrating' themselves in an attempt to experientially extend an
incapacitated body with detail and accounts of living from which they are
typically excluded. The main arguments of the thesis are developed from a
collection of narratives provided by parents of brain injured children who
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This thesis attempts to explore those experiences that are situated in
the physical motor expressions which function to characterise a specific group
of children as brain injured. Such a focus on embodiment is not only intended
to illuminate the medical agendas that control and manage a symptomological
approach for disability, but more importantly provides a referral point in the
attempt to encounter the personal phenomenology of brain injured children.
In this sense the body of the brain injured child is not only valuable because it
permits a narrative of disability to be semantically located in its pathological
and mechanical operations, but also because the body is that very genesis
where intent and potential are fused with experience. The result of this, as I
intend to show, is that the brain injured child's body is indeed 'orchestrated' by
professional practice, but embedded in this 'management score' are the hidden
motifs of self expression if one can but discern the experiential child from the
labelling condition.
The notions which are developed here were kindled when I was
appointed as research and development officer for a national charity that
devised family habilitation programmes for brain injured children. My main
responsibilities were to research into new therapeutic techniques and rationales
which could expand those already in practice. However, during my stay with
the Kerland Foundation I became increasingly aware of the trauma that shaped
the lives ofmany families who were attending the centre in the hope that
something might be done to help their children realise a better independence
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than that offered through traditional medical practice. The fact that many
families had felt their consultations with medical personnel to be less than
satisfactory played a large role in the development of this thesis.
However the focus on clinical practitioners, alternative therapists and
the families themselves kept, in an almost subliminal way, returning me to a
singular preoccupation with that physical entity which makes the child a
unique embodied individual. It seemed that the child's body was being
orchestrated by professionals, the family and even the community in ways that
made their dealings with the child more meaningful in terms of therapy and its
underlying social constructions.
Although these children are described as brain injured, the abstract and
technical implications of linking specific problems to brain function are often
too theoretically challenging to be valid for any meaningful insight into the
ontology and nature of the underlying condition. Instead, the focus on aspects
of physical form and function seem to provide much greater currency to the
understanding of the problems of brain injury (see Chapter 3). In this way, the
brain injured child is constructed not only in medical diagnosis but also in
terms of social discourses which act to fix the largely 'hidden' neurological
impairment to the more readily perceived somatic manifestations of
disablement. It was, then, the body and its performances that appeared to me
and, ifmy analysis of the family material presented here is a sympathetic one
for the parents also, which served as the defining feature of brain injured
children. Brain injury may well be the cause of their child's difference but it is
the body that makes impairment conspicuous and causes disability to have an
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experiential reality for both parent and child. Thus, it is the body as that one
tangible artefact of trauma which will be utilised in diverse ways in this thesis
to explore the embodied reality of these children and the ameliorative
possibilities offered by both therapist and doctor.
It is in this sense that I refer, throughout this study, to the brain injured
child's body as 'orchestrated'. As an orchestra is composed of different
instruments, each with its particular voice, so too is the body. The limbs and
senses inform one another in a concerted effort to make motility a harmony of
intent and action. However, this is but a part of the orchestrations that I shall
explore in this study. The musical analogies that pepper this work are not
merely metaphors ofmotor function but are also intended to demonstrate the
collective influences that arrange the particular 'scores' for the disabled bodies
of children in our society. The variations and themes that I will elucidate,
therefore, are not intended to obliterate the unique and essential melody on
which these orchestrations are developed (the phenomenological body) so that
the tune is no longer recognised, but are instead an exploration of all those
'soloists' involved with the orchestrations of disability. In my account I intend
understanding the composers as conductors, doctors, alternative therapists,
parents and families - the performers as children - and the performance as that
quintessential stage on which all the soloists compete for primacy of
expression in a world that has already been defined by the politics of the adult
(see Chapter 2). In this sense the body of the brain injured child carries the
tune, a tune that has been composed by personal phenomenology, and it is
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within this tune that the eventual embodiment and experience of the disabled
child is to be heard expressed.
The fact that others, both professionals and lay observers, have
implicitly constructed meaning from the somatic, and sometimes chaotic,
manifestations these children present seemed to require exploring in greater
detail. This, in turn, gave rise to the idea that somatic manipulations,
themselves a form of orchestration, might be practised by the individual as a
method of extending personal phenomenology. This led to the question of
whether it was possible that the injured child, too, could be manipulating his
or her body in diverse ways that enhanced their experience of the physical and
social world so as to develop greater self understanding and, from this, the
ability to construct their own personal realities (see Chapter 8). Before being
able to answer these more complex questions, however, I realised that I would
have to examine the social constructions which were imposed upon these
children by those who held differing responsibilities for their future. To this
end my sources for this investigation required a multi-disciplinary approach, as
literature from medical anthropology alone would not have allowed an
exploration of the injured child and his or her embodied possibilities to be
unfolded. In this way, although the ethnographic 'visions' in my thesis are
conducted by an anthropology of brain injury they are not limited to one. It
has been argued that
ethnography is an emergent interdisciplinary phenomena. Its authority and rhetoric have




The point Clifford makes about culture, then, has relevance also to those
children who are the subject of this work. They can no better be understood
by any one discipline, be it anthropology or neurology, than can society by
economics alone. Therefore, in this thesis explanations and understandings of
children with brain injury are sought from a variety of disciplines in the
attempt to make their experience and embodiment more explicit. Moreover,
the methodology of this thesis has been devised is an attempt to locate an
experiential disability through discursive ethnography. Familial 'texts' are,
therefore, used to structure the arguments and accounts that provide the
research narrative. However, it is unlikely that these 'texts' are solely the
product of those who express them, since the accounts contained here concern
those families who may be referred to as therapeutically articulate. That is,
they have 'first hand' experience of the rhetoric and practice of alternative
therapy, something with which I myself am more than familiar, and which,
methodologically, needs to be accounted for.
For example, a number of questions were raised with regard to the
reflexivity that naturally occurs within the relationships between
clinician\therapist and child. It appeared to me, from my work in the Kerland,
that the alternative therapists were more inclined to be affected by their
encounters with a particular child than orthodox clinicians. This would often
involve them modifying their therapy programmes to accommodate those
observations that resulted directly from their interactions with the children.
On the other hand, doctors appeared, particularly to the parents, less tolerant of
their child's unique capacities, preferring instead to be constrained by the
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inevitable assumption of diagnostics and pharmacological applications.
Moreover, my own position was also embroiled within this reflexive
paradigm. After all, I was a researcher employed by the Kerland to investigate
both the possibility of extending therapeutic procedures and to explore new
methods of understanding the children with whom we worked. That is, I was
already involved with many of the parents who were to help with this research
and I wondered how this familiarity could affect the interpretation of the data I
was to collect. Would this prior experience, for example, affect my objectivity
so as to confound my study or could it be used to more sharply discern the
experiences of disability that were a target of this research? Could I, and my
encounters with brain injured children, ever be productive in helping to make
more explicit the embodied reality of disability? If the assumptions of the
philosopher Peter Winch (1958) are correct, then my interpretations of
another's consciousness (embodied potential) inevitably arise from my own.
Tony Cohen (1994) has argued that this is a oversimplification of the problem
in anthropological account.
It is plainly unacceptable to assume that the anthropologist and the anthropologised
are alike; indeed, it could be perverse, for it might risk rendering anthropology redundant. But
equally, the assumption that they are not alike is unacceptable for it seems to lead inexorably
to the construction of their difference. It is also perverse, for it denies the pertinence of the
most potent investigative and interpretive weapons in the anthropologists armoury; his own
experience and consciousness (Cohen 1994: 4)
I, too, soon realised that it was my own experiences of an encountered
disability that made possible the connection between myself and my subject,
and it was the reflexivity of this encounter that would act to reform my
experience from the relatively naive to a more informed position. In this
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sense all the ideas presented here are the product of that inevitable
ethnographic process which contained both myself and those with whom I
worked.
Issues in Accessing Children's Experiences: Embodiment
Traditionally, general anthropological research involving what might
be referred to as 'issues of childhood' has reflected those agendas proposed by
adults, and has tended to relate to social change in urban culture (Turner 1987)
or the emphasis and value placed upon the socialisation of children (Grylls
1978). Furthermore, Mayall (1994) has noted that studies involving children
may often conceptualise them as if they were characters from some other or
'separate' world. However, there is a rapidly increasing corpus ofmore
sensitive literature concerning the child and the social processes in which
childhood is framed (James & Prout 1990, Jenks 1996.1982, Voysey 1975 and
Aries 1962). Studies reflecting death in childhood (Bluebond-Langner 1978)
and the effect of handicap on the family (Blacher 1984) for example, have
demonstrated that childhood and all its presentations are occupying an
increasing interest for the social scientist. There is, however, little material
that specifically looks at children with brain injury from an anthropological
perspective, and which considers these disabled children as a disempowered
community under the regulatory influences of professionals, be they orthodox
or alternative in their persuasion1. Moreover, such issues which reference the
body and its actions are likely to be coloured by the cultural variants at play in




their given situation. That is, anomalous patterns ofmotor behaviour produce,
to different degrees, different rationales to the understanding of the somatic
meanings that bodies convey. Indeed, this is particularly relevant for the
interpretation of brain injured children's bodies in both our own and other
societies. However, there is a substrate on which even these cultural dynamics
(see Chapter 7) must rely for their expression because at their most
fundamental level they require that corporeal enterprise, embodiment. Thomas
Csordas expresses this notion well when he states
The approach I will develop from the perspective of psychological anthropology leans strongly
in the direction ofphenomenology. This approach to embodiment begins from the
methodological postulate that the body is not an object to be studied in relation to culture, but
is to be considered as the subject of culture, or in other words the existential ground of culture.
(Csordas 1989: 32)
The problem I faced was how would I discern this existential cultural
bedrock so that an unfolding of a phenomenology of brain injury would be
realised? I had reasoned that although brain injury was the term for an
aetiological taxonomy, professionals, parents and lay observers scrutinised the
surface and behaviours of the body and showed surprisingly little interest in
precise neural detail. Indeed, even if a therapeutic procedure resulted from
some neurological theory its pragmatic focus nevertheless remained on the
body (i.e. doing this or that to the body, physically or pharmacologically,
should affect the associated neurological problem). Having being convinced
by an exhaustive analysis ofmy family material that embodiment held the key
to understanding the phenomenology of brain injury, something that had been
largely overlooked by the professionals, I sought a way to gain detailed
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awareness of the brain injured child's embodied reality. In my attempt to
address this I saw the family as the methodological key.
Not only do the families' biographies and narratives presented here
offer a rich source ofmaterial to help piece together the mesh of detail needed
to explore the social issues of brain injury at the personal, or
phenomenological, level but they also show, I was soon to realise, that
families' expertise would be needed if I was ever to experience, even in a
vague way, the world in which brain injured children live. Narratives, of
course, provide a broad context for discussing disability (see Monks and
Frankenberg 1995) whilst the creation of opportunities for autobiographical
accounts has been argued, in phenomenological theory, to be 'one of the
essential dimensions of the articulation of the streams of consciousness'
(Schutz and Luckman, 1974, cited in Kholi 1981). Indeed, it was through such
streams of consciousness that it became clear to me that brain injury was not
about the brain but about the body, not about physical dysfunction but social
embodiment, and finally, not about neurological theory but personal
experience. The problem now would be how might I begin to access the
relevant data that could provide an answer to these speculations?
A few of those children with whom I did my fieldwork could articulate
quite well but, due to their physical and/or mental incapacity, and the result of
this on their experiences, even their words and actions meant very little unless
I could access the 'dialect' in which these statements became meaningful.
Furthermore, with those children whose accounts were not available, due to
gross impairment, families might, I hoped, provide a context in which
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meanings could be attached to my observations. The 'dialect', then, which
engendered our discussion was not that which influenced the ways these
children's, and even their parent's, statements sounded, as one might expect to
find in some phonetic shift that occurs in a regional accent, but was, instead,
that total phenomenology which enveloped their lives and perhaps my own in
ways which could engage a common emotive union of interpersonal
expression.
Although inarticulateness and unresponsiveness present problems
these, in themselves, are not insurmountable (see Booth & Booth 1996 and
Booth 1996 for a good account of such difficulties in narrative research).
However, the total communicative inability ofmany of the children with
whom I worked proved somewhat more challenging. Families, as I suspected,
held the resources I needed to access the essential personal background that
would make translation between myself and these children's accounts possible.
Their narratives made possible a phenomenology of encounter, action,
purpose, environment and disability that was to underscore every aspect ofmy
research.
The families with whom I worked were eager to help, not perhaps
because their information would make explicit the problems of embodiment
and experience that were becoming central to this research, but rather because
my study gave them the opportunity to explore, through conversation, internal
ideas and statements that they had thought but had not, for a variety of reasons,
articulated. I also noted that sometimes the role of interviewer / interviewee
was reversed, I became the respondent and would be systematically questioned
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by the families about my ideas and particular statements that came to light
during the interview. Sometimes this would involve asking me how I felt
about the minor modifications that the parents had made to their child's
therapy programme and, occasionally, how did I see the future, in terms of
development, for their particular child. This usually served to make our
discussion a two way exchange of ideas, although at times I was aware that my
comments affected their statements and, unintentionally, provided them with a
structure for interpreting their material in ways which would have not been
solely their own. However, parents do have a unique insight into their child's
corporeal management and, potentially, their experience of embodiment due to
both the all consuming time they spend with their children and their
fundamental need to make sense of, and understand, the expressions of a child
orchestrated by physical and mental disability.
There are, of course, methodological problems to any study that
attempts to access personal embodiment through a 'third party' but I, myself,
have spent considerable time with brain injured children and could also draw
on the wealth of the encountered experience ofmy colleagues when it came to
analysing parental observations of their child's behaviour. Although I could
not assume that the words that formed the parental statements, which related to
their notions of the child, had implicitly the same meaning for the child or
myself, they nevertheless functioned to enrich my own observations and in




For example, I imagined that those brain injured children who were
aware of a particular circumstance or event would necessarily have an opinion
about it, even if it were an entirely egocentric one. This proved to be a
mistake. One mother told me that her son Timothy was about to start at
mainstream school. 'Is he looking forward to that'? I asked. His mother
simply replied, 'he is not looking forward to it neither is he dreading it, but
rather he just knows he's going'. Such statements show that it is not always
possible to fix explanations to 'either / or' options and that the alternatives
expressed are no less valid to research even if, as in the above comment, they
prove somewhat problematic for analysis. Thus, whether the accounts
presented here do highlight the experiences of the children involved or simply
represent parental rhetoric must be, in the final analysis, up to the reader to
decide. I hope, however, that the presented ethnography, if not convincing the
reader of the possibility that parents' statements actually can inform us about
the brain injured child's experiences, may demonstrate that something tangible
and pertinent to issues of disability can be learnt from such an investigation.
Ambiguities: The Developmentalist & Researcher
Ambiguities as to my role in the clinic acted added a further dimension
to the problematic nature ofmy family research. What I was getting from
these discourses was clear. I was collecting data by which to formulate my
ideas, but I soon realised this was, in fact, also what some of the families were
achieving. They too had formulated ideas about their child and were seeking
confirmation that, in terms of his or her future developmental capacity, their
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child was a suitable candidate for their prolonged commitment and
subscription to a particular variety of therapeutic ideas. Furthermore, being
employed by the Kerland Foundation, a therapeutic community to which they
were committed by the fact of being part of this research programme, I became
a 'testing ground' on which they could explore the rationale of particular
methods of treatment. This, I initially reasoned, required me to be specifically
careful in selecting which data was rhetorical, and intended to show support
for the therapeutics they saw me as representing, and which, on the other hand,
was heart felt or unbiased by a particular ideology. Although this is not
necessarily to imply that these are mutually exclusive, some parental accounts
did occasionally sound as if they had been lifted from a brochure for the
Kerland. I recall one mother telling me that the therapy makes sense because
it involves an 'increase in frequency, intensity and duration', sentiments which
appeared in much of the Kerland literature. The main reason for this was that
in the years preceding this research all of the families had seen me as a
member of the clinic's staff and not as a researcher. Although my role was not
that of a 'developmentalist'2 but rather was concerned with the Foundation's
research and development programme, my close working relationship with the
'developmentalists' in the clinic did not help to clarify my true role to the
families.
During my initial research contact, for example, the ambiguities ofmy
real 'role' were often so uncertain that parents would open our discussions with
comments relating purely to those of administering therapy. This was
2
A 'developmentalist' is the name given to the person who has been trained in the
particular therapeutics of the Kerland and who design therapy programmes for the children.
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intended, no doubt, for the 'developmentalisf who had designed their child's
therapy programme. At first I felt that this was not the information that I
required, as my concern was for the 'deeper meanings' that lay beneath the
surface therapeutics with which they were engaged. I did not need to know
whether they were having difficulty with their programme or, for that matter,
getting volunteers (patterners) to help or, indeed, having problems obtaining
their child's compliance to the routines of therapy. But as I later realised, all of
this was, in fact, important. But in my naivity, and researchers are, initially at
least, more naive than those under their investigation, I was after the 'true
meanings of disability', that reality of experience, that very phenomena which
made brain injury exactly that what it is, encountering a world in such a way as
to make our access mere speculation. I understood, from the years I had
worked with brain injured children, the rationale of therapeutics. However, I
did not know the personal embodied implications of brain injury, and how
these manifest in both the individual's and the collective consciousness that I
assumed were being affected. I was, after all, based in the clinic, a member of
staff and had but little previous opportunity to encounter the children in their
homes with their families. This was soon to be remedied by the extensive
travel and frequent homes visits over the following two years.
During and after my field visits I soon realised that my concern for the
'true meanings' was misguided as none of the material I was gathering and
which is presented here represented an ultimate truth in an objective sense.
Rather the personal descriptions of, and encounters with, disability - a
disability that exists in real terms for the family - are, nevertheless, also
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communicated as a collection of narratives and discourses. Through this,
disability becomes socially constructed into a somatic manifestation of unique
personhoods. Thus, the information given on those first interviews was as
relevant to my research as that collected in subsequent visits, but I needed
those latter visits in order to recognise this fact.
The meanings that would eventually arise from this research were
constructed from a plethora of arbitrary symbols concerning disability, and
therefore specifically used for their plasticity to be shaped and moulded by
personal experience. This brings me to another point with regard to narrative
research and its validity. It has been argued by Baron (1991), for example, that
those whose stories most need telling are not necessarily the most competent
to tell them. Of course, with such a diverse group of participating families,
representing difference in socio-economic class and educational attainment,
the level of narrative expression and literary imagery will vary considerably.
However, provided that the families' narratives can be anchored into a more
readable text a parental 'loss of word' need not make their accounts ineffective.
In this one important sense I was not only a researcher collecting and
interpreting data, but I was also an amanuensis writing down the traumatic,
angry and hopeful stories of a brain injured child's parent. These familial and
child related accounts provide an 'inner view of the person' (Birren and
Deutchman 1991) or, in this study, a closer view of the child and make the
scenarios of disability 'more tangible by grounding then in concrete lived
experience' (Booth 1996: 239)
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As my research focused on the tangible, the observable and its
accompanying narrative, my own embodiment was brought into sharp focus.
It had become a catalyst. I represented the Kerland Foundation and the
suspicion was, for a few families at least, that I was a spy, checking-up on
them and making sure that they were following the therapy programmes that
they had received from the clinic. As I became more aware ofmy role as an
embodied Kerland representative it became increasingly clear that the politics
which engendered my role were also going to influence the ways in which the
family and child were about to be presented to me in this research. On several
occasions I felt that a few of the mothers who were being interviewed had
prepared for my visit. Some ofmy general questions yielded such precise and
well thought out answers that they led me to suspect that certain notions had
been previously rehearsed.
At other times, however, the parent would take a moment or two then
reply 'I don't know, I will have to think about that'. The mother who made
this statement appeared a little uncertain about the interview and had
postponed my visit twice before she finally phoned the clinic to ask what
exactly did I want to know. When we eventually met she actually made the
comment that she had bet that she was the last family for me to visit, and I
confirmed this. This made me realise that I was not a neutral but interested
bystander to whom the families were going to articulate their personal
understanding and experiences of the trauma that accompanies brain injury.
Rather I was, after all, a member of the Kerland's staff, a person with an
agenda, and they would need to know that agenda before any real trust and
16
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co-operation could be developed. As the interviews progressed I attempted to
make it explicit that my concern was not to discover how well they were
achieving therapeutic targets3 but rather that I wanted to learn how they made
sense of their brain injured children's consciousness and the experiences of
embodiment that possibly acted to underscore it.
The embodiment of brain injured children had possibly a divergent
reality from those not mentally and physically impaired. This may well
function to make our understanding of the personal phenomenology with
which these children experience the world almost inaccessible. If I could
convince the families that I wanted only to account for their children as
children, not as a therapist discerning disability, but more as a parent
perceiving the subtler cues of some corporeal enactment, I reasoned that this
would allow me to reveal new insights into their personal phenomenology.
Disengaging the clinical associations that parents felt I represented, then,
would permit a new perspective on brain injury. This role would not only
allow a more holistic view of the child with disabilities to inform therapeutics,
but might also help challenge the negative professional rhetoric that had, for so
long, orchestrated disability. If families would entrust their accounts, their
fears, hopes and unique insights to me I may gain a deeper understanding of
what disability means. That is, I could establish a conceivable consciousness
for their injured child in the face of often contrary somatic 'evidence'. This is
the challenge of the present study.
3
My role as researcher visiting their homes had been, to a degree, compromised by the
fact that it had been traditional practice for developmentalists, particularly when training, to
make home calls to see how the family was coping with the therapy.
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Over the course of this research a new relationship therefore developed
between me, the families and some of the children4, and so did personal
confidences. The initial ambiguities ofmy role in the clinic dissipated, they
stopped viewing me as a developmentalist and started to see how someone in
my position (a researcher) could be utilised to convey their opinions and
sentiments to the Kerland and thereby give some form of personal expression
to their child's therapy5. Although, as already mentioned, this particular
research project was but one of several, since my other responsibilities
involved finding new ways to enhance therapeutic goals, particularly in vision
and cognition, I soon realised that insight into these and other problems was
not solely to be discovered in the literature and through experiments that were
so typical to my working routines. There was a mass of detail that had been
overlooked. In subscribing to the notion that only the professionals know
what they are doing, and that therefore any solutions that exist are to be found
solely in the archives, journals and academic papers, we had lost sight of the
intrinsic nature of our subject, the child. I felt that if credibility was given to
the families' statements concerning their children it may help disclose other
issues pertinent to brain injury that had, perhaps for political reason (see
Chapter 2), been largely neglected by the professionals. By looking at the
embodiment of these children in the family setting I might call into question
those speculations that regarded the brain injured child as a non-participater in
4
I say some of the children because the severity of impairment made it at times
impossible to ascertain whether the children knew that I was there let alone understand what I
was doing. However, the family and I always acted as if the child understood my presence by
introducing me, directing rhetorical comments at the child and at the end of the interview
saying goodbye.




the social world. Surely, simply qualifying these children with the term 'brain
injured' did not make their comments or expressions of an experienced
embodiment any less valid.
Participating Families: The Nature of the Sample
My fieldwork was carried out between October 1991 and March 1993.
At this time the Kerland Foundation had some 189 families on programme
(receiving an alternative therapy based loosely on the Doman-Delacato method
involving neurological organisation). The initial stage involved sending out
some 40 preliminary statements asking if the family would be interested in
participating in a research project that would attempt to explore a possible
anthropology ofbrain injured children. The 40 families contacted were from
all over the country and were selected to represent the range of age, sex, level
of disability and economic class typical of that larger group of families who
attended the clinic. Some 36 families responded, 23 of them favourably6. The
interviews took place at the families' homes. The initial visits involved
unstructured interviews where discussion on a variety of topics took place,
usually initiated by the parents. These were taped for subsequent analysis.
The first stage involved, on average, three visits to each household where the
family would talk about their concerns, occasionally prompted by some ofmy
own, relating to general statements about professionals, their child's problems
and their understanding of these problems. Before commencement of the





analysed for common themes or variations that seemed specific to their
particular experiences of having a disabled child. This material tended to
reflect general dissatisfaction with professionals, their ability to cope,
understanding their child, alternatives in therapy and education, the effects of
time and concern for the future.
The second phase consisted of interviews that were to be more
structured, with reference to exploring, in greater detail, those articulated
concerns that seemed common to most families taking part in this research.
This required, on average, another two visits to the homes of each ofmy
participating families. Although each family is unique in terms of their child's
specific problems there is, nevertheless, a great commonality of experience.
This is primarily expressed in their hope that something positive might be
done for their child and their seemingly universal dissatisfaction with orthodox
medicine. It was, in fact, this latter loss of faith in conventional medical
practice that had brought them to the Kerland in the first place. Margaret
Voysey (1975), in her classic study of families coping with a disabled child,
had also noted this apparent professional neglect of families when she states
that:
Actually, I rather think that I doubted whether people concerned with the parents, notably
doctors, were 'reasonable men' - they were either misguided or wilfully putting their own
interests first (Voysey 1975: 61)
It is probably true that the families who responded favourably to my
request for volunteers to assist with my research were those most willing to
discuss their problems with doctors. Almost without exception, the families
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whose material is both presented and represented here initiated our interviews
with their own critical accounts and experiences of orthodox medical practice.
Over time, however, I realised that they did not just want to express the
injustice they felt had been delivered to them during their consultations with
doctors, but that they also needed to understand it. Indeed, that is the defining
common feature of all those families who had assisted this research. Through
exploring the issues that surrounded their trauma they had the opportunity to
'air' those particular uncertainties which would now challenge their lives and
future. In this sense the families that would be my sample were also
researchers, they were trying new therapies, developing propositions and
voicing their results.
Selecting Family Material
Once sensitised to the issues and concerns that my research families
identified I found that many others, who attended the centre but were not
directly part of this study, were only too willing to express their views. In this
sense the material presented in this thesis is inspired by those 23 families that
assisted me but is not, by any means, restricted to those families. As already
mentioned, there was a great deal of common ground expressed by the families
and much replication as to the parents' views concerning the central themes of
this study - professional attitudes, coping, future concerns, and their child's
chances of some level of amelioration. In order to clarify the impressions and
agendas of all of those families with whom I worked I decided that the visions
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presented here would be clarified by focusing on a smaller sample of 11
families.
This is not to confirm that these families were more articulate than the
others, or had sharper insight into the issues explored, but they certainly did
have a gift for expressing the collective concerns that my research began to
reveal. I also felt that adopting a more restrictive, in terms of number only,
ethnographic account would make clearer methodological sense. In reading
through my field notes obtained from all 23 families even I, who had known
and worked with them, found it difficult to retain which particular family had
said what. The data obtained from all of those families with whom I worked
demonstrated that families' concerns were certainly being expressed, but with
so many differing accounts on the common perspectives identified there was
little continuity to help the reader trace a single parent's view through the
engaged issues. I therefore decided to present the accounts of the 11 families
who best encapsulated the familial themes here portrayed, and which are as
typical as possible of all those accounts of parents who attended the Kerland
Clinic. But our discussions were often informed, to varying degrees, by the
comments of other the families with whom I had worked.
The ethnographic accounts presented here act to situate my thesis of
embodied brain injured children in the biomedical and political world in which
they are corporeally retained. Given the physical limitations of these children,
and the exhaustive routines of parents coping with these limitations, their




Presentation of Family Material
The families' accounts are to be found in the discourses that weave
through this study. Of course the language is my own, but this is not entirely
true of the ideas. When starting this research I envisaged its presentation to be
like that encountered in the case studies of the final chapter. However,
working with the families forced me to reconsider this approach. In working
with families I was not just collecting facts or accounts of personal
phenomenology, I was being invited to participate in the discovery ofmeaning.
This, I eventually learnt, was my common ground with the families. One
cannot just collect material, unbiased and unmoved by the situations you
observe, as one's presence there makes you a participant. Participant
observation is a key feature in much anthropological research, but what I
became aware of is how large a part of this process depends not on
observations but on participation, and participate I did. I was being invited by
the parents to look for meaning in the trauma which had engulfed their lives.
In this way we sought understanding together, not just of what it must be like
to experience brain injury, but more basically to be a child with brain injury. It
was, then, this need to locate children first, and only after this brain injury, that
gradually transformed the intended structure of this work.
As I hope to demonstrate in the following chapters, irrespective of
personal meanings and views there is a childhood world view to be accounted
for. In Western societies childhood is a bio-political reality as much as it is a
familial one. In accounting for their injured children and their medical
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treatment parents had attempted to understand their problems without
reference to these agendas (and sometimes hidden ones at that) in the
professional procedures that attempted to manage them. During fieldwork I
found a function for my participation, I could consider the families' accounts in
terms of the control that is exercised over their lives when their child presents
a problem that is considered to be within medical jurisprudence. In this way
my thesis explores control, the body and, most importantly, our understanding
of these and its affect on the personal embodiment ofbrain injured children.
To understand these dynamics my argument must firstly locate
children, their childhood and the politics, inspired from adulthood, which
contains them. The second issue is to attempt to understand the singular
prestige with which medicine controls the body in both illness and health.
Thirdly, only when we have accounted for the dynamics of childhood and
control can we be sure that the family ethnography given here connects with
the reality of experience that orchestrates the lives of the families and children
with brain injury.
In order to protect the confidences of the families I have given a
fictitious name to each child. The child's name will precede each family quote
so that the reader may be better placed to track and cross reference each
particular family though the thesis's argument Occasionally, when it is felt
necessary to contextualise the quote, I will include a brief description of the
child's condition and the situation surrounding the family so as to make their
accounts more relevant to the argument7. In this way I hope to show that the
7
See Appendix 1 for a breakdown of the diagnoses given to the children with whom
this research was conducted.
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personal statements and expressions given here inform and enrich our
understanding of that experiential reality which brain injured children possess
but have few means to articulate. It is probably true that much of the familial
ethnography voiced within these pages occupies a subjective position, but that
is necessary if I am to explore the phenomenology of 'The Orchestrated Body'
Objectivity and Subjectivity
This leads to an important point: the view that research in the social
sciences, like those in the other sciences, is objective, merely describing the
world as it is without imposing personal values, cannot be sustained. Research
is not value-free (Smith 1981, Bell & Roberts 1884) and neither can the
account presented here be completely neutral (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983:
9-23). However, I hope my ethics in the collection, interpretation and
presentation of the data here have been guided by my concern for the families
and the children who have helped me realise that disability is as much a
concept for control and embodiment as it is an expression of limited physical
and mental action.
As mentioned above, it is not entirely relevant to refer to the material
provided here as being essentially the 'truth', but it is necessary to establish that
the data is valid for the analyses I attempt to make. With this in mind I will
briefly consider the problems of validity in biographical and narrative research
as it relates to my fieldwork.
Autobiographical narratives rely upon what has been suggested to be
their 'reconstructive character' (Kohli 1981). Evaluation is thus dependent
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upon narratives being presented in their temporal order, but they are also
required to relate to the present so as to make clear their intentions to the
participants and situations in which they occur. In this way narratives are
reconstructed to convey relative meaning. We are inclined, when involved in
this process, to believe that the accounts presented are sincere and valid, after
all 'nobody knows his own history better then he himself (Kohli 1981: 69).
However, conscious distortions may act to reduce the validity of these
accounts. Therefore, the process of subjectivity may compromise the sincerity
and accuracy of the statements, making narrative research somewhat
problematic.
However, in the research presented here the problems of subjectivity
are largely dissipated as it is the family's subjectivity in relation to their
encounters with, and narratives of, their brain injured children that may
provide the most suitable insight into the child who cannot otherwise facilitate
communication. It is, of course, possible that the child's phenomenology is
exchanged for that of the parents, but as a participant in the biographical
enterprise I am at least allowed the opportunity to question, speculate and, in a
passive way, contribute to the explorations of a given narrative context. It is
through such discourses with a variety of families, and with my observations
of their children, that a picture of the personal trauma of childhood
disablement has been made not only possible but perhaps also valid.
Finally, when dealing with such topics that involve personal disability
and its affect on other close family members one must be aware that certain
sensitive statements are offered to provide the researcher with a better
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understanding of the events being narrated. Therefore, some accounts of a
highly personal or confidential nature are not intended for publication, but are
the way in which the respondent develops or extends an empathy with the
interviewer in order to facilitate a clearer understanding of particular events,
and the concerns to which they relate. It was by providing such discursive
opportunities for families to explore their relationships, both intellectually and
emotionally, with their brain injured children that the general research
questions gradually emerged.
Brannen (1988) has suggested that this two-way process provides a
theoretical and methodological strategy that has implications for the 'meaning
and conceptualisation of the research questions' (1988: 523) as well as acting
as a technique for data collection. It also highlights the patterns of disclosure
of information, insomuch that the great amount of confidentiality I was
exposed to seemed to affirm my trust. Once this was established families
tended to make me a confidant to ideas and notions that were generally privy
to only a very close few. The material presented in this work does not,
however, include those most intimate statements given in confidence, but they
have helped me colour my analyses so that their experiences are better
expressed.
Structuring the Orchestrated Body
Although sociology has been anxious to identify structural social
processes and minimise the role of the individual in life histories (Thompson
1981), the account presented in this study will champion the embodied
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experience of brain injured children and their families so as to make explicit
the role of the body in both therapeutics and social theory. This is not to
suggest that the body is 'fixed' to any particular theoretical argument, but rather
that it has the capacity to change its role to meet the demands of both
biological and sociological input over the individual's life span. In Shilling's
(1993) terms the body is indeed best 'conceptualised as an unfinished
biological and social phenomenon which is transformed, within certain limits,
as a result of its entry into, and participation in, society' (1993: 12). In fact, it
is this belief in the transmutable nature of the body that encourages families to
seek therapeutic options, so as to assure that future scenarios will not be
determined by present disabilities.
My intention in Chapter 2, 'Orchestrating Childhood'; is to demonstrate
that bodies, and especially brain injured bodies, not only express in a culturally
specific way the perceived nature of the person but are also the fundamental
units in enabling this perception. I will attempt to show how bodies are
manipulated in both social and clinical space by the professional language and
procedures invested in both medicine and education. After exploring these
issues, Chapter 3 will consider brain injury as a problem of embodiment,
aligning the actions and behaviours of the physical body to an expressionism
that may permit an insight into the personal experiences of disability itself.
Chapter 4, 'Scoring Professional Parts', will review the complex and often
ambiguous feelings that result from family consultations with the medical
orthodoxy, and locate the role of alternative practitioners and their orthodox
counterparts with the family in a network of interdependencies. The ways in
28
Chapter 1
which brain injury is dealt with occupies Chapter 5, 'The Irreverent Method',
wherein the considerations of a particular therapy are outlined, as are the many
motivations that structure therapeutics and their implication for both the brain
injured child and his or her family. The reality of brain injury is then
encountered through an analysis of the 'Coping Strategies', Chapter 6, that
permeate the living rituals of the individuals involved. That these coping
strategies are not passive, but are often active devices that may help to change
perceptions and alter goals, ties them in to a deep substructure out of which the
experiences of disability may be illuminated.
Chapter 7 reviews the perceptions that are induced from bodies that,
for a variety of reasons (possession or injury), appear different, and the
significant ways in which an 'audience' observing these phenomena might well
affect its presentation and subsequent meaning. Throughout this chapter, and
the final one, I return once again to the body, only here the issues not only
relate to the socially constructed aestheticism of children, but also identify the
anomalies of physical character, due to injury, that impinge upon the appeal
that children are typically regarded as possessing. Here I explore children's
own construction of reality. I argue that notions derived from clinical science,
familial relationships and the larger community make appeals for their validity
to different criteria which reflect personal competencies that are largely
incommensurate with one another. The results of these competing theories
and rationales leave children themselves little room for developing, let alone




Finally Chapter 8, 'The Orchestrated Body', concludes by postulating
that an understanding of the brain injured child's body not only acts as a
valuable semiotic schema helping us to relate to disability, but demonstrates
also that both the social and individual phenomena that orchestrate the body
permit an acknowledgement of the part we may personally play in structuring
disability. The experience of brain injury may well be a personal and isolating
trauma, but its amelioration involves us all because the issue is not so much an
abstract notion of neurological impairment as one of social construction. The
part we play critically affects the child's performance and may even dictate the
tempo of possible habilitation programmes.
Notes on the 'Patterning' Method.
Before concluding this chapter I would like to briefly describe the
method of therapy that the Kerland was practising when I was employed as
research officer. The Kerland Foundation's 'patterning' method was devised
from those procedures advanced primarily by Doman-Delacato (1960, 1961,
1964), Doman, Spitz, Zucman, Delacato and Doman (1960) and Doman, Le
Winn and Wilkinson (1977). I intend only to outline the theory and method of
this therapy so that the reader will have a better understanding of the basic
therapeutic accounts that I present. Before beginning, however, I should also
point out that although those techniques practised by the Kerland had their
genesis in the Doman-Delacato method, they had, nevertheless, evolved
independently over the years, so that some practices are more uniquely those
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of the Kerland. Although this method has attracted a great deal of criticism
(see appendage 2 and Chapter 4) the emphases of such critiques relate to its
supposed scientific validity. For brevity, however, the present account will
simply outline the method and theory of this therapeutic regimen.
At its most basic level the therapy entails passive manipulations of the
brain injured child's body so that sensory-motor input, believed vital for
neurological organisation, is accommodated by the brain. In this way the child
is taught patterns ofmovement that follow the developmental stages that the
child would have naturally experienced if not for the brain injury. However,
before the child's body can be patterned to establish such movements the
effects of hypertonic and hypotonic muscle conditions must be challenged.
This is achieved by a series of exercises designed to release the contractures of
stiffmuscles and improve the tension in floppy ones. Such exercises act as a
'warm up' before the 'input' and 'output' techniques are practised.
Input is regarded by the practitioners of this technique as those
manipulations of the body that, via proprioceptive information, provide the
brain with the co-ordinated movements that facilitate purposeful motility. In
this way the child experiences his or her limbs being extended in space in a
manner that provides experience of specific functional motor behaviour. For
example, the 'cross-pattern' involves placing the child either supine or prone
on a table with the parents or helpers (patterners) standing either side and at
the child's head. The procedure involves turning the head to face the
extending right arm while pushing the left leg to a knee bend position, while at
the same time the left arm is placed down the child's body and the right leg is
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kept straight. The second movement requires the same procedure to be
administered in the opposite direction. This alternating patterning is repeated
for perhaps three minutes. The procedure attempts to mimic the movements of
a crawling action. Indeed, the 'output' form of this exercise would involve
providing the child with the opportunity to practice these movements on the
floor with a procedure called the 'assisted crawl'. In this technique the child is
placed prone on the floor and encouraged to move his or her limbs in the
fashion shown in the cross-pattern above. Helpers assist the child by
extending one arm and/or placing the leg in its correct position for the required
movement. It is intended that through an extensive range of such input and
output techniques the child's body develops the motor skills necessary for
independent mobility.
Other practices concern sensory and cognitive development. For
example, vision, language and hearing are often disrupted in children with
brain injuries. These problems, as are those ofmotor function, are addressed
by a similar method of treatment that increases the intensity, duration and
frequency of a particular stimuli in the attempt to breach the child's incapacity.
Thus a 'Black Room' is utilised to promote visual development, wherein the
darkness masks all other visual detail save that of a simple high definition
object. Luminescent patterns presented in ultraviolet light are also employed
so that familiar items and objects are contrasted against a masked background.
In this way it is believed that the child can be encouraged to develop a visual
capacity and learn to see the world in which she or he lives. The child is also
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assisted to use tactile information to help explore 3D visual objects and in this
way hand eye co-ordination may be aided.
As with all the techniques, their rationale depends upon increasing
stimuli intensity, frequency and duration so that the child with sensory-motor
impairments is given an extended opportunity to attend to a variety of
movements, sounds, patterns and experiences. In this structured way the child
is helped to develop the capacities of sensory-motor integration. The
techniques are quite demanding on the family so helpers, i.e. volunteers who
come into the home to assist with the therapy programmes (patterners), play an
important role in administering therapy and enriching the child's social contact
with others.
These procedures have attracted a great deal of criticism, some of
which will be discussed in later chapters. However, it is important to state that
many families who have committed to the programme have believed that it has
directly improved their child's condition. It is in this light that the present
study reviews families' encounters with therapy. However, this thesis does not
intend to validate or reject the techniques of therapy. Rather it explores the
phenomenology that results from a procedural approach that engages the
child's body, and the ramifications of such an engagement for an enterprise
which attempts to address issues of embodiment and experience in brain
injured children.
Finally, one remaining point concerning the therapy presented here
involves the undirected or unintentional processes that are likely to arise from
a families' commitment to therapy. These tend to accompany therapy, but are
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primarily involved with the social more than the therapeutic situation. For
example, the process of therapy may yield advantages in terms of coping with
the demands of a brain injured child. Having goals that are believed attainable
gives purpose to action and can help to structure the daily routines of care
giving. Patterners or helpers often develop strong bonds with both families
and their children, and can provide both moral support and attentive listeners.
In such ways therapy can enrich the social sphere and, as such, may play a
valuable role in helping to lessen some of the trauma that is encountered when
a family realise their child is brain injured. Irrespective of therapeutic
efficacy, the fact that families commit to the disciplines of a particular therapy
needs to be understood as a social process, rooted in both trauma management
and habilitation, and not merely concerned with providing scientific validity.
In this light it is unlikely that speculations concerning parental naivity or
'magical thinking' (Cummins 1988, see appendage 2) will be helpful in




Let us consider it (objective thought) then at work in the constitution of
our body as object, since this is a crucial moment in the genesis of the
objective world. It will be seen that one's body invades, even within science
itself, the treatment to which it is intended to subject it. And since the
genesis of the objective body is only a moment in the constitution of the
object, the body, by withdrawing from the objective world, will carry with it
the intentional threads linking it to its surroundings and finally reveal to us
the perceiving subject as the perceived world (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 72).
Introduction
In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological discourse the body is not only
regarded as a means of expressing the world in which we live, it is also our
way of experiencing it. Although seeming distant from a study that concerns
itself with the anthropology of brain injured children and their embodied'
experience of disablement, Merleau-Ponty's observations illuminate a
remarkable insight. They highlight the importance of the body, not only as a
baseline for a semiological system, a popular anthropological construction and
one which has inspired scholars such as Mary Douglas (1966), Mauss (1937)
and Hertz (1909) but rather as a living, tangible entity with the power to
perceive as well as being the very object ofperception. Indeed, it is this notion
of the body as an object in the world, as well as it being our way of conceiving
the world, that concerns us here.
The crucial point, then, that I wish to develop in this thesis is that the
body of the brain injured child plays both a passive and an active role in the
construction of the individual child. It is passive in the sense that because
almost every aspect of the disabled child's body and behaviour is medically
structured in a language of dysfunction and pathology (Armstrong 1983), such
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terms bring with them overtones of negativity. That this might help to
legitimise the subsequent medical procedures as some form of 'positive'
intervention strategy is likely not to be a coincidence. However, I shall argue
that the use ofprofessional language might even act to restrict individual
expression since it often dictates a course of medical supervision that
manages the symptomology of brain injury without affecting the underlying
condition. That is, it treats the symptoms without reference to the patient's
underlying needs, concerns and problems. Unfortunately, in adopting such a
posture the child's agency with respect to his or her own behaviour is
inevitably terminated. It is replaced by professional control which manages
trauma as a purely clinical expression and disrupts the child's 'normalising'
routines within a nurturing environment of familial care. This can be
regarded, as indeed disabled writers on disability have already argued, to be a
form of 'social oppression' (see Oliver 1996).
Whilst undertaking research for the Kerland Foundation11 had the
opportunity to discuss with many parents, often at length, the issues with
which they were most concerned. Inevitably, after only a short time parents
would talk about doctors, their relationship with them and the treatment of
their child's condition. Most comments centred on their belief that medical
professionals often failed to understand that they and their children had needs
other than those singularly prescribed for by medical practice which,
historically, had disciplined and regulated the body through the bio-politics of
control (Foucault 1973, Turner 1992). Furthermore, they would often feel
1 The Kerland Foundation operate a child development centre that designs home based
therapies for brain injured children based on the Doman-Delacato method.
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dehumanised by the experiences that had resulted from their encounters with
medicine. For example, Sarah is a 5 year old cerebral palsied girl who
suffered a brain injury during birth. Mum had experienced poor health
throughout pregnancy when Sarah was born weighing 81bs loz after a 10 hour
labour with a comfortable forceps delivery. Her parents' main concern relates
to developing effective communication. Sarah's father's comment can be seen
to illustrate an uneasy parental tension with medical professionals.
(Sarah)
One ofthe things which were a consequence ofall the drugs they gave her
was, ofcourse, a muscle relaxant so she couldn't breathe as well and she was
lying on her back so the fluids built up in her lungs Plus theyput her on
steroids so she was so fat not only were her muscles relaxed with the drugs but
she couldn't move them anyway because she was so damnfat.
It was statements such as this that first kindled my interest in the
medical management of brain injured children. In order to understand why
this child's body should be treated in such a fashion, I felt that I needed to
understand more about the ways in which medicine dealt with the body and
how these models ofpractice had come to involve, to differing degrees, an
orchestration of the body for the brain injured children with whom I worked.
As I explored the copious notes generated from my family fieldwork
interviews I realised that, for all the medical skills of the clinicians, they too
were compelled to operate within the larger societal framework of social
policy, politics and economics that had already created a social construction of
the body (Foucault 1973, 1979, Armstrong 1983 and Turner 1992).
Reconsider, then, the father's statement above concerning his child's treatment.
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Does this represent 'sound' medical thinking or does it serve some other
interest? And if so, might this other interest involve control, not only over the
physical body but of the human expression that embodiment permits? Another
question one might wish to ask is one that challenges the very wisdom on
which medicine is based - do such clinical practices (e.g., drug regimens)
really reflect a thorough understanding of the child's condition? Some
families, of course, know that doctors can't offer very much. Karen is 8 years
old and suffers from a genetic disorder, her mother is a health visitor who has
had both personal and professional experience of a parent's plight.
(Karen)
I know they can't do anythingfor my child, I know that but I think some
people who don't know about doctors and nurses quite the same think that they
are going to get a cure, or this doctor is magic and he can do something.
Perhaps they go into hospital and their anxieties become less because they are
dealing with people who think they know better. Well I'm sorry I know they
don't because I've worked and trained with them, so I know they are just
human, like me.
It was problems like this that prompted David Armstrong to doubt the
assumptions of clinical practice when he was a medical student. How, he
asks, 'had the body become so evident in the first place' (1983: xi). After all,
the pre-enlightenment generations that practised medicine before the late
eighteenth century had failed to understand the most rudimentary procedures
that now operate in modern medicine Was it not possible that modern
medicine did much more than simply describe the body? Had it, as Armstrong
suggests, begun to construct it 'as an invariate biological reality' (1983: xi)?
For Armstrong, medicine developed a reality for the body as a physical and
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biological entity and, in doing so, it constructed embodiment, the very
experiences and potentials of an individual, as a clinical expression of their
medically controlled organic material, the body. Stimulated by his own
observations, Armstrong sought an explanation in the writings ofMichel
Foucault who argued that 'the concept of the body which emerged at the end of
the eighteenth century - discrete, objective, passive, analysable - was the effect
as well as the object ofmedical enquiry' (1983: xi).
The body now emerged from the discourse of a new language, a
language constructed by what Foucault refers to as a 'political anatomy'
(Armstrong 1983: 2 ). This new anatomy of the body selected certain aspects
or structures from that amorphous mass of the body which could allow
physicians, with their new clinical skill, to confer a power over the body and,
with it, control.
However, my concern with the body is not with the somatic detail at
both the cellular and functional level, nor indeed with that undifferentiated
space between bodies that was quickly forging the political sphere of a new
anatomy - the social relationship between bodies (Armstrong 1983, Foucault
1973). Although both perspectives inform an objective analysis of the body
my interest here is mainly concerned with the experience of embodiment as
both a discursive paradigm (Csordas 1989 and James, forthcoming) and as a
lived phenomenological entity in its own right. Bodies are not just objects
manipulated, controlled and understood by the objective analysis of a given
society or people within it; they are themselves lived expressions of their own
actively interpreting consciousness. The body is an object in the material
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sense, but it is more than this; it is the subject of the individual's intentionality,
an intentionality which permits the individual to be a proactive agent in a
social, political and physical world of potentialities and communities.
Anthony Cohen (1994) has shown how the physical transformations,
sometimes even mutilations, which occur in the rituals that confer gender and
other changes in status on children affect their consciousness. The interest for
Cohen is whether or not such rituals impress on the bodies and minds of
children a conformity to replicate society, acting and being like others, or does
it provide its initiates with a relevant 'text' to enhance personal experience
(1994: 58)? Either way it does suggest that practices which specifically target
children, be they ritual initiations conferring a new status or medical
procedures that manage symptoms, are likely to be reflected in the child's
consciousness. The question for this thesis is, what are the implications of
such procedures on the brain injured child? Can these treatment protocols,
which administer the drugs or physiotherapy of bio-medicine, confer social
and motoric norms to the injured child or might they further displace his or her
experience of those typical encounters that initiate children into their
childhood? These considerations, as I hope to demonstrate, are rarely explored
when referring to the brain injured child. Sarah's father recalls his concern
about medical provision when his developmentally delayed daughter was just
a few months old.
(Sarah)
You sat (in hospital waiting rooms) not knowing what's happening and
you don't know ifshe is going to be dead in three months, and that halfher
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life time. So we just gave up on the NHS and the beliefthat they were doing
any good.
What this thesis explores, then, is how the child impaired by brain
injury might be more completely understood ifwe interpret the manifest
orchestrations of the body (therapy, the consequences of non therapeutic
approaches and the child's own orchestrative attempts) as being both the
experiences of personal embodiment and the result of a social construction that
encompasses brain injured children and their bodies. An initial problem is
deciphering these bodily orchestrations into their primary interpretative
classes. Do, for example, the hypertonic (abnormally tensed muscle)
contractions and extensions of a child's limbs only confirm a medical
diagnosis of cerebral palsy as the bio-medical model would suggest? Or,
might such a motor pattern sometimes be used by the same child to express
some personal intention, statement or frustration? In the contemporary
semantics ofmedicine, can the disabled child's very behaviour ever be
considered to reflect a conscious attempt at self expressionism, as might be
considered in some traditional societies2 or are they just the manifestations of
pathology?
David Armstrong (1983) is cautious of the solely 'clinical gaze'
(Foucault 1973) that medicine uses in both observing and constructing the
body and its pathology. That medicine has agendas, political and social, which
affect its scrutiny of the body, only suggests that children disabled by brain
injury may have little means left to them by which to express themselves
2 For example, shamanism, trance and possession are often typified by overt changes to
the body's usual character and expression.
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without these orchestrations ofbody being possibly misrepresented as the sole
features of clinical pathology. Such effective orchestrations of the body will
be considered later in more detail (see chapter 7). Here I shall first examine
the role ofmedicine in constructing the body as object and the influence such a
clinical gaze has upon our own perceptions of the body, especially that body
which has come to typify the brain injured child.
Medical Power and the Body
Medicine has a selective eye when considering the body, though with
the influence of sociology and anthropology, and their observations on clinical
practice and treatment, it may be beginning to apply a less reductionist model
to its investigations3. The anatomical atlas, which focused exclusively on
cellular mechanisms as the only causal factors of illness, is becoming
complemented by environmental considerations of the modern lifestyle. With
such notions a change in emphasis is evolving which considers a much wider
set of causal factors than those which were to be found illuminated in the
anatomical atlases of enlightened medicine and in which the aetiologies of
tissue disease were located. If, as Turner (1987) points out, changes in the
nature of disease are to some extent a reflection of an alliance between
medicine and sociology, it seems appropriate that social factors, economics,
demography and lifestyle have affected the causal assumptions that underlie
disease. Indeed, Brian Turner has been moved to suggest that 'to some extent
3 See Oliver (1996) for a critical account of a sociology of disability.
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stress has replaced the germ as a major explanation of modern illness' (1987:
8).
In considering stress as a possible component in disease development
(a notion that will be further developed in Chapter 5), the social setting in
which bodies are located becomes subject to medical scrutiny and, in doing so,
the social interstices that demarcate embodiment become reconstructed as
legitimate clinical space. As a result of this widening of the field ofmedical
enquiry, not only are the operations of the body medically located but the very
social fabric in which embodiment is experienced and expressed is also
brought into sharp clinical focus.
There are obvious benefits from such a procedure. Medicine is now
forced to adopt a more holistic view of the individual, but there are
concessions to be accounted for with such an expansionist mode of clinical
operations. It may be true that what Mangen (1982) sees as a new sociological
perspective, encouraging 'medical professionals' to consider the person and not
the patient as the focus of an enquiry into illness, is a procedural improvement
. However, this also legitimises the application of clinical metaphors to social
behaviour. For example, while medicine conceptualises the body as a
biochemical machine, wherein illness is causally linked to dysfunction, within
this mechanism (the body) social problems too can now be articulated within a
medical rhetoric, established and validated by scientific empiricism. This
authoritative contemporary voice ofmedicine thus not only claims the body as
its specific area of interest, but is also beginning to claim the social space in
which people live. As I shall show this can be seen, clearly, in the influences
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exerted on the brain injured child and his or her family to conform to their
appropriate 'illness' roles (Parsons 1951). As one mother mentioned when she
told the doctor that she had considered alternative therapy for her five year old
daughter.
(Jayne)
Imean Jayne's paediatrician, I nearly 'bopped' her last year she was
so arrogant. 'Oh no, that sort ofthing (alternative therapy) doesn't workfor a
child like Jayne'. And I say why? 'Because she has got globalproblems and it
tends to workfor specific things but it won't workfor Jayne'.
How had such a finality concerning alternative practice been achieved
by the medical profession? In order to address this I shall now attempt to
locate the disparity between orthodoxy and alternative regimes by briefly
reviewing the historical lineages of both traditions.
In the Westminster Review of 1852 the literary critic Samuel Brown
had noted the increase in 'physiological reformers' who accounted for health
care in terms of'physical puritanism' (Smith 1987: 174)
nobody can deny that this is pre-eminently the age of the physiological reformers. A new sort
ofpuritanism has arisen in our times, and its influence is as extensive as its origin is various.
and in all not inexpressive of certain of the wants and aspirations of society. It is the
puritanism of the body; but the common purpose of all its manifestations is the healing,
cleansing, and restoration of the animal man (cited in Smith 1987: 174)
Virginia Smith has shown that much of the historical understanding
concerning health was established through a 'popular physiology between 1650
and 1840, in relation to certain 'core' beliefs connected with the philosophy of
hygiene' (Smith 1987: 174). This popular physiology was also extended by
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vegetarianism, hydropothy, mesmerism and phrenology, to name but a few of
the trends of the day4, the important point being that much of these new and
all encompassing disciplines were invested in both folk healers and the
professionals who held clinical skills. During the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries professional practitioners encompassed a diverse group of
individuals with barber-surgeons, apothecaries, educated householders and
commercial 'quacks' offering traditional remedies and moral self-help therapies
that could not be ignored by the other professionals (doctors) (Smith 1987:
181) This, Smith tells us, divided the medical profession not only on
therapeutic, but also on pious grounds.
By the 1840s significant changes in the medical world, which also took
account of the nation's social and political reform, had propelled medicine into
a constitutionally much 'tighter' group. As Sharma (1992) has argued:
The orthodox medical profession was a very powerful group in the nineteenth century, an
alliance ofphysicians, surgeons and apothecaries. This alliance was not without its internal
tensions, but the consolidation ofmedical education and the state recognition of orthodox
medicine through the 1858 Medical Registration Act promoted the amalgamated power of
qualified practitioners of this kind ofmedicine,... (Sharma 1992: 116).
Indeed, by this time many authors of popular books on general health
'were careful to indicate that they were qualified professionals' (Smith 1987:
182). Public hygiene had now become a major political issue but its
amelioration, in the practical sense, caused great debate. The problem, then,
was not one of simply educating the public and the politicians but one of
4
Many of these trends have become incorporated into modern mainstream medical
practice with the appropriate 'clinical' (legitimising) modifications. '... mesmerism - which was
once a desperate heresy - later became acceptable to medicine on a more empirical basis and
under the guise of hypnotism' (Brown 1987: 228)
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standards in training and hygiene. At this time a great deal of confidence had
been lost in the medical profession, so much so that Sir Anthony Carlisle,
president of the Royal College of Surgeons, commented on the deleterious
effect of the 'heroic' drugging practices of an inexperienced younger generation
ofpractitioners of the profession (Smith 1987: 190). However, even with a
'tightening up' ofprofessional standards there still remained then, and even
today, (Sharma 1992) an alternative position on therapeutics.
Why, then, are the alternativists still advocating different procedures to
those offered by the orthodoxy? A possible explanation has perhaps less to do
with clinical wisdom and technological advancement than it has with common
belief. That this belief concerns the empirical accounts of parents more than
the clinical observations ofmedicine is a line of enquiry that will be explored
later (see chapter 5). However, as Smith (1987) convincingly argues
Ifwe accept that the terms 'fringe' (alternative) and 'orthodoxy' (like 'regular' and 'irregular')
are primarily related to a defensive professional strategy that is intended to deny the common
ownership ofmedical knowledge, there remains a question yet to be resolved. Just how
successful was this defence after the medical state had been publicly reinstated? (Smith 1987:
191)
As I intend to show, it appears that orthodox medicine has had but a
little, if any, deleterious effect on alternative practices (see Sharma 1992).
What it has done, then, is to exert its primacy over mainstream conditions,
such as those which are successfully remedied by surgery and drugs.
However, its lack of clinical efficacy in treating brain injury has kept the door
open for alternative intervention. Indeed, it can be seen that the boundaries
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between the orthodoxy and alternative or fringe practitioners has a long
tradition of demarcation problems. Brown (1987) has suggested that one
possible blurring of the boundaries between the orthodoxy and the fringe may
have resulted from the fact that many proprietary or 'patent' medications were
constitutionally similar to those medications dispensed at public hospitals
(1987: 217). The difference was not that one medication was efficacious and
the other not, but that one was supplied through the orthodox outlets (i.e.
hospitals etc) and the other offered through advertisements in the popular press
(Brown 1987: 217). This persists today as many medications are serviced over
the counter, but few would argue that these medications are 'fringe' treatments
(Sharma 1992).
It was, then, this historical development of institutional power, and the
knowledge base which permitted it, that intrigued the French philosopher,
Foucault. However, for medicine to make authoritative statements and
influence the social processes which regulate personal behaviour in society it
needed to gain access to, and mastery over, the organic units from which
society is constructed. Medicine had, since the formal tightening of a new
professionalism in the 1790's (Smith 1987), been responsible for providing
knowledge of the body which was both expressed and described through a
technical language. However, Foucault saw that language did much more than
describe the processes of organic pathology; it had the power to invest these
descriptive metaphors ofmedicine with a new 'reality' that helped establish a
mastery over the body. As Turner states, when referring to Foucault's
contribution to medical sociology,
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we can no longer regard 'diseases' as natural events in the world which occur outside the
language with which they are described. A disease entity is the product ofmedical discourses
which in turn reflect the dominant mode of thinking (the episteme in Foucault's terminology)
within a society (1987: 11).
By the end of the nineteenth century medical professionals had
accessed scientific knowledge, a knowledge which as already mentioned was
selectively acquired by paying attention to certain features of anatomy whilst
ignoring others. As Foucault points out this gaze acted to include a totality of
understanding.
What now constituted the unity of the medical gaze was not the circle of knowledge
in which it was achieved but the open, infinite, moving totality, ceaselessly displaced and
enriched by time, whose course it began but would never be able to stop - by this time a
clinical recording of the infinite, variable series of events. But its support was not the
perception of the patient in his singularity, but a collective consciousness, with all the
information that intersects in it, growing in a complex, ever-proliferating way until it finally
achieves the dimensions of a history, a geography, a state. (Foucault, 1973: 29)
Such endeavours conferred many advantages, not least the fact that
access to this scientific knowledge enabled its advocates (doctors) to gain
considerable social prestige and influence (Turner 1987). So much was their
influence that they were not only able to define reality but also to establish the
range of norms which could act as a measure for social disorder and deviance
(Turner 1987: 11). For Foucault, medicine was another agency, along with
the prison and the school, that sought to morally regulate the population
through surveillance (panopticism5). Within medicine, the human body had
become the target of medical enquiry, language would describe it and medical
5 'The Panopticon represented a creative arrangement of power which fabricated an
individual body - that very body which was to be the point on which repression could be exer¬
cised and into which ideologies could be inscribed, but, nonetheless, a body which had no




practice could now exercise unprecedented control over it. Through such
procedures the body would be disciplined by a new and overwhelming medical
etiquette into operating in a morally correct fashion. Indeed, Foucault informs
us that the major contrast between 18th and 19th century medicine was the fact
that during the former medicine related more to the notions of good health.
However,
nineteenth century medicine, on the other hand, was regulated more in accord with normality
than with health (Foucault 1973: 35)
But what about those bodies that could not conform? Through
observing, describing6 and regulating bodies, medicine had developed
'scientific' criteria for appropriateness and conformity within which the ill were
contrasted with the healthy, the mad with the sane, and the abnormal with the
normal.
Armstrong (1983) refers to these dichotomies as 'binary separations'
which result from the increasing sophistication of the panoptic mechanism
employed by medicine. Not only was medicine involved with surveillance,
but the introduction of compulsory education created the opportunity for
medical practitioners to develop their observational skills of the child's body
through the development, in 1908, of the school medical service7. The
consequences of this double pronged approach was an increasing medical
61 use the term 'describing' to reflect the power a language, expressing anatomical con¬
siderations, has to control the body by placing its functioning and behaviour under the author¬
ity of those who practice medicine.




interest in children's pathologies and the creation of a further distinction within
the category 'child'
in which the child could be manipulated and transformed within the new field of observation
established by the large halls of the new schools and the open wards of the new children's
hospitals (Armstrong 1983: 14).
The need now was to establish both a normality and commonality for
children. Post war medicine shifted its focus from an ontological perspective,
addressing the 'child as a solitary figure in the Panopticon' (Armstrong 1983:
57), to one which considered a phylogenetic interest (Foucault 1973: 29) with
children and their bodies. Longitudinal studies that employed charts to
measure children's development indexed periods of change over time, thereby
allowing comparisons to be made. As Armstrong notes
The sick body of the child was no longer to be constructed by a clinical gaze which sought to
analyse in the context of nosological referents, but by a gaze over the normal child against
whom, by juxtaposition, the sick child was created (1983: 57).
The result of this was that children were becoming categorised, and the
developing observation of childhood was not to stop at the inspection of the
child's body. During routine medical examinations at school and at the clinic
medical practitioners also sought to map the social space in which children's
relationships with others were enacted. Children's homes were visited by
health visitors, and by 1910 it was made compulsory 'that only qualified
midwives and doctors could supervise the actual birth' (Armstrong 1983: 15).
Thus the child's body, from conception to maturity and throughout adulthood,
became the object ofmedical enquiry. The consequence of this surveillance
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regimen would not, as perhaps it was hoped, clarify the roles of biology and
society as independent variables, functioning and being responsible for the
body's development and ultimate clinical understanding. Instead, it acted to
obscure the interdependency of the social and the physical which united and
determined embodiment. As Shilling has pointed out
Medical and other technical interventions into the body also highlight the biological and social
character of the body and have made it even more difficult to grasp exactly what the body is
This discourse which concerns the nature/nurture argument has yet to
be settled. However, biological reductionism has had the effect of controlling
the body, even if it has not understood the social substrate that transfigures
embodiment with experiential capacity. The authority medical practitioners
had conferred upon them was significant enough to allow them to make
decisions as to whether or not a child should live. Doctors and midwives,
when faced with the birth of a deformed (my italics) baby, sometimes
conspired to kill the child without the parents' knowledge (Humphries and
Gordon 1992: 13). The following gives a tragically descriptive account of one
such birth when in 1929 Marjorie Collins was born with cerebral palsy.
Apparently I was not a pretty sight from being rather bruised, with one eye pushed up
into my head, which quickly righted itself. The doctor took me downstairs, put me to one side
and left me for dead. But my grandma was there. She told me that she noticed that I was not
breathing very well so she washed me and put something around me and put me next to the
fire. The doctor came down after seeing to my mother. He said, 'Shall I take it away, the dead
baby ? You don't want it left there do you ?' My grandma was horrified and she said that I




This is but one expression of the power that has been historically
conferred on those who practice medicine. Indeed, doctors yield supreme
authority in medical matters which is a reflection of the high status given to
the profession generally (Morgan 1986). This status is as much derived from
doctors' ability to operate an efficient surveillance mechanism as it is a
reflection of their competence to guard our medical welfare (Foucault 1973,
1974). Such surveillance starts at birth and continues through school because
the state of childhood, once identified and observed, has come to reflect yet
another concern for the authorities. The increasing sophistication of childhood
surveillance techniques in the school, clinic and at home acted to highlight the
hidden agendas of the panoptic mechanism. These agendas concerned
themselves with the apparent danger of an 'inadequately supervised' childhood,
because after all, 'some of these children might eventually rise to a high career
in public affairs'8 and thereby pose a threat to the very fabric of state.
Childhood, it could now be reasoned, was not merely a state of developing
biological maturity but was seen to also involve the acquisition of social traits
that could pollute as well as benefit the society into which they would
eventually emerge.
Childhood as a Historical Invention
It has been suggested that childhood has rarely been so highly profiled
as in the twentieth century (James and Prout 1990). Children had historically
become an interest to society, not simply because they represented the
8 Board ofEducation, Annual report for 1920 of the Chief Medical Officer, London.
(reference in Armstrong (1983: 14)
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reproductive growth of adults and therefore organic continuity, but also
because they might, in adulthood, influence public affairs (Armstrong 1983:
14). As already noted, under the auspices ofmoral regulation children in the
United Kingdom were subjected to surveillance9. Their bodies were examined
and their education and upbringing were more increasingly being supervised
by state institutions. In order to accommodate this new interest, the various
doctrines ofmedicine, education and social work sought to identify a scientific
rationale for the emergent phenomena of childhood. Through the observations
of children in hospital, schools and the home new methods were being evolved
that were to have several implications for the 'nature' of children. Some earlier
understandings of the child had been brought to bear on these reconstructed
ideologies of childhood. For example, the early and influential notion of
'preformation'10, which denied human development and proposed that peoples'
'tendencies and characteristics exist preformed and prestructured at birth'
(McNeil 1966) was disregarded, and so too was the 'homunculus' (that notion
that a perfect little man or women was inside and operated the outward self)
thrown out with the bath water. So if children could not be considered as little
adults, what were they?
For Rousseau [1762](1895) children were born pure and innocent,
struggling to adulthood through the corruptions and evils of organised society.
This view proposed that children were natural and innocent, and that
institutions, like education, should not distract from the natural unfolding
9
By the 1830s extensive investigations were carried out on morbidity, deformities and
life expectancy among children working in factories and mills (Smith 1979: 170)
10 This view probably descended from a religious and theological explanation of
development which although dominant in the early 16th century still courted some favour with
19th and 20th century theorists such as Rousseau and Jung.
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talents of the child. In some ways, such a notion re-enacted the
preformationist's beliefs since both views subscribed to the idea that the
essence ofman, or indeed childhood, is to some degree predetermined and
natural. For these doctrines the environment, physically or socially,
represented chaos, uncertainty and perhaps even evil. This notion however
was challenged by John Locke who, earlier in the 18th century, saw children as
possessing a clean slate or tabula rasa, inheriting ideas via the germ plasm and
chromosome. In this instance 'the neonate becomes, then, living material to be
moulded, for better or worse, by the people and things that surround him'
(McNeil 1966: 2). However, even Locke assumed that there must be, to some
degree, a predisposition in children towards unruliness. He argued, in a
treatise on education, that regulation or restraint of children would be
necessary to control their 'natural impulses' before they could be considered as
full members of civilised society. Such 'humanistic' assumptions considered
the environment in which the child lives as playing a crucial part in his or her
development.
The behaviourism of John Watson (1919)11 aligned itself closely to the
principles of environmental influence that had been a key feature of those who
adopted a humanist position. For Watson, the infants were such 'blank slates'
that even thinking was beyond their immature capabilities. Children's thought
processes were considered to be nothing more than "subliminal vocalisation"
that had little or nothing to do with abstract thought. This view replaced the
homunculus with a mechanism, albeit a biological one, controlled through a
11 John Broadus Watson (1878-1958) founded the American school of'Behaviourist




system of innate reflexes that responded to stimuli. With such a notion,
children moved from being traditionally considered as little people to being
thought of as simple mechanisms acquiring, via selective input, adult
maturation. But children are not merely simple biological machines, and
therefore childhood cannot only be understood as a chronological event.
Although Western science intellectualised children with discourses
sympathetic to their newly established and professional doctrines, it is only
relatively recently that children's own realities have begun to be of interest
(Richards 1974, James 1979, Jenks 1982 and James & Prout et al 1990). That
children's development takes place over time makes it likely that with
maturation comes differing issues of interest and concern for children able to
perceive and construct for themselves alternatives to that world presented by
adults. For example, Hendrick (1990: 36) has argued that
the numerous perceptions of childhood, which have been produced over the last two hundred
years or so, can only be fully comprehended within the context of how different generations
(and, no less significant, social classes) responded to the social, economic, religious and
political challenges of their respective eras.
Hendrick identifies a number of socially constructed states of
childhood which reflected the prominent doctrines of their day. In Britain 'The
Romantic Child', for example, resulted from the humanist's concerns with the
ideals of innocence. But Rousseau's inspirations for childhood were to
:come short lived as new issues became pertinent to society and so, too,
oved the ideals under which children were considered. The need for a
ittled society' (Hendrick 1990: 39) in the face of social, political and
onomic unrest desired children to be obedient and respectful of authority.
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This notion, Hendrick points out, courted much favour with the Evangelicals
and the upper classes. Subjected to order and moral regulation, children's
economic worth was soon exploited and the factory child was a rediscovery of
historically earlier routines of child labour. With the establishment of social
welfare agencies, and an increasing interest in children's medical conditions,
issues of childhood became highlighted and constructed by the professionals
who represented official and legitimate authority, an authority that was, in its
very nature, adult centred. Out of this a 'desirable state of childhood'
(Hendrick 1990: 55) required manufacturing which in some way attempted to
understand the various trends that had been enacted over the last three hundred
years or so. Such an archaeology of childhood has generally been more
concerned with the illumination of adult recognition of childhood states and
their socio-chronological changes (Aries 1962) than children's own
construction of an experiential childhood. Parents, too, are occasionally
reminded that their assumptions need remodelling in the light of observation
and experience. For example, Jayne is a five year old girl with developmental
delay. Her mother recalls Jayne watching a little boy playing with his truck on
the other side of the road.
(Jayne)
Iwas talking to somebody not taking a lot ofnotice ofJayne when she
went in doors andfound a truck, which had something in it, emptied it out
came outside and got my attention. She was standing by the side ofthe road
nodding her head and because she wanted to attract my attention going ugh,
ugh to show she wanted to cross the road. I thought that was a really complex
situation. She knew what the other little boy had, she hadfound a similar, not
the same but a similar item, and came and asked me ifshe could cross the
road. I was amazedfor her to do all that.
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What is important in this thesis, however, is that childhood is seen as
being a construction of the personal statements and experiences of a child's
embodied reality which might, and perhaps often does, contrast radically with
that proposed by adults. Indeed, it is only when we identify the lives and
dialogues of real children in the discourse of social theory that we can be
certain that our propositions of childhood are commensurate with those
experiences of childhood themselves. Such an approach can be found in the
'new paradigms' which are emerging (see James and Prout 1990) as more
researchers are concerned with identifying those issues which suggest that
children are responsible for constructing their own realities. But
notwithstanding this need, these new child-inspired constructions of childhood
must be also accounted for in the adult conceptual and socially structured
framework within which children have been historically placed.
Unfortunately, because the bodies of brain injured children are often
contorted by spasticity or other deforming conditions, which incidentally are
the diagnostic features that indicate neurological impairment, they are
conspicuous when compared with the bodies of other children. As one mother
with two congenitally disabled children points out.
(Fiona & Tony)
Yes, I think unfortunately that handicapped children do have several
sort ofcharacteristic problems, a lot ofthem dribble, don't speak very well
and because ofthis make noises. They often have strange jerky movements,
are slow and can't sit up right. A lot of them have visual problems. On the
whole, you know I can say it because I'm a mother of two handicapped
children, they don't look very nice.
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Doctors, armed with their clinical skills and assessment procedures, are
not only empowered by their diagnostic abilities to identify normality but
enforce also the social parameters which determine it. This normality is
engineered with many social consequences but singularly constructed by
clinical medicine. Little or no consultation takes place with its recipients,
brain injured children themselves and their bodies ( cf., Alderson 1993, on
consent to surgery).
As I have already mentioned, children's own experiences are recently
beginning to be considered by adults. Although significant changes are being
made to the conceptualisation of children, guided in the main by agencies
which claim to be sensitive to children's own experiences and expressions,
such interest has also brought into sharp relief issues which are
incommensurate with many modern views on the nature of childhood. For
example childhood criminality, although not a recent phenomena, is one which
has caused great public outrage and condemnation, particularly when it
involves children being murdered by children. James and Jenks (1994),
highlighting the public perceptions of childhood criminality that resulted, in
the main, from the 'Bulger' case, have attempted to locate the ambiguous
public feelings towards childhood in a sociological context. They argue that
although there is a plurality of childhoods, stratified and fragmented by class,
gender, ethnicity and disablement, children's experiences are nonetheless
supposed to conform to some statutory normalising routines that dictate an
ideological commonality for children. These have worked to create a vision of
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childhood that depends upon morality and capability (Hockey & James
1993)12. That some children should transgress their imposed boundaries of
moral innocence, and prove capable of acting out violence that takes another
child's life, is irreconcilably problematic to a cherished state of childhood.
What James and Jenks suggest is that childhood criminality has come
to be a metaphor for social decay, an index of the moral slippage to which
society has moved. If society cannot maintain the ideological incorruptibility
of childhood then its adults, which are the very future of childhood states,
cannot maintain a caring and compassionate society. Thus childhood is much
more than a state in which the experiences and expressions of children are
articulated with adult sentiment. Childhood expresses a pastoral purity within
which the worth of society is nurtured. It is of little surprise, then, that
childhood criminality incites so much public anger and dismay.
What this example demonstrates is that it is not only the professional
bodies that attribute a particular condition to childhood. It seems, then, that
before children have any chance of being encouraged to negotiate, develop and
articulate their unique realities, the present adult ideologies which regulate our
perception of childhood must firstly be deconstructed. That is, any analysis of
childhood must, as its starting point, discover how adults structure childhood.
Benno Glauser (1990) had experienced similar problems with his research
when he wished to understand the implicit concepts that operated with regard
to Street Children in Asuncion, Paraguay. He suggests that the discourses in
which concern for these children of the street are expressed relate more to the
12 In James and Jenks ( 1994 )
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external observations of the adult community than to the internal experiences
and lived situations of the children in question. In order to unravel such
dichotomies he proposes that the assumptions under which such children are
perceived need deconstructing.
Thus the importance of 'deconstructing' lies in trying to find out what lies behind and
at the origin of the concepts currently dominant. It means trying to answer questions such as:
to what do the terms used refer; how were they generated; in response to what problems and
issues did they arise; and whose interests and needs do they serve? (Glauser 1990: 144).
Childhood as Multiple Realities
The approach postulated above by Glauser is useful to help deconstruct
our perceptions of brain injured children which have for too long governed the
way in which this group of children are considered. Much of this perception
focuses on the negative as the only expression of these children capacities.
However, one father has a different vision of his children and although this
family enjoy a more luxuriant life than many, in my experience it is not an
entirely uncommon perception at all.
(Fiona and Tony)
One thing that we recently spoke about is that everyone thinks our
children are desperately unlucky,.... our children have had a very happy
childhood so far. You know, I think ifthey had a perception ofhow they live
they would say they have been very happy. Are they more unlucky than a child
who has had no health problems but as lived a miserable life?
As we have briefly seen then, childhood has been an adult-centred state
- even the parent statement above confirms this - in which children, their
needs, expressions and obligations have been, to a large degree, manufactured
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by determinate societies at differing periods of time. Within this category,
brain injured children have only been loosely placed since physical and or
mental disability has often acted to exclude such individuals from membership
of that already ambiguous group that composes childhood. Historically, the
practice of infanticide in Western Society is well documented. Hocart, writing
back in the thirties, remarked that 'the newly-born child is not reckoned a
person, except under Christian influence: to kill it is not murder. It is still (or
was) only homicide in some European codes' (1933: 230). This does serve to
highlight the relatively recent uncertainties concerning the status of children.
Moreover, though children are undoubtedly important to all societies,
ambiguities as to what exactly constitutes a child in any particular culture
remain. Ethnography is rich in such detail the Inuit of Greenland, for example,
have no moral regulation whatsoever against the termination of the foetus 'a
woman who is pregnant, depending on her personal circumstances, will make
her own decision as to whether she will keep the child' (Nuttall 1992: 62). It
appears that every birth itself does not ensure, for that child, the status of a
person; the child must be firstly named in order to prevent infanticide being an
option (Balikci 1970).
However, it is not only in traditional societies that children are
excluded from many important rituals that confer advantage until they are
formally initiated usually at puberty. Interestingly enough, they were also not
considered 'fit for full membership' in the Christian church (Hocart 1933: 141).
This may suggest that children represented, at one level at least, a potential for
corruptibility, or perhaps a contagion of the adult boundaries that regulate and
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maintain the continuity of the moral and social systems, for if the argument
centred on the fact that they were simply not yet adults; and that being a child
was just an immature form of being, there would be no need to exercise such
controls over the child's access to adult social institutions and behaviours. It is
more likely that children do have a power, a potential to pollute an etiquette of
social order, which can be exercised even in their marginal state of childhood
because it ultimately provides accent to adulthood. Freud, in attempting to
understand the possible influence that is exerted upon the rules of exogamy by
the practice of totem and taboo, cites the behaviour of children as an
illuminating psychoanalytic example.
There is a great deal of resemblance between the relations of children and of
primitive men towards animals. Children show no trace of the arrogance which urges adult
civilised men to draw a hard-and-fast line between their own nature and that of other animals.
Children have no scruples over allowing animals to rank as their full equals. Uninhibited as
they are in the avowal of their bodily needs, they no doubt feel themselves more akin to
animals than to their elders (1983: 126-7).
The point I am attempting to make is not to support a Freudian notion,
which is of little concern here, but to show that it does highlight the
uncomfortable and potentially dangerous contamination that children and their
childhood realities may impose on our systems of classification. The question
we must ask is, if children have the potential to disrupt our rules of
homogeneity and threaten social order how much more disruptive to social
categories could brain injured children be?
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Jenks (1996) has argued that childhood has been traditionally
understood in social theory to be an expression of those trends that relate more
to adult society, its cultural reproduction and capital. He suggests that
the child is always revealing of the grounds of social control. Thus in one sense (with
historical changes and a contemporary weakening of authority in social and education patterns)
we get the children we deserve or, to put it more formally, our historical perspectives on
normality in childhood reflect the changes in the organisation of our social structure (Jenks
1996: 80).
Presumably childhood disability has, however, had its perspectives
embedded in a society's social structure. For example, Henri-Jacques Stiker
(1982) attempted to understand society through an analysis of the way it dealt
with difference in terms of discourse on bodily abnormality. For Stiker,
Western society's focus on difference gave rise to disability as a specific
category, and its responses to this difference invoke a variety of procedures
that involve 'charity, medical analysis, special education and rehabilitation'
(Reynolds Whyte 1995: 269) all of which, no doubt, are stratified in social
structure. However, these perspectives on disability are those originated by
wider society and tend not to be informed by the experiences of the disabled
themselves (Eayrs & Ellis 1990 & Shakespeare 1994)
The potential for brain injured children's bodies to disrupt society is
made apparent by their inability to perform the appropriate behaviours
(normal) that help categorise children as a special group. Furthermore, their
disabilities are not only conspicuously ambiguous and emotionally challenging




My mother came over just to check that Tony had not grown into an
ogre.
Mary Douglas (1984: 39) has argued that anomalies cannot be ignored
but must be dealt with. In this sense fear, shame, repulsion and suspicion are
common avoiding strategies used to negotiate the 'threat' that brain injured
children may pose to the moral and experiential regulators which enforce an
ideological role for childhood. In this way these children are, however,
confined within a conceptual space whose boundaries are maintained by both
professional and lay statements that attempt to control and regulate the
expression of children's own agendas. For example, medical rhetoric and
'special' educational discourses function not to simply identify or clarify the
needs of injured children, but also to exclude them from the larger category of
children. A mother with a 7 year cerebral palsied son recalls the problems she
experienced when trying to get Tom who has difficulty with breathing, speech
and vision into mainstream school.
(Tom)
I think it just interrupts their routine, I think they think that children
like Tom do not benefitfrom mainstream school. We were actually told that
by somebodyfrom County Hall. 'Ofcourse, there are some children who
come outside ofthe school andyour son is probably one ofthem'.
The exclusion of the brain injured child is thus achieved by redefining
the boundaries that may govern children, and by placing them in a
sub-category that is even further removed. This, then, dictates a course of
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social action which serves more to discharge our obligations to these children
than to understand their needs. Indeed, it could be argued that many of the so
called special institutions within which some of these children find themselves
placed fulfil this function.
A comparative anthropological example might prove useful at this
point. It concerns the practice of selective infanticide amongst the Nuer of the
Southern Sudan.
When a monstrous birth occurs, the defining lines between humans and animals may
be threatened. If a monstrous birth can be labelled an event of a particular kind the categories
can be restored. So the Nuer treat monstrous births as baby hippopotamuses, accidentally
born to humans and, with this labelling, the appropriate action is clear. They gently lay them
in the river where they belong (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 84, In Douglas 1983: 39).
This practice presumably not only maintains the defining categories
which help the Nuer conceptualise their own unique natures, but also
discharges their responsibility to one of their own who would require an
inordinate amount of special care if the child was to survive. Moreover, the
Nuer example is, structurally at least, similar to what the doctor wanted to do
with Marjorie Collins (earlier in the present chapter)). However, in this latter
case, taking away the injured baby was not to be justified by the cultural myths
that combat anomalies and maintain social order, but only in the sense that it
enforces a medical decision onto a social problem for which clinical practice
has no solution. Removing the injured baby was not solely the attempt to
maintain the boundaries of an all important classification system, as in the
Nuer example, it was also a move to minimise the threat this baby posed to a
clinical system that was at a loss to do anything efficacious but which must, at
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all costs, maintain control. Another striking similarity between the mothers of
the hippopotamus child amongst the Nuer and Marjorie Collins is that they
both experienced the same disempowerment that results from the regulating
influences which operate in their own societies. Order and control are
paramount features of regulation and anomalies, particularly those in children,
must be contrasted with those individuals who establish the norms.
Aesthetic Tensions in Childhood
What, then, shapes the concepts which define brain injured children as,
by their very nature, being different from others? In Goffman's analysis of
'Stigma' he identifies three main forms, (1) 'abominations of the body', (2)
'blemishes ofphysical character' and (3) 'tribal stigma of race, nation and
religion' (1963: 14) It is likely to be the case that all three impinge upon the
brain injured child and his or her family to some degree, but there is none
more conspicuous to the closure of normality than those notions concerning
the abominations of the body. Goffman argues that
an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a
trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he meets away from him,
breaking the claim that his other attributes have upon us. He possesses a stigma, an undesired
differentness from what we had anticipated (1963: 15).
The brain injured child motorically disfigured, by a lesion to the central
nervous system, presents further problems. There are expectations of the body
at issue here and children too, even injured ones, are not to depart from these,
unless we consider 'by definition, of course, (that) we believe the person with a
stigma (spasticity, for example) is not quite human' (Goffman 1984: 15).
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However children, almost by default, possess ambiguities that have the power
to cloud cherished boundaries. They still represent, in Western society at least,
an innocence and purity not only of action (and although the Bulger case might
have threatened this concept, it has not destroyed it), but also of aesthetic
character. The aestheticism of children has been widely used not only because
it has 'consumer appeal', and thus has become the marketing person's ace in
selling campaigns, but rather children's aesthetic appeal seems most cherished
for its very ambiguity (Ennew 1986). Furthermore, this ambiguity produces
tensions in the understanding of childhood as a social and experiential
phenomenon. In a similar way our sensitivity to the contours and expressions
of physical form permeates consciousness at all levels and, as a result, is also
likely to be utilised in perceiving the child as different from adult.
Donatello's 'David' provides one expression of this ambiguity. In this
depiction the boy David has a naked androgynous form, an almost feminine
pose and by what Gill refers to as being ,'.... clad only in a saucy hat and kinky
boots' (1989: 205) reflects what can be seen to be a sexual tension. This
bronze is challenging in two ways. Firstly, maturity has yet to confirm David
with the typical form of his gender, so that he is in one sense physically
ambiguous. Secondly, his behaviour is not commensurate with that of
children, since the decapitated head ofGoliath lies upon the ground
whereupon David has rested his left foot, thereby portraying his victory over
the giant (adult). Although there seems little doubt that Donatello's David
externalises his own interest in young boys, it also acts to confirm a social
unease with the ideological state of childhood and the particular physical
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characteristics and aesthetics that accompany it. This too, not surprisingly,
relies for its validation upon the adult physical form that portrays gender in
both a biological and culturally acceptable fashion. In this sense perhaps
children portray an innocence because they lack definite, gender typical,
bodies. Indeed, Kitzinger (1990: 160) has suggested that it may well be the
association of such ambiguity ofmaturity and innocence that so strongly
appeals to child sex abusers. She states that 'a glance at pornography leaves
little doubt that innocence is a sexual commodity'.
Such considerations are I believe important to help highlight the
tensions that underscore childhood and its embodiment as a transitional state.
Although childhood represents a moral stasis within which children are
obliged to behave in a predefined way, and wherein adult attainments are
usually prohibited, this stasis is, nevertheless, punctuated by change which
requires them to move along the maturing ladder to an ideal adulthood. Such
transitions are rarely achieved without some personal trauma and threat to that
social system which regulates the child's 'passage' to adulthood. It is in this
potentially dangerous procession that innocence acts as the ensign ofmoral
well-being and one which will permit the child to navigate his or her
development under the watchful adult eye.
But childhood innocence is a construction that historically appears first
in the Renaissance, when the appreciation of childhood as a special state of
being replaced the earlier notions that considered them as tiny adults. Art, too,
visualised children as the possessors, for the first time, of a truly childlike
form. The fact that the depiction of cherubs started to reflect an anatomical
68
Chapter 2
realism also illuminates possible physical ambiguities that suggest a sexual
tension. Moreover, several artists demonstrated the potential for a
corruptibility of children's form with artistic nuances, revealing an adult
centred sexuality (see Gill 1989: 208). Before this time, children being
considered as nothing more than 'little adults' presumably presented no greater
problems to the enforcing moral, religious and social regulations governing
sexuality than those which operated over adults. Indeed, by the eighteenth
century sexuality was beginning to be conceptualised within a framework that
advocated productivity, procreating children within marriage, along the lines
of their present day labour theories. Before this time, Turner informs us that
behaviours such as juvenile masturbation were tolerated by the religious and
medical authorities (1987: 100).
However, with the developing role of childhood as a special and
transitional expression of humanity, regulation was required to ensure that
children conformed to the adult ideal within which childhood was to be
structured. Masturbation, or for that matter any expression of the child's
sexuality, was not only considered polluting and aetiologically linked with
madness (Turner 1987) but also threatening to the social construction that was
manufacturing a new childhood. However, childhood is a dynamic which
eventually confers adulthood and as long as the individual's sexuality is
expressed within the institution ofmarriage such contacts are permissible.
This particular illustration of the ambivalence of childhood raises
another interesting problem for those persons who have some form of
disability. Before the last war, contact between disabled boys and girls was
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discouraged because it was seen as dangerous due to their vulnerable age
(childhood). Furthermore, 'Poor Law officials' and religious charities assumed
that the disabled were potentially highly fertile and promiscuous, particularly
'women classified as "feeble-minded" (who) were seen as slaves to their
animal passions and were thus supposedly a moral danger to the community'
(Humphries & Gordon, 1989: 100). Sexuality has also been argued to play a
part in the modern 'disabling' ideas about disabled people.
In the realm of sex and love, the generalised assumption that disability is a medical
tragedy becomes dominant and inescapable. In modern western societies, sexual agency is
considered the essential element of full adult personhood, replacing the role formally taken by
paid work: because disabled people are infantilised, and denied the status of active subjects,
consequently their sexuality is undermined. This also works the other way, in that the
assumption of sexuality is a contributing factor towards the disregard of disabled people.
There are clear parallels with the situation of children and older people (Shakespeare 1996:
192).
These examples demonstrate the limits society places on the full
embodiment of not only disabled people but on children too. I am not
advocating sexual experiences for children but rather accepting the fact that
such aspects of embodiment exist in humankind and therefore, with regard to
disabled people, elderly people and children are problematic where social
etiquette is concerned..
The aesthetic issue is not merely important for aestheticism alone but
because the 'assumption is that the person who looks very different is in some
way morally inferior to those who are normal' (Lansdown 1980: 25). The
potential threat of corruptibility embodied in the brain injured child, then,
whose behaviour makes it difficult to conform to the appropriate stereotypes
that frame childhood, challenges the very moral existence of this cherished
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category, 'childhood'. For this reason such children must be conceptually dealt
with.
Lansdown points out that Shakespeare's portrayal ofRichard 111
exemplifies the notion that a misshapen body is the outward manifestation of a
distorted mind. Indeed, the 'disnatured' Richard 111 is so much a dramatic
construction that his body depicts his moral corruption so plainly that even
those at the back of the theatre are in no doubt as to his character. And so, too,
on the social stage, the audience who observes the brain injured child has
already been familiarised by a script that gives meaning to the orchestrations
of disability. It is, then, the very orchestrations which must be deconstructed.
We must explore the language of dysfunction that uses, for its own
semiological system, the overt body. Not just the body, but that of the child
and that which has been orchestrated by both disability and its subsequent
interpretations. The body, as Douglas (1966) informs us, has the potential to
put in danger those boundaries that embody the moral regulation of society.
However, these boundaries are not only breached with 'matter issuing from
them' (Douglas 1989: 121), spittle, blood, urine, hair clipping and sweat etc,
but are transgressed also by the inability of an impaired body to conform, and
control its functions in socially acceptable ways.
(Jayne)
She might decide that she doesn't want to go down aparticular aisle in
the supermarket and she will sit down and kick her legs in the air. I'm sure
people think she is just an incredibly badly behaved child.
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For this very reason the brain injured child risks being excluded from
that enterprise in which other children are located, their childhood.
These overt incapacities are not the only threat to the boundaries within
which the moral welfare of children is contained. Maturation and gender also
present problems. The fact that many brain injured children transgress the
aesthetic and behavioural requirements that constitute childhood threatens not
their moral validity but our interpretation of it13. Physical completeness
complies with the requirements of an overt morality (to be just that which we
think they should be) in which all children are located. The need, then, to
rethink the problems and naive transgressions of the child incapacitated by
brain injury is fundamental to enclosing them within the same essential
boundaries that their peers enjoy. Adjustments are indeed required, but the
starting point is not so much with the injured bodies as with those injured
assumptions that sustain childhood as a restricted embodiment, that expresses
little more than an aesthetically pure unfolding state toward adulthood.
Conclusion
The issue of embodiment has, until recently, played but a little part in
sociological theory, and has been very much an 'absent presence' in social
theory (Shilling 1993) and childhood studies (Jenks 1996). Emphasis has been
traditionally placed on the 'social meaning of social action at the level of
values and beliefs' (Turner 1992: 37). Whilst this is still crucial to the analysis
13 One cannot help wondering whether the systematic sexual and physical abuse of
young children recorded in the many state institutions is made possible by the perpetrators en¬
tertaining the notion that because these children are injured or delinquent they somehow have
forfeited the right to be considered and cared for as the children they really are.
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of the implicit statements that express the observer's position with regard to
the brain injured child, it fails to illuminate the phenomenological events of
disability. Thus, not only must we attempt to discover that which is
conveniently embedded in the adult centred rhetoric, which serves to confirm
the reality of childhood, we must also give credibility to the lived experiences
of brain injured children. This is, however, likely to be difficult for two
reasons. Firstly, the agendas of brain injured children are not easily
understood, primarily because the statements of children, let alone brain
injured ones, tend only to be valued if they reflect the adult's perceptions
(Alderson 1993, 1995). The second difficulty arises when one seeks to
explore the experiential worlds of children who, due to their very disability,
have often evolved expressive and communication systems that present
problems for decoding. The present paradox can be expressed thus - even if
the brain injured child's communicative expressions were successfully
deciphered, we would still be left with the problem of getting them accepted,
particularly if they had little consonance with those that adults accept. This is
made even more problematic by the fact that the disabled body often presents
what Goffman (1959) might call management problems. Stated simply, the
body must be controlled during our encounters with other social actors.
Disruptions to social order are often represented by failures of the body to
control its expression during social interactions with others. The management
of embarrassment requires, for example, considerable control over the body
(Turner 1992) and may be a specific problem for families with a brain injured




As soon as you get Sarah out into a big open space she squeals and she
screams and ifyou have got her in a buggy she grabs at everybody. I've had
countlesspeople coming up to me and say, I should have kept it at home. And
last year Iwas told, 'you shouldn't bring her out, she's mental'.
More than a notion of a 'spoiled identity' (Goffman 1963) a child
whose inability to manage his or her self (presentation), for whatever reason,
compromises another social actor's space, and in this example the mother is
considered to be courting her child's misconduct and thus playing a part in the
offending conspiracy. That such statements sometimes give rise to feelings of
guilt and personal responsibility will be considered in more detail later. The
point I wish to make is that, whether brain injured or not, children are playing
roles, these roles or behaviours are expected to conform to the constructions of
childhood which give them social meaning. That this meaning may not
represent the internal realities that children construct for themselves is
something that I shall later consider (see Chapter 8).
In summary, this chapter has shown how a child's existence is confined
to a conceptual space referred to as childhood, within which his or her
behaviour and agency is regulated by special institutions that ensure that the
child develops and conducts his or her self in the appropriate way. Brain
injured children are constitutionally problematic because they represent an
anomaly to the rules of conduct. Professional agencies, responsible for their
social management and moral control, are brought in to regulate and control
them. The result is that childhood is an orchestrated enterprise and brain
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Brain Injury : A Problem of Embodiment
Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that children and their childhood
experiences had yet to be fully understood. Although there is no paucity of
concepts that attempt to locate children in adult centred space, I have
suggested that such procedures provide little opportunity for the children
themselves to express their own realities. I outlined briefly also some of the
issues which are particular to those children who have suffered a form of brain
injury. In this chapter I will attempt to explore, in greater detail, the problems
that confound our understanding of these children and their conditions - and
the consequence of these misunderstandings for the injured child's experiences
and personal expression. It will be seen that scientific notions concerning the
brain have, historically, strong and influential links with philosophies of mind.
Therefore any analysis of the brain would be incomplete without reference to
the capacities of, and statements concerning, mental function.
In the following analysis I shall show that the mind itself is best
understood as an attribute empowering corporeal agency. The dichotomy
between mind and body that appears so prevalent in much social and
philosophical theory can often be resolved by perceiving the person as the
union of both mental intentions and physical capacity. It is this union that
interests Shilling when he states it 'is for a view of the mind and body
inextricably linked as a result of the mind's location within the body' (1993:
13). First, however, I shall outline brain injury and the current assumptions
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made about this traumatic event so that the arguments I wish to develop in this
thesis may be better evaluated.
Non Progressive Brain Injury
Brain injury is clinically considered to be of two types which act to
dictate not only the theoretical assumptions about what this traumatic event
entails, but also the responses and postures that the therapeutic communities
are most likely to undertake. The first approach considers injury which is
progressive in nature. That is to say, damage to the central nervous system is
due to some dynamic agent that persists in compromising function until it
reaches its terminal phase. Such conditions can arise from inoperable
malignant tumours, genetic degenerative conditions and the so called
demyelinating diseases such as motor neurone disease and multiple sclerosis.
These constitute 'progressive brain injury'. In such cases medical concern is
usually placed on making the person comfortable since ameliorative
procedures are, at present, rarely available1. The other group, which is my
major concern throughout this thesis, constitute those forms of injury that are
not progressive in nature. This form of neurological insult can typically occur
at any time of life from a variety of factors, irrespective of gender, class or
occupation. Stroke, accident or viral infection can all result in the individual
suffering neurological impairment. However, my concern is with young
victims and the special problems that this trauma entails for children and their
families.
1
Multiple sclerosis is possibly an exception here as techniques utilising hyperbaric




In recent years medical technology has had an enormous impact on
monitoring the pre and postnatal development of infants. As a result many of
the conditions that contribute to non-progressive brain injury in the new born
can now be identified. Some of these techniques have also proved valuable in
preventing the deleterious affects that exposure to radiation, drugs and alcohol
may cause to the developing foetus. However, even with such procedures
readily available they have generally had little impact on the 'incidence of
chronic childhood disorders' (Logigian 1989: 1). What has, however, become
apparent with the utilisation ofmodern monitoring technology in hospitals and
clinics is that the survival rate for children with chronic diseases has increased
considerably: that is to say, more of the infants born with or acquiring some
form of neurological impairment are surviving into adulthood.
Although 'the object of neurological assessment is to recognise the
nature, site and extent of pathological lesions of the central nervous system
(Forfar 1984: 677), for children this presents some rather unique problems.
Unlike the adult who may have acquired neurological impairment after the
central nervous system has properly matured, the infant, with its immature
nervous system, has yet to inhibit the stereotyped behaviours and reflexes with
which it was born. Such reflexes involve hand and feet grasping and the
rooting reflex (mouth and head movements to locate the nipple) etc. However,
as the uninjured baby develops, these reflexes become increasingly difficult to
illicit, until eventually they disappear or are inhibited and integrated into more
purposeful and evolved motor behaviours (Teitelbaum 1967: 67, Logigian
1988: 25). This may not be so for the brain injured baby who may still possess
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a primitive repertoire of such behaviours. Therefore, assessments which seek
to diagnose deficits in functioning involving integrated sensory, motor or
intellectual performances are not so easily obtained, as the infant has not
developed these abilities to a recognisable state where a precise evaluation
would be meaningful. There are, of course, procedures that utilise the reflexes
of the infant to evaluate the integrity of the central nervous system. For
example, some of these stereotyped reflexes to stimuli may illicit abnormal
patterns or be absent altogether, which may indicate a potential neurological
problem. In order to investigate these lesions in the cerebral cortex a level of
neuronal and synaptic maturation is required which permits the development
ofmotor, cognitive, adaptive and social behaviours in the child. Therefore
some deficits in the child's behaviour are likely to not be detected until the
time when one would expect such assessable functions to have developed.
The other main problem for those wishing to localise a lesion of a
child's brain, only after which would a treatment regime be suggested, arises
from the 'plasticity' of the central nervous system. The assumption is that,
unlike the adult, children's brains are more flexible so that disruption of
function caused by a lesion at a particular site may be recovered by a different
area taking over that function. This notion of'recovery' is the therapeutic
ideal. However it is also a problematic one due, in the most part, to semantic
differences used by researchers and clinicians to define exactly what
constitutes 'recovery'. Almli & Finger (1988) suggest that the problem may be
resolved if a working definition of recovery demanded 'a complete regaining
of 'those' identical functions that were lost or impaired after brain injury'
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(1988: 12). However, this is not straightforward for children with immature
and functionally adaptable nervous systems. Moreover, even applying this
definition to adults may prove problematic as recovery may be misinterpreted
as 'behavioural sparing' or 'compensation'. The former is 'defined as an
absence of a specific performance deficit after a brain lesion' (Almli & Finger
1988: 5).
However, this in itself is not evidence of behavioural sparing, because
even if behavioural dysfunction is not observed after an injury it need not
imply that dysfunction may not, at some time in the future, develop. This
typically occurs in 'slow-growing' or 'staged lesions'. For example, if a child
had a tumour removed from a part of the brain responsible for language
(Broca's area) and subsequently proved to be indistinguishable in language
skills from others in her class, one might argue that she had not recovered her
language because in fact she had not lost it in the first place, i.e. behavioural
sparing. The other phenomenon which may confound neurological assessment
is whether the individual has 'recovered' from or 'compensated' for an
impairment. The latter implies that the injury persists, but that new
behavioural strategies or goals have been developed which compensate for
specific impairments.
The ability to determine whether compensation or recovery has taken place can be
exceedingly difficult under some conditions. To appreciate this, one might think of a mute,
brain-damaged child who may now use visual imagery to solve simple subtraction problems
that previously were handled by rote memory (Almli & Finger 1988: 7).
This may account for much of the difficulty encountered in diagnosing
the extent of brain injury. It also seriously affects the clinicians' ability to
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provide an accurate prognosis. Such problems persist in challenging the
understanding of those professionals who work with the so called
non-progressive brain injured. It also, moreover, causes great concern for the
parents as the initial confirmation that the child has problems is typically met
by a level of parental confusion and uncertainty in the doctor's statements.
The following example shows one aspect of this for a mother of a 6 year old
girl with hydrocephalus and athetoid spasticity.
(Cindy)
Mother: My husband came in and I said to him, 'they're saying she's
deaf and he said 'rubbish'. She isn't in fact its very acute. So we had lots of
things told us but we didn't really believe them or have time to be shocked over
the news that Cindy was disabled. We had realisedfor a long time that things
were not right. When I went down and saw the consultant and she said this
child is slightly spastic it didn't surprise me, the term did because I didn't
know what it meant, but Iwasn't surprised that she hadproblems.
Interviewer: Do you feel that in an initial way you came to terms with
it through disbelief, because of all the misinformation you had been given?
Mother: Yes, you just thought well lets take each day as it comes. She
was healthy, she was sleeping, eating, she was fine in every other way but I
did all the normal things you would do with a normal baby. At 10 months we
were told she was slightly spastic when I challenged that and said all right
what does that mean? 'Oh her ankles are stiff was the reply. The actual
statement was made to a trainee, not to her dad and me.
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Where, then, are we to look for the rationales that inform professional
judgements on the clinical features of non-progressive brain injury?
Surprisingly enough many notions concerning cerebral lesions have their
genesis in a much older tradition than neurology.
'Ghosts in the Machine'
Neurological models, whether involving injury or function, tend to be
both informing to, and informed by, a philosophy that locates the 'mind as a
global property of the brain' (Hodgson 1991: 64) The fact that a correlation
exists between neural events and mental phenomena does not directly confirm
that the latter is purely the result of the former. A description of the physical
events that occur in the brain is not essentially a description of specific mental
actions ofwhich minds are capable, it merely suggests some relationship
between them. Likewise, as I am arguing in this thesis, the problem of
understanding a brain injured child may not be one ofjust understanding the
neural pathology of lesions, but one of understanding the whole embodied
world to which the child is attempting to accommodate.
However, problems concerning the brain, mind and their dysfunctions
have traditionally been related to a mechanical theory, i.e. to organic and
pathological lesions in the very material substance of the physical brain,
thereby locating dysfunction to particular cerebral sites. Whilst not arguing
against this, I wish to demonstrate that such explorations are often so
exclusively focused on cerebral models that the body, that very corporeal
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expression of central nervous system (CNS) activity, is at times completely
ignored.
The following will entail a reverse order chronology of the
philosophical notions which have influenced the study of brain injury. The
reason for this is that they have been listed not historically but in order of their
importance to my argument.
One of the major reasons why such a mechanical theory ofmind
should arise stems, in the main, from the influential work ofRene Descartes
who as a man both of science and of God could not accept, as indeed Hobbes
did, 'that human nature differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork'
(Ryle 1976: 20). Overwhelmed by the moral and ethical constraints of his
religiosity, Descartes proposed that the mental could not simply be a variety of
the mechanical. Ryle, although himself not a supporter of an independent
mind (the possibility of conscious mental events ensuing from an immaterial
mind Hodgson 1991), points out that he and other philosophers availed
themselves of an escape route that postulated the following explanation.
Since mental-conduct words are not to be construed as signifying the occurrence of
mechanical processes, they must be construed as signifying the occurrence of non-mechanical
processes; since mechanical laws explain movement in space as the effects of other movements
in space, other laws must explain some of the non-spatial workings ofminds. The difference
between the human behaviours we describe as intelligent and those we describe as
unintelligent must be a difference in causation; so, while some movements of human tongues
and limbs are the effects ofmechanical causes, others must be the effects of non-mechanical
causes, i.e. some issue from movements ofparticles ofmatter, others from the workings of
minds ( 1976: 20).
Gilbert Ryle, in arguing against Descartes' dualist doctrine, proposed
that the errors that postulate phantom embodiment, or in Ryle's words 'The
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Ghost in the Machine', evolved from a category mistake. Furthermore, it is
one which assumed that the differences between the mental and the physical
were expressed in one common framework. This encouraged the idea that
both minds and bodies functioned relative to some form or expression of
mechanical law. Bodies were governed by material processes, so minds were
obliged to be governed by non-material processes. Thus, although minds are
'things' and bodies are 'things' they are different types of'things'.
Most importantly, they can have different causal attributes. This
'para-mechanical hypothesis' (Ryle 1976: 21) was, however, at loss to explain
the subtleties of a physical and mental unity that operated and could be
perceived in human behaviour, since it could not ascertain the nature of one
from the other. Aligning his discourse to mechanics, Descartes had assumed
that both mind and body operated in the same category but were polarised by
the fact that their behaviours were constrained by the terms of the same logical
type. That is, since the body is a machine observing its mechanical principles,
so too is the mind obliged to observe its non-mechanical operations. The
consequence of this erroneous assumption was the proposition of the mind as a
spectral machine operating within the physical or corporeal machine that
constitutes the body. In Ryle's view, such notions over-sophisticate the
operations ofmind, leaving the body behind as nothing more than a
mechanical receptacle of some spectral agent, the mind.
How many of us are able to deny the pleasures of an experienced
embodiment involved with routines of eating, bathing, creating music and art?
These have, at their very essence, not just some spectral monitoring of the
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mechanical operation of body by mind, but serve to gratify that conscious
vehicle which permits these performances. The body is not just a hollow
machine, awaiting a sentience installed only by the operations of mind. The
body is, in itself, a conscious entity that, with its very presence in social space,
kindles a consciousness in others with whom it interacts.
Merleau-Ponty offers such an example. He studied the psychology of
phantom limb experiences2 and their consequence on cognitive judgements
and, after noting the disruption limb loss can produce on perception,
concluded that 'all 'higher' mental functions are also somatic activities' (Turner
1992: 43). Such was his commitment to the role of embodiment,
Merleau-Ponty proposed that
the body is not an object for itself; it is in fact a spontaneous synthesis of powers, a bodily
spatiality, a bodily unity, a bodily intentionality, which distinguish it radically from the
scientific object posed by traditional schools of thought (Langer 1989: 56}.
Likewise, neither are the mind or the processes which are traditionally
considered to arise from it (e.g. conscious experience) objects with a single
kind of property. Ryle argues that "mental' does not denote a status to talk
of a person's mind is to talk of a person's abilities, liabilities and
inclinations (dispositions) to do and undergo certain sorts of things in the
ordinary world'(1976: 190).
In order to achieve such a conscious state sensations, feelings and
images, either external or internal, help to constitute that 'stuff of which minds
are composed' (Ryle 1976: 190). Thus, put simply, sensations require the stuff
2
Phantom limbs are limbs which have been lost due to accident or disease and often
reported to still provide sensation to their former host many years after their surgical removal.
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of the body and its specialised organs of perception to the same extent that
they require the stuff of minds. Bodies and their organs are unlikely to be
passive vehicles of sensation, as iconic storage3 demonstrates that the sensory
organs themselves may act as a register, with perhaps certain processing
attributes built in.
An Aristotelian Psyche
In proposing that a distinction existed between mind and body,
Descartes saw the body as a machine, behaving according to the mechanical
principles ofmatter, while the mind had no such constraint upon its
operations. This proposition is very problematic and to review, to a
satisfactory depth, the arguments for and against would be well beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, one critical issue will be addressed. This does
not involve the dualist's arguments, entrenched as they are in the notion of
mechanical 'entity', for the argument presented in this thesis rests not on what
matter or stuff constitutes and forms the distinctions between bodies and
minds, but on what are the capacities of human beings. As Smith and Jones
(1986) point out in their excellent book:
an analysis of what it is to have a mind should mention capacities rather than entities. And
that points the direction for progress. To give a fuller account of the nature of the mind is to
give a fuller account not of some special sort of thing but of the capacities which constitute the
mind (1986: 74-75).
3
Iconic sensations are those images or indeed sounds which persist in their receptive
organs after its physical termination (see Gregory, R.L. 1987: 336).
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Furthermore, these capacities are not only the result of institutionalised
conventions of behaviour operating on the person, for the individual's self is
also a contributor to the genesis of capacity:
In treating individuals either explicitly or by default as merely socially or culturally
driven, ignoring the authorial or 'self-driven' aspects of behaviour, is to render them at best
partially, and perhaps more often, as fictitious ciphers of the anthropologist's theoretical
invention (Cohen 1994: 7).
For Aristotle, such capacities (that derive from individual and
socio-cultural authorship) are those which make us human beings and are
invested in the 'soul'. However, Aristotle's soul, or in his terms 'psyche', is not
to be confused with that common usage of the word which owes much to
theological coloration, and which expresses strong dualistic connotations.
Instead, the word mind would be a better translation. In this sense the mind
(psyche in Aristotelian terms) is '.... simply what determines' a particular
creature 'to have the sort of life characteristic of creatures of that kind' (Smith
& Jones 1986: 78). Aristotle was not concerned with issues that give rise to
mind / body dichotomies but was rather more interested in 'substance', 'matter'
and 'form'. That these have a particular meaning for Aristotle should not come
as any surprise. In Aristotelian terms, a 'substance' can be any particular entity
- for our purposes let us say a brain injured child - but it could as easily apply
to a dolphin or a bread knife. All these entities have 'matter' and 'form' but it is
the unique arrangement of these features that make a particular thing what it is.
'Matter' and 'form' are not singularly concerned with questions relating to the
material and shape of things or entities, but rather state the capabilities of
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entities ('substances') and how they behave. For Aristotle, 'substance', 'matter'
and 'form' are the very attributes which express the nature of things, not the
components from which they are made. Descartes postulated that people were
made up from two contrasting components, corporeal stuff (body) and
non-material stuff (mind). For Aristotle, however, 'substance' is the aggregate
entity, comprising 'matter' and 'form', the former providing potentiality and the
latter actuality. Indeed, it is due to this unique arrangement and their
interrelationship with one another that minds, expressed as capacity,
perception and knowledge, are tangibly evolved within the living body. Thus
the soul, mind or psyche is that which
makes a body a living creature of the kind it is - that is, the soul (or perhaps better having such
a soul) is the 'what it is to be what it is' or form of a living creature (Smith & Jones 1986:
78).
The important point is that for Aristotle the soul, or in our terms the
mind, is not a separate feature or aspect of the body but one of its defining
characteristics, and one which constitutes the very nature of the body.
Moreover, it is this augmentation that gives the living body potentiality and
actuality, and in so doing defines the unique qualities and capabilities of a
particular living creature.
The Nature of Mind.
I have mentioned two contrasting and competing theories that attempt
to locate the mind. The dualist's notions, postulated by Descartes, assume that
the world consisted of two things, res extensa and res cogitans. The former
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referred to extending things, such as the body, whilst the latter concerned those
thinking things i.e. the mind. The body, being embedded in space and time
due to its corporeality, contrasted radically from the mind, which observed few
if any of the laws which operated on the body. Descartes himself envisaged a
problem of interaction between these two conditions and proposed that the
pineal gland4 mediated the operations of res extensa and res cogitans
(Edelman 1992: 11). According to Edelman, such dualist notions persist today
and can be attributed to the behaviourists' assumptions5 which deny the
processes ofmind, believing that, since they cannot be observed, they must be
beyond the scope of scientific exploration, and therefore should be
disregarded. As I shall demonstrate in later chapters the influence ofDescartes
also remains insidiously discernible in much ofmodern medical practice.
In an attempt to relocate the mind within modern science a new
discipline has evolved which combines psychology, computer science,
artificial intelligence, biology and philosophy to address the issues of
cognition. In a simplified way these new cognitive scientists have attuned
themselves to those mental functions, those internal processes of mind, that
were largely rejected by the behaviourist tradition. The cognitive school rely
on the concept ofmental representations and on a set of assumptions collectively called the
functionalist position. From this viewpoint, people behave accordingly to knowledge made up
of symbolic mental representations. Cognition consists of the manipulation of these symbols.
Psychological phenomena are described in terms of functional processes. The efficacy of such
processes resides in the possibility of interpreting items as symbols in an abstract and
well-defined way, according to a set ofunequivocal rules. Such a set of rules constitutes what
is known as a syntax (Edelman 1992: 13).
4
The precise function of the pineal body is still obscure and species dependent,
however, it does play a role as a neuroendocrinological mechanism, particularly relating to the
effect of light on gonad inhibiting substances. (Gardner 1975: 352)
5
According to Hodgson, Ryle's proposition also adopted a similar stance to that
posited by the behaviourist tradition (1991: 64)
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However, Edelman is cautious of such an approach that considers the
mind to be analogous with that of a computer, running specified programmes
to manipulate data in the brain. For the cognitivists, these mental processes
are largely independent of the structure and developmental modes of the
nervous system, making the underpinning biology (and perhaps the body)
incidental to the operations. For Edelman such views, as influential as they
are, fail to give an adequate description of the mind because they fail to
provide an adequate description of the very substrate ofmind, the brain as a
biological unit. Indeed, as Edelman notes
one of the most curious deficiencies is that it makes only marginal reference to the biological
foundations that underline the mechanisms it purports to explain (1992: 14)
However, this biological mechanism should not only encompass the
brain but should also explore the issues of embodiment and the conscious
experiences which result from such an interplay, and which may serve to help
empower the mind.
Evolving Bodies
That bodies are important in determining behaviour is well
documented. More precisely, morphological adaptations, such as an opposing
fifth digit (thumb), a bipedal gait and large brain development, have probably
played a major role in the evolving behaviour of our species. To what extent
changes in morphology have preceded behaviour, or whether behaviour itself
may have just as likely acted to induce morphological adaptation, remains,
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however, unclear. What is clear though, is that flying requires wings of some
description to the same extent that thinking requires a brain (Edelman 1992:
50). That genes play a crucial role in the evolution of our bodies is not
surprising. The importance of genetic material is not one of gross difference,
as one might initially imagine, but one which relates to the expression of
specific sets of instructions. The genetic similarity between man and the other
primates has been well described. For example, the difference between the
DNA ofman and that of the chimpanzee is less than two per cent. That is to
say the genetic similarity between us is so great that more than 98 per cent of
our genetic material is identical to that of the apes (Passingham 1982: 5).
However, although discerning the difference between our shared DNA
is difficult we have little trouble in identifying a chimp from a man.
Presumably the differences between our body types or phenotypes arise from
less than two percent of our DNA. It has been postulated that the variation
between our own bodies and those of the chimp results from the influence of
control genes which may act to turn on and off developmental regulating
processes, thereby affecting size and shape of the body and its organs (Gould
1977 ). This, then, accounts for the anatomical difference between man and
apes even though our DNA is almost identical. It also provides some insight
into the significance of the body in determining the operations ofmind.
There has always been a deep rooted problem with aligning the
physical to the mental. Although we have little problem identifying the
existence of a conscious corporeality motivating the behaviour ofman and
many other species, reducing it to its constituent elements has not proven
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fruitful. For Thomas Nagel (1979) the trouble with understanding the
mind-body problem rests with interpreting the consciousness that results from
such interactions. But answers have not been discovered by the intellectual
disciplines that attempt to explain consciousness through the principles of
material reductionism. It is not always wise to imagine that the
incomprehensible will be explained by applying the deduction of what is
familiar or well understood. Surprisingly enough, much ofmodern science
and philosophy has been doing just that, reducing consciousness to something
entirely mental and then looking for its physical expression within a material
entity. Anthony Cohen (1994) has been one scholar who has attempted to
insert the 'self back into an extended consciousness which unites the social,
cultural and individual into a meaningful and, most importantly, an
interdependent consciousness. However, there remains one final incorporation
to complete that functional system of a fully aware mental capacity, the body.
To describe the animation of the human body, not in terms of the descent into it of
pure consciousness or reflection, but as a metamorphosis of life, and the body as the "body of
the spirit" (Valery). The latter purpose would demand an "esthesiology," a study of the body
as a perceiving animal. For there can be no question of analysing the fact of birth as if a
body-instrument had received from elsewhere a thought pilot, or inversely as if an object
called the body had mysteriously produced consciousness out of itself..... Thus the body proper
is a sensible and it is the "sensing"; it can be seen and it can see itself, and, in this latter
respect, it comprises an aspect inaccessible to others, open in principle only to itself. The
body proper embraces a philosophy of the flesh as the visibility of the invisible
(Merleau-Ponty 1970: 128-129).
The Conscious Body
When I talk of a person being kind, honest, tall or ugly I am likely to be
addressing the issues of consciousness. It is true that the consciousness to
which I refer is my own and the adjectives used more likely describe, or at
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least represent, my own assumptions about the person. Nevertheless, the
person about whom I speak is, in part although not exclusively, responsible for
my statements. It therefore seems natural to assume that these statements I
make about another ensue from the person I am. This, then, will be my
starting point for a brief corporeal tour of consciousness. My consciousness is
most basically that what it is to be me. As Thomas Nagel agues
but no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all
means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism.... But fundamentally an
organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that
organism - something it is like for the organism (1979: 166).
This 'subjective character of experience' (Nagel 1979) is essential to
any analysis of consciousness for without it we cannot ever really know what
are its material requirements. It has been pointed out earlier that minds require
the material substance of a brain, and although we do not understand the exact
relationship between the physical matter of the brain and the conscious
thoughts that constitute the mind, the brain seems, nevertheless, an essential
feature of the processes ofmind. But any account of the physical basis of
mind must explain a plethora of things. Amongst these the phenomenological
detail of experience is central. Nagel argues that physical reductionism would
require that the 'phenomenological features must themselves be given a
physical account' (1979: 167) but the impossibility of this task is evoked by
their very subjective character. Indeed, as Nagel goes on to point out, any
objective physical theory must abandon this because every subjective
phenomenon is essentially derived from a single point of view. Furthermore, a
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point of view that is only accessed from the personal character most likely
incorporates all of the physical, spatial and behavioural features of that
organism.
As an example of this Nagel asks 'what is it like to be a bat' ? The bat,
although a mammal like ourselves with conscious experience, has a
profoundly different way of relating to the world that we both share. Its
sensory capacities differ, as do its bodily structure and the functions that result
from those different structures. It is also likely that its nervous system is
arranged in such a way as to initiate the behaviour we recognise as being that
of the bat. Nagel's point is, however, what can we ever know about what it is
like to be a bat ? Because it uses sonar, which is just one of its describing
characteristics, to orientate itself in three dimensional space it has subjective
experiences which are beyond our capacity to acquire6. Our own experiences
are of little use. Even with our imagination we will not experience that what it
is to be like a bat. At its most basic this is because we are restricted by our
own resources of both mind and body. Simply being informed about the
structure and function of the bat is clearly not enough to enable us to infer the
internal conscious states, and the resulting experiences, that help make the bat
what it is. Bats, like other conscious organisms, have experiences embodied
within a particular point of view. That points of view can be shared is not
contested, but that points of view can be subjectively experienced is certainly
6
I think Nagel's point is generally a valid one, although sonar is not exclusive to bats,
or for that matter cetaceans , humans can also develop the capacity for echo-location. (See R.P
Power, et al (1981: 35) Therefore, if his argument were to rest solely on the uniqueness of
sonar being a perceptual capacity of the bat, thereby excluding human comprehension of this
experience his argument would be somewhat weaker but still not invalid since subjectivity
must be one of the defining characters of individualism.
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more problematic. We do not understand how physical events produce
subjective phenomenological experiences because we have yet to account for
the interface that permits such transmissions. It is likely, however, that the
physical architecture, within which the mind is materially placed, has many
implications for the processes that ensue from its operations. Presumably the
subjective phenomenological experiences that Nagel refers to are, in part at
least, the result of the physical capacities of that particular organism.
Therefore he is quite right in maintaining that there are facts and experiential
details involved with being a bat that are well beyond our human capacity to
express, experience or articulate. But the fact that 'we can be compelled to
recognise the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend
them' (Nagel 1979: 171) need not lead us to deny that such phenomena are
indeed experienced and acted on by our friend the bat.
But it is not just the bat's experiences that lie beyond our capacity to
describe. The subjective nature of those experiences that relate to individuals
born blind, deaf and brain injured are equally likely to not be accessible to
others. It is for this very reason that embodiment, those experiences, accounts
and the influencing speculations of others, climax to significance. That a
body, orchestrated by brain injury, is conscious and has experiences of the
world in perhaps a subtle, but also a dramatic, way poses another problem for
those attempting to understand the individualised encounters with life that




Why is individual phenomenology not public experience ? Let me
phrase this question another way, i.e. why does the individual have
subjectively unique experiences? The initial answer seems simple - because
they are unique and individual they will experience events in the world in their
own particular way. But then we must ask, what makes the individual an
individual? One possible explanation would arise from the genetic varieties
that result from sexual recombination and mutation. In fact it has been
suggested that
by mixing genes with those of another individual, (and) even one pair of human parents, at one
mating, can produce 64 trillion genetically different offspring... (Ornstein 1991:116).
Although this genetic variety confers benefit to the species in
evolutionary successful ways, this genetic drift does not alone account for our
individuality. The psychological and biological literature is full of facts on
individual differences. However, a central component in the individualism of
humankind is environment. It appears that both social and physical
environments influence the development of the individual (Jenkins 1997).
That different worlds confront different people seems to be important here.
Position in the family, diet, sex, height and personal interest all act to
individualise the person (Ornstein 1991: 114). Indeed, the idea that race,
socio-economic status and age also help to individualise the person is no
longer a surprise. In addition to this there is phenotype, which for our
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purposes will include shape and the body's functional properties, which also
plays an important role in the individual's consciousness. Interest in the
human body, its form and expression, and how such somatic varieties impinge,
presumably, upon the mind donating different personality traits is not a new
idea. Hipprocrates (460-377 BC.) classified people according to their body
type and the diseases to which each type were likely to be associated. Sheldon
et al (1970) developed a hypothesis that distinguished three body types or
somatotypes, endomorphy (fat), mesomorphy (muscular) and ectomorphy
(thin). Each type had its accompanying temperament and was also seemingly
inclined to develop a corresponding variety ofmental illness (Sheldon, Lewis
and Tenny, 1969).
Physical attractiveness is another aspect of the body which can
influence the personal experiences of an individual so much, in fact, as to
affect their treatment injudicial matters. Efran (1974) showed that those who
were regarded as more physically attractive tended to be given the benefit of
the doubt by juries as compared to those perceived as plain or unattractive.
Moreover beauty, as defined by the external contours of the body (aesthetics),
or in Featherstone's et al (1991) terms the surfaces of the body, has given
emphasis to the growth of both consumerism and the fashion industry which
play a key part in not only the medicalisation of diet and fitness but also in the
development of 'the body beautiful' as the 'target of advertising and consumer
luxury' (Turner 1992: 164-165). This serves to show that the body may well
be a physical and biological entity but its individual management is as much
one of social regulation as it is of hormonal activation.
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So it appears that the specific details of human bodies, their aesthetics,
capacities and incapacities, are important in influencing the conscious
experiences of the individuals in the same way that the bat's body influences
its experiences. We may conclude that bodies, their individual characters and
their functional properties, help engage our minds with the world in which we
live. Is it not possible then, that our minds which consciously operate on our
experiences of self, other and the perceived world can influence the very
physical nature of our bodies? For example, many brain injured children will
dissociate themselves from their hemiplegic limbs, making any form of
functioning with that limb seem impossible. They have developed a 'neglect'
for that area of the body that does not conform, due to a lesion of the brain, to
its appropriate motility. In doing so, however, they further decrease their
opportunities to exercise control over it. This leads to an escalation of the
problem, reinforced by a negative feedback link of dysfunction. However,
developing uses such as supporting roles for the spastic or athetoid limb,
where the dysfunctional hand and arm, for example, are used to simply keep
some weight on a paper for writing or to push against an object so that the
other limb may get a better grasp of it, helps to reintroduce a purpose for that
limb and also re-establishes a sense of completeness in the mind of the injured
child. In this way the neglect shown to dysfunctional limbs can be challenged
and over time, with therapy, function can improve. The problem is and still
remains one originated by injury to the brain, but an ameliorative solution may
nevertheless be found in engaging the mind through the body.
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Indeed, this is often the underlying philosophy, although rarely
articulated, in many alternative therapeutic systems7. We know that injury to
the brain often results, particularly when occurring at the time of birth, in
motor and sometimes sensory and intellectual impairment. One of the most
frequent causes of this has been suggested to involve a disruption of oxygen
supply to vital areas which control the movement of limbs in the child's
developing brain (Pape, et al 1979). In such cases the nerve cells do not
develop sufficiently to establish a pathway down the spinal cord, but
nevertheless continue to emit an excess of signals to the muscles resulting in
'uncontrolled contractions known as spasticity' (James 1995). What we must
now explore is, how might such contractions of the body affect the individual's
experiences and what are the consequences of these 'adjusted' experiences,
due to motor impairment, for the particular individual's consciousness?
Chaotic States
I have attempted to show that bodies, or perhaps more importantly an
individual's experiences of embodiment, are to a large extent constructed on
the personal and subjective experiences an individual encounters. Nagel's
discussion (above) on the unique morphological adaptations of the bat
frustrates our ability to imagine what it must be like to be such a creature, but
does serve to provide an interesting insight into how bodies might play a
1
Both Doman-Delacato and Conductive Education approaches imply, sometimes on a
subliminal level, that amelioration of brain injured children involves addressing the processes
ofmind. The Doman method refers to 'neurological organisation' whilst the rhetoric of
conductive education states that one uses the brain not legs to walk. Interestingly enough
although many therapeutic rationales identify the biological unit of the brain in language, in
practice they are often attempting to engage the mind.
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critical role in individual phenomenology. We have seen also that a more
pragmatic approach to addressing the mind / body dichotomy is to refer to the
capacities and potentials of individuals - and attribute these expressions to be
the result ofminds, or brains working through the somatic activities of the
body to establish a personal actuality and potentiality. Indeed, for this reason
it is also possible that the minds of brain injured children are found expressed
in the limited somatic but, nevertheless, communicative functions of the body,
as related by the parents in the following account. Karen was born with a
chromosomal disorder and a heart defect that required surgery.
Communication, feeding, balance and scoliosis and the major concern for the
parents.
(Karen)
Interviewer: You were saying that Karen enjoys physical contact.
Father: Although people tend to think that she is delicate she likes
and always has liked rough play. She likes to be physically bounced around
she likes movement.
Interviewer: Has she any concepts of her body, for example, is she
modest?
Mother: No, but she does think its funny to have her clothes off. You
know when she goes for a bath she scratches her bottom and laughs about it.
Father: She's notfar enough on to have a concept ofher body. Well
Sally (Karen's sister) doesn't worry about running around the house without
her clothes and she's 6.
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Mother: Well she would at school.
Father: Yes, but at home she wouldn't.
Mother: But then she would know the difference because she would
not do that outside. But on the other hand I think Karen would think if
someone undressed her out ofthe house she wouldfind that strange. So I
think she does know the difference. There are times when she won't letyou
brush her teeth, she doesn't want you to invade her mouth.
Interviewer: Especially considering her problems with language, is it
possible that she may use her body as a communicative tool?
Mother: Oh yes she can exclude you with her eyes.
Father: She puts her arms aroundyou, that's herfavourite thing now,
she digs her nails into the back ofyou neck topullyour head down into a
cuddle.
Mother: But she willpush people away, the ones she doesn't like and
at school they say ifshe doesn't want to do her work she will close her eyes
and switch off.
Like that of other children Karen's body has an actuality and
potentiality but due to motor impairment is embedded in the deep semiotics of
disability. But even here it is likely to be the reciprocal genesis of a personal
phenomenology and, as such, at least one account of the processes that
underlie subjective experience. However, in order for this statement to
represent, although very simply, a possible solution to a confounding 'dualism'
I make the assumption that the operations that ensue from both body and mind
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are to some level united, co-ordinated and functionally operable together.
Consider, for a moment, the implications to self expression and experience if
disruption was to occur at any vital point of this integrated system.
Luria (1973) investigated a tragic case in which an individual's brain
(left parietal area) was damaged by a war wound. Although the person had
difficulty with memory, vision, speech and reading he managed to reconstruct
his life well enough to describe his experiences.
I'll look to the right ofme and be horrified to discover half ofmy body is gone. I'm
terrified - sometimes when I'm sitting down I suddenly feel as though my head is the size of a
table, every bit as big - while my hands and feet and torso become very small
Sometimes when I'm sitting on a chair, I suddenly become very tall, but my torso becomes
terribly short and my head very, very tiny - no bigger than a chicken's head. You can't imagine
what this is like even if you have tried - its just got to happen to you (Luria 1973, cited in
Young 1978: 215).
This statement informs on more than just the personal tragedy of an
individual, for it also supports the notion that experiences cannot be accounted
for in any other way than that given by personal involvement. Indeed, it really
has 'got to happen to you'. Social anthropology is laden with rich
ethnographic resources describing and theorising the pragmatic function and
semiological significance of culturally and socially retained bodies. However,
a specific aspect of this embodiment paradigm remains, in the large,
undisclosed. Because human bodies are, in Hallowell's (1955) terms, 'objects
in a world of objects' they have a social value which depends largely upon
their normative expression that is, of course, normative within their particular
social and cultural context. This normative account of embodiment depends,
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to a large extent, on shared personal experiences or phenomenology, being the
result of socially defined bodies acting in socially defined space.
Of course, the operational rules which serve to govern bodies can and
do change when transformations such as possession, trance and obsession etc,
are recognised (see chapter 7). Although these altered states of consciousness
often have accompanying bodily manifestations (as I shall show later), in the
main embodiment, as an anthropological issue, has often been concerned with
either the functionally normal body or that recognised as illness behaviour.
The latter, indeed, has given rise to medical sociology and medical
anthropology (Good 1994, Radley 1993 and Helman 1986). Thus the fact that
there are bodies that do not conform to normative expression, due to some
underlying trauma, not only presents the anthropological enterprise with an
interesting methodological issue, it also likely presents an individual so
affected with a set of unique, and perhaps socially isolating, experiences
incommensurate with those already discerned from studies of normative
embodiment.
What, then, are the implications of radically different experiences of
embodiment due to changes of physical expression and ability? The fixed or
sometimes fluctuating muscular contractions, which can often not only distort
the brain injured child's body but also reduce his or her capacity to
purposefully engage with the world, must then surely effect the very
consciousness therein restrained. However, that individual consciousness is
thus restrained need not confirm it as a limited capacity but rather as one that
presents a greater challenge to interpretation. The problem, then, of
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interpretation is as equally true for the parent as it is for the anthropologist.
The following mother's statement may help to illuminate this uncertainty.
(Cindy)
Its just those little things she says (wishing she was someone else, not
disabled) every now and again that gets you. She's not saying it in a way like,
'oh Iwish I could walk', she's not saying it like she's making a statement and
that's the end of it. She said to me a little while back, 'oh I had a nightmare
last night' and I said 'didyou'? 'Yes, Iwas being chased and Iwas running
like mad'. I said 'were you running or were you in your wheelchair', 'no Iwas
running' she said. She actually dreams she's running. So you know its in her
subconscious, its us that get upset. Imean ifthere are other children here
they all run off into the garden and there's Cindy crawling along the floor and
by the time she gets to the door they have all come back in again so she turns
around and comes back in and I think 'oh poor little thing'. I don't think she
worries about it she justplods along. Imean she knows she can't walk, well
she used to. We've had a long chat and I've explained to her the best as my
ability will allow about the brain and that a little part had been damaged, but
she doesn't really seem to be that worried about it. What is going on in her
mind? I don't really know what she is thinking. She came in yesterday and
had a school journalfor spelling open on a blankpage, but she was reading a
story, I said 'what are you doing Cindy'? She said, 'shush' I'm nearlyfinished,
so she finished her story and said 'right, you can talk to me now' and I said
'what were you doing? 'Oh Iwas just reading a story'.
These states ofmotor impairment establish an actuality for the injured
child but do little to provide him or her with an easily recognisable and
interpretable personal potentiality. What are the consequences for such
children when their own bodies do not project into the world in such a fashion
as to provide them with a construct for what Mauss (1934) and Bourdieu
(1977) might term 'habitus'? It is surely not that these children evade this
concept, for even motorically and intellectually impaired children have bodies.
But if'habitus' is the concept which refers '...to the sum total of culturally
patterned uses of the body in society' (Csordas 1989: 11) where are we to
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locate the dysfunctional patterns of bodily expression within this cultural
environment? If functionally normative bodies have culturally patterned uses,
which establish them as both the tool and purpose of culture in society, what
part is left for the disabled body? Ifwe continue this line of reasoning for a
moment longer we can see that disabled bodies play but a little part in the
cultural construction of society, and as such are neither likely to be its object.
Perhaps the only exception to this is a negative role: they may help to make
explicit the boundaries of normality.
Thus if one of the purposes of an abled embodiment is to be personally
empowered as a functional representative of society, then disablement is likely
to be the signature expression of the disempowered. Furthermore, ifwe
consider that not only are brain injured children's bodies culturally less
manipulative, but they also have the added disadvantage of being children, a
category which, as we have seen, (see chapter 2) has little status in the adult
affairs that largely determine society, we begin to see the depth of the isolation
to which many such children must be subjected. The brain injured child's
experience of embodiment must, at some deep and important level, reflect the
child's conscious position in the external world, for Merleau-Ponty argues that
the body is a "setting in relation to the world," and that consciousness is the body projecting
itself in the world (cited in Csordas 1989: 8).
Merleau-Ponty's observation is based on perception and its
phenomenological nature, and in his account our bodies are the starting point
of this process. Thus perception is, in the first instance, a style or pattern of
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the body behaving that encounters (perceives) objects after reflective analysis.
Encountering objects is the experience of perception permitted by the body
engaging at all levels (physical and social) in the world. So, for
Merleau-Ponty objects are indeterminate until determined by the conscious
body. But if our experience of objects, presumably existing independently in
the world, is only determined after our conscious bodies have encountered
them, then there is likely to be a particular way for bodies to correctly behave
in order to achieve their perceptual goal. The following account concerns
Timothy (see 'case two' in chapter 8) and one consequence of his body's
motility. The present account is presented as a narrative simply because
Timothy's mother was not comfortable with the tape recorder being used so I
took notes contemporaneously and wrote them up after returning to the clinic.
(Timothy)
Mother talked about Timothy's behaviour and inparticular one
element that was ofsome concern to them. This involved Timothy "escaping"
i.e. getting out ofplaces andmaking a run for it. He could be quite devious
about it and seemed to carefully choose his moment when just the right
circumstances existed he would make a dash for it and escape. On one
occasion he was caught running up the middle ofthe road seemingly oblivious
to the danger ofthe situation. On another occasion, a neighbour was looking
after himfor an hour when he climbed out ofan open window and into the
garden. Both his mother andfather had spent much time considering the
rationale for this behaviour and are at a loss to accountfor it..
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We talkedfor some time about this and I suggested thatperhaps one
way to interpret this was to consider notions ofconfinement wherein the body
and his mental disability are contrasted with some aspect ofthe outside,
possibly unconfined space andfreedom. For example, Timothy has to be
closely watched so most ofhis time revolves around being kept indoors. The
sphere ofthe home may now give rise to feelings ofconfinement and routine
attached to familiar experiences. However, outside provides new possibilities,
opportunities and stimulation which may not only be very attractive to an
inquisitive child, but also provide an important extensions to experience.
Thus, the external outside sphere, as opposed to the internalised one ofthe
home, mayprovide a new experience for the body, through escape both the
body and the mind are liberated. That is, inside represents confinement and
emphasis on disability whereas, the outside represents in some way, perhaps
even just spatially, freedom and new levels ofexperience and autonomy.
As Merleau-Ponty would argue movement, either imagined or real, is
one of the key features of the body's discerning ability, for without it we are
unable to purposely project into the world. However, unlike those patients
with whom Merleau-Ponty worked and studied, many brain injured children
have often not lost their body's motility but rather have failed to acquire it in
the first place. Thus it is unlikely that one could even imagine purposeful
movement if one had never had the opportunity to develop such a facility. So
how are such children to be, in this sense at least 'in the world' if their bodies
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fail them as culturally and socially refined phenomenological receptacles?
This problem is perhaps alluded to when Merleau-Ponty writes
It is true that even in the normal person the perception of the body and of objects in contact
with the body is vague when there is no movement (1962: 108).
The so called 'normal' body in this view does not need to rely upon real
movements of the body to experience a stimulus, as these can be aroused by a
kind of 'potential movement' (1962: 109 ). This is due, argues Merleau-Ponty,
to the fact that for the
normal person every event related to movement or sense of touch causes consciousness to put
up a host of intentions which run from the body as the centre ofpotential action either towards
the body itself or towards the object (i.e. what is perceived) (1962: 109).
Now the lack of purposeful and intentional movement is very likely to
exclude the brain injured child from that consciousness inspired by the body's
potentiality. There is little point, argues Merleau-Ponty, in attempting to
'deduce the normal from the pathological' (1962: 107) or transferring the
meaningful patterns of normal movement to the injured child. In this sense the
child is not in some temporary or virtual world but in a concrete one that is
itself a 'complete form of existence' like that which naturally occurs in
childhood, old age and illness (1962: 107). Although this world is indeed a
real one it can have few, if any, of the conscious fusions between object and
self that are both the purpose and result of the functional body actively
engaging with the external world.
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However, there are possibilities here for those brain injured children
who have little motor ability. Although they might have never experienced the
necessary motility of body as a facility to Merleau-Pontian perception they
might, through discourses and observations with others, imagine or construct a
representation of themselves as both 'subject' and 'object' and thus extend
themselves into an external world (see chapter 8).
The Antisocial Body
What I have attempted to argue is not that children with a brain injury
fail to be conscious of themselves and the world in which they live but that we,
the abled bodied, are presented with many problems in gaining insight into
their conscious states unless we investigate the fundamental roles embodiment
plays in developing their consciousness. This problem might be more clearly
expressed if presented in a different way. In 1950 A.M. Turing predicted that
by the year 2000 computers will have a 30% chance of fooling an interrogator
into thinking it was a person. There were several conditions attached to this
prediction governed by a specific methodology8. However, one thoughtful
critique of "Turin's Test" asks how could an interrogator (a given person)
assume that the object he was interrogating was, for example, either (1) a
concealed woman or (2) a digital computer, when he had no evidence that the
object uses words as he himselfmight understand them. That is, 'uses its
words to refer to objects in the world' (Davidson 1990: 7) which he too
8
For a good review of Turing's prediction see D. Davidson (1990)
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recognises to be the same objects. Furthermore, the references made would
need to be responses to events and aspects of a shared world with mutual
access. Donald Davidson continues his evaluation and makes an observation
which is equally relevant to the present discussion when he states that
It is clear, then, that the physical characteristics of the Object (computer or woman) will matter
a great deal. We have already noticed that one physical characteristic was essential: the
Object had to be causally responsible for the 'messages' observed by the interrogator. But now
we see that the Object's 'body' matters for further reasons, since the Object must be able to
respond to many of the same features of the world that can be noted by the interrogator, and it
must be possible for the interrogator to see or otherwise learn that the object is responding to
those features. For the Object to have a semantics, it must operate in the world a certain way,
and for someone else to grasp these semantics, there must be a three-way interaction between
Object, interrogator and shared world (1990: 8).
Now this argument against the so called 'Turing's Test' postulates the
same problem for brain injured children. Bodies, especially those which
operate in a particular way, provide a baseline for consciousness through
experience. The body that is unable to interact in culturally and socially
specific ways with aspects of the world that impute meaning is unlikely to
have developed a commonality of experience and expression commensurate
with those who do. Unless of course, they have circumvented the problem by
initiating novel strategies that we have yet to explore (a possibility that will be
considered later).
Furthermore, I must include into my analysis the fact that bodies, abled
or disabled, have properties other than their motility and perceptual skills.
They also have deep social meaning attached to them. One of the most
inspiring contributions to the cultural value of bodies, and the social regulating
mechanisms imposed on those that do not conform to 'normative' values, is
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presented in Erving Goffman's book 'Stigma' (1963). To be physically
disabled may not just limit the semantics, or the rules for interpreting
experiences that result from a collective phenomenology in a shared world, but
may also limit one's personal experience or contact with the social world. That
is, prejudices relating to disability impose their own explanations on an
individual's behaviour without reference to the individual's self-account of the
presented behaviour (Shakespeare 1994 and Oliver 1996) Moreover, such
'stigmatising' will inevitably lead to a restriction of activities and experiences
regarded as unsuitable or inappropriate simply because their understanding of
the problems involved is based on prejudice and ignorance. Thus, we can
identify another isolating dimension to be encountered by brain injured
children and to be discerned by us. To be in the mainstream requires that the
body, its physical, social and political functioning, must not challenge the
cultural norms of operation.
Paediatricians Duff and Campbell (1979, cited in Finkelstein 1991: 51)
have recognised that those children, who they refer to as 'defective', will
receive little if any acceptance into mainstream society and have subsequently
termed these infants 'socially dead'. The underlying rationale which often
determines such statements reflects the notion that physiognomic appearance
is socially defined. It has been argued that much of the modern industry of the
body uses exercise, cosmetics, clothes and even surgery to fashion a portrayal
of personal character by developing an 'ideal' body (Featherstone et al 1991,
Finkelstein 1991 and Turner 1992). This, of course, would not be possible if
there were not precedents and accessible substructures already developed to
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propagate such an ideology. The body is not just a functional mechanism of
personal intention or collective expression, or for that matter 'an architectural
metaphor of the society at large' (Regnier-Bohler (1988) cited in Finkelstein
1991: 50). Bodies are, most fundamentally, the very material repository of
society and that on which its appraisals and regulations fall. It is of little
wonder, then, that the normative and aesthetic attributes of the body have
evolved a prerequisite role in the maintenance of a social, as well as a
personal, identity. The primacy of an aesthetic body, a socially acceptable one
with no anomalous detail, is witnessed by the industry which serves it.
However, it seems that enlightenment has yet to sympathise with the
seemingly socially intolerable forms of disablement. Deficiencies and
inadequacies are, at every opportunity, regulated and, where possible,
corrected.
The increasingly detailed notation of correctable human features is a reflection of the
proliferation of techniques now available with which to alter and presumably refine
appearance. These mechanisms and services are available not because modern individuals are
inherently more flawed, but because the belief in physical appearance as a signpost to human
character has not been expunged from our culture. Indeed, ifwe consider the growth in the
'body industries', including the development ofmodern medicine, the possibility emerges that
the belief in character as immanent in appearance has intensified (Finkelstein 1991: 69).
Finkelstein's observation that bodies have a social currency, providing
this currency has not been defaced in any way, is particularly true of children,
whose aesthetic qualities, as noted in chapter 2, are regarded as emblematic of
an ideal state or innocence. Thus many brain injured children may become
physically conspicuous due to the associated aesthetic symptoms which often
accompany a neurological insult. Positional deformities, spasticity and facial
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grimaces act to signal the child's marginal status to a motorically competent
community. However, if such symptoms are not overtly present then
discovery of the child's problems are often only detected during personal
interaction. It is through such encounters that the politics of disability (Oliver
1996, Barnes 1996) are discerned and established.
(Karen)
Father: To the outside person Karen's not immediately handicapped,
she quite apretty child really, isn't she?
Mother: Yes, but she's becoming now father interjects, 'its
becoming more noticeable, that's what we are going to face'. Yes because up
to now she's just been a baby and everything was well she's just apretty little
baby.
Father: She still goes around and is big enough to fit into an oversize
McClaren buggy.
Mother: That is straight way a mark that she's disabled in some way
but she doesn't have any abnormal behaviour.
Comments may be made which reference the 'shame' that such an
otherwise 'pretty little girl' should be mentally incapacitated, imposing once
again the notion that physical attractiveness is incompatible with disability. It
is, of course, both possible and likely that people feel uncomfortable when
they discover that the 'pretty' little child is brain injured and thus attempt to
salvage their embarrassment by making reference to the child's 'saving'
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physical normality, her general aesthetic appearance. However, either reaction
simply serves to highlight the notion that physically anomalous bodies, or in
some cases anomalous behaviour, seem to contaminate their possessors, and
that disability is regarded as an unlikely associate of the aesthetic or normative
body. Indeed, it appears that the physiognomic practices of the nineteenth
century which assumed that an individual's internal character, or for that
matter state ofmind, was pictorially represented by a misshapen body and face
may still remain persuasive9.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the relationship the body has with the
clinical notion of brain injury. Bodies, to a greater or lesser degree, are the
external representatives of a given person and as such they are emblazoned
with both social and clinical significance. Typically, the hidden neurological
trauma is outwardly manifest in the body. Bodies thus affected are
conspicuously charged with disablement, an emblem in itself for social
exclusion.
What I have attempted to demonstrate is that brain injury makes few
substantive references, neither social nor clinical, to that complex physical
organ wherein, presumably, the problems are located. This probably has less
to do with our present level of understanding concerning the brain and its
diverse functions than with the body as a narrative for social engagement. It is




the body, not the brain, that is continually on show, that has a public function
and responsibility and which acts to make the definitive statement of the
possessor's underlying character. Physical appearances are not the result of
the fashion industry but the cause. Fashion, in one sense, is not the process of
simply obtaining a cosmetic change of appearance, it has more to do with a
particular way of behaving in a socially prescribed manner.
The value of the individual's physical appearance lies not so much in its
approximation to a specific style or ideal of beauty but as an indication of his or her
willingness to treat the body as malleable, and so to subject him- or herself to the array of tools
and techniques that can fashion it (Finkelstein 1991: 184).
That this 'malleability' is likely to be present in the bodies of brain
injured children seems obvious enough, but identifying the subtle self
adaptations of form, appearance and expression that these children may engage
in order to offer some statement about themselves to an external and
prejudiced world remains problematic. To engage in the cultural practice of
adornment, to transform the body with the prevailing tools of society, serves as
a reaffirmation of the values held by that society. The body is, once again,
both the purpose and tool of social unity, wherein the perceived
'non-transformers' are, for whatever reason, viewed as deviants. It is little
wonder that so many parents of brain injured children seek to minimise their
children's disability with active therapies that attempt to reinstate 'positional
normality' and dress their children in fashionable clothes so as not to attract
public gaze (see chapter 6).
Whereas brain injury as a neurological condition is only ever loosely
articulated by the clinical communities its presence, as indicated by a
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transformation of the body, provides much more scope for social debate. The
fact that such children are often unable to benefit from the tools of a body
culture industry to effect change acts to conspicuously confirm that these
children are indeed on the social periphery. The fact that the consumer
industry is challenged by their anomalous bodies only threatens to further
distance these children from its transforming services, and as a result, their
social position becomes as equally anomalous as their bodies (Turner 1984).
The body has become a fundamental feature of taste and distinction in which the
management of the human form becomes part of the major aspect of cultural or physical
capital (Bourdieu 1984 cited in Turner 1992: 47).
However, by 'disembodying' the significant aspects of such a trauma,
i.e. the personal experiences that result from embodiment, which often occurs
in the clinical setting, we risk failing to understand the interactions that give
meaning to consciousness itself and which are likely to be an important aspect
of brain injury. Indeed, as argued, this consciousness is not solely restricted to
the individual but, by means of a socially engaging body, is paramount in the
aggregate experiences that establish a societal or collective consciousness.
For Wittgenstein the body provides 'the best picture of the human soul',
and portrays the essence of human character itself (cited in Finkelstein 1991:
184). Such rhetoric places great demand upon the body, a demand that cannot
always be met, particularly by disabled bodies. So a thorough understanding
of embodiment is essential ifwe are to account for the personal isolation that
injured children experience, and which inevitably is partly constructed by the





Up to this point I have developed my theme on the 'Orchestrated Body'
with particular reference to the social construction of childhood and the body
that gives meaning to the public performances which conspicuously present
brain injury. That childhood has been explored socially, clinically and
philosophically by so many scholars testifies to the enormity of interest that
underscores the developmental events which chronologically locate children
for particular concern. Specialist groups have evolved a variety of
professional roles to educate children's intellect, doctor their bodies and
sometimes their minds, regulate infringements of conduct and even, when felt
necessary, remove the child from its parents. It seems, then, that the
socialising of children merits much concern. It is true that, as adults, they will
be charged with the responsibility of replicating society, and as such must be
schooled in the commensurate ideologies and practices that are, for better or
worse, its future investment1 (Jenks 1996). However some children, almost
by default, will be viewed as transgressors or deviants simply because of their
inability to conform and perform to the prevailing tempos that orchestrate
childhood as a part in the larger societal score. The fact that such issues arise
from specific aspects of embodiment being perceived as abnormal or
pathological helps to constrain the brain injured child within a medical
1
See Armstrong (1983: 13-18).
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perception. In contrast to this, alternative therapy attempts to help the parents
engage with the child as an embodied person, not an entity of disability.
In this chapter I will explore, in greater depth, brain injured children
who may well be construed as 'non-performers', and the interest and ultimate
control that management centred systems impose on so many of them and their
experience of disability. That is, I shall explain the consequences of the work
done by the 'professional players' (doctors) in structuring clinical pathology as
some independent aspect of the social constructions which attempt to provide
meaning for those traumatically involved. In this way, brain injured children
are regarded as a particular construction of an 'objective' medical gaze largely
concerned with identifying paediatric pathology. This, perhaps, is what
parents who seek alternative therapy are hoping to get away from, as they try
to reach and realise the embodied potential that they feel by intuition is
present.
The Cellular Concept
Engel (1962) suggested that often the orthodox approach is fixated
with disease and dysfunction at the cellular level, and argued that such medical
reductionism affects the practitioner's ability to conceptualise the problems at
all levels of organisation. Indeed, this trend was noted by Armstrong (1983) as
one of the historical products ofmedical enlightenment in the late eighteenth
century.
When the "body appears to have been discrete because it was recorded in separate
case notes; it was accessible because at this time medicine began to use methods of physical
examination; it was analysable because pathology became localisable to a distinct point within
118
Chapter 4
the body; it was passive because the patient's personal history was relegated from its primary
position as the key to the diagnosis to (that of) a preliminary" (Armstrong 1983: 6).
This is particularly true with regard to brain injured children. The
primary focus of clinical attention is some (often vague) area of neurological
cell destruction, and the behavioural dysfunction that ensues is directly
attributed to this defined pathology. The question now is to what extent are
the gross observed dysfunctions solely associated with the underlying neuronal
damage2, and how much are they contributed to by sensory and general
environmental deprivations that may, in part, be a product of some medical
labelling theory and its associations? Indeed, might not some of the observed
dysfunction result from the absence of an appropriate therapy? Whatever the
aetiological agents responsible, it is, for example, now recognised that they are
likely to associate with a myriad of external and non clinical factors that serve
to further confound our perception of the aetiology of dysfunction and its
subsequent amelioration. Furthermore, with increasing diagnostic techniques
disease, or more specifically brain damage, is identified as a deviation from
normal structure. The temptation now is to consider such findings as the
explanation for the present condition rather than a manifestation of the
condition's state (see note 2). The logical approach for orthodox medicine,
then, is to attempt an amelioration of the condition by directly treating the
damaged area concerned i.e. that which deviates from the normal. The fact
2
Neubauer et al (1990) have noted that some tissue in the brain may be viable but non
functioning ('idling neurons'). Research involving hyperbaric oxygen suggests that recovery of
function may, in some cases, be related to oxygen uptake in this partial hypoxic area which
surrounds the more densely ischemic centre of the lesion (Astrup 1981). Thus, many of the
disabilities we observe in brain injured children may well be related to the inability of these
idling neurons to 'come on line'. Therefore, any prognosis based on dead tissue (pathology)
may not be a valuable indicator of outcome.
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that often in medicine such measures prove successful, as perhaps in some
form of surgical intervention, is not in itself 'evidence for the general validity
of such a point of view' (Engel 1962: 241).
That all bodies are, in some way and to differing degrees, orchestrated
by the professional gaze of the society in which they live seems reasonable
enough, but why many will be given an active voice and others seemingly kept
mute may not be so easily deciphered. My purpose in this chapter will be to
attempt to show the method of 'muting' certain potential 'instrumentalists' and
the consequence of this on the overall harmonic quality of society. If I
maintain this musical analogy for a little longer we will see that the 'soloists' in
our symphonic impressions of society are the professionals, playing the
leading parts and heard over all the other members3.
Medicalising the Family
Zola (1975, in Hillier 1986: 175) and Foucault (1973) have argued that
medical institutions function as agents of social control whilst Hillier points
out that 'despite medicine's acknowledged contribution to public welfare it can
be dangerous to life, liberty and happiness' (1986 :175, Illich 1975). This
process, which Hillier (1986) refers to as the 'medicalisation of human affairs',
encourages the application of medical practice and principles to the social
setting. By defining the expression of normative values for behaviour,
physical function, feelings, thoughts and perhaps even aesthetics4 (Gill 1989,
3
However, one should remember a cautionary maxim that states 'you do not create a
choir with soloists alone'!
4
One only has to look at the anatomical charts to see classical proportions presented as
ideal body types. Not only did Western medicine inherit the Greek medical system (Turner
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Turner 1987 and Featherstone 1982) as the medically inspired healthy body,
those individuals identified (through surveillance) as not conforming to this
criteria risk being treated as deviant (Scambler 1986, Featherstone 1982,
Freidson 1970 and Goffman 1963). However, it is not just those who visit the
doctors' surgeries with organic and or social problems who are likely to be
labelled deviant. Parents of a brain injured child may, by questioning medical
provisions, be labelled deviant by the supervising doctor. Many families with
whom I have personally worked recall seeing notes attached to their medical
records identifying them as belligerent or troublesome, as Philip's mother
recounted her experiences with doctors when attempting to secure information
and treatment for her 22 month old boy following a drowning accident.
(Philip)
I know I'm down on a lot ofpeople's lists as being that awful woman.
But it is not just that parents may be labelled troublesome. Worse, is
their feeling of disempowerment, their inability to effectively negotiate on
their child's behalf with the medical profession. The mother with two
disabled children recalls
(Fiona & Tony)
There is a time when you sit there and they (doctors) say, you're very
lucky that your child has got thisfar and there is not much more we can do.
And there comes a time when even you, because you are going through this
trauma, actually think, are we mad? Why are we still pushing? You need to
go home have some rest and then start again. So it is a great body (medicine)
that you are up against andfighting, and unfortunatelyfor mostpeople, they
1987: 20) it also adopted their aestheticism, their celebration of an ideal, healthy, body which
was "a moral as well as an aesthetic experience" (Gill 1989: 27).
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are stronger because you are brought up to be in awe ofthe medical
profession. They do save lives, they can blindyou with science, they can
actually make you feel that it is not your child, its the condition, that the child
doesn't have a personality, the family doesn't have apersonality, all this is the
condition.
'All this is the condition' - what condition? By ascribing both the
child's disablement and the parent's trauma of coping with it as legitimate
clinical dysfunction, 'the condition', medical practice sets out to supervise not
only the child's treatment but also the ways in which parents attempt to deal
with it (Voysey 1975). However, as I have shown in Chapter 3, brain injury
presents some rather unique problems for medicine and its ameliorative
processes, particularly with regard to treatment efficacy. As a result medicine
offers clinical wisdom as a guide to the social consequences of disablement so
as to legitimise its own medical role in the social situation of the family. Its
inability to ameliorate brain injury is threatening to its professional
competence, and it is therefore through the imposition of other kinds of
medical control that legitimacy is re-established. The following is another
account from Philip's mother.
(Philip)
And this professor came in and said. 'WellMr andMrs Jones we've
done the scan', and my husband said. 'Well before you start I don't want no
beating around the bush, you know what is wrong with him andwhat is
happening'. He said 'OK we'll be honest. Iwouldput him in a home, you
forget about him and have another baby', he said. 'Because he will never do
anything'. He said with the extent of Philip's brain damage he will be no




The result of this conversation was to encourage this family to seek an
alternative approach to that offered by doctors which led them to the Kerland
Foundation. Philip is now 12 years old and has made some progress and is
showing interest in people and his surroundings. The family recently had
another child.
Such statements are, surprisingly, not uncommon. The problems of the
child's injury tend often not to be addressed directly by medicine. Instead the
social sphere in which the child is dependent may become the focus of clinical
concern. The following is, once again, a statement from Philip's mother which
typifies this adjustment in the clinical gaze from injured child to familial
distress.
(Philip)
That's right, keep him quiet, don't disrupt your life too much you've got
to get on with it. Because that's what we found with everybody, they were
more concerned about me and John, all they kept saying was, 'how are you
and John getting on', you know? 'Are you two all right' ? And Iwould say,
yeah we're fine. But they would (always) seem more interested in us
In fact, doctors are often more eager to discuss the parents' well-being
than those features which are likely to affect the child's development.
There are, however, few professionals eager to inform the parents that
something may be wrong with their child if the problem is believed to have
resulted from some trauma at birth. In such cases most appear to play the
'waiting game' which allows parents the opportunity of self discovery, to come
to terms with the child's problems over an extended period of time.
Unfortunately, such tactics often increase parental anxiety, since many mothers
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are especially sensitive to their child's behaviour, even if it is their first child.
Some mothers have experienced health visitors and other professionals calling
at the home, examining their child and leaving without mentioning that
something could be wrong with the baby's development. The following
statement expresses well this anxiety. (For a more detailed review of Cindy's
condition see the first case study in Chapter 8)
(Cindy)
Surely as a trainedperson he could have seen that (spasticity), and if
he had seen it and thought there was a problem, he should have said
(something) shouldn't he?
Another mother recalls her disappointment and puzzlement at the lack
of information relating to her son's condition (cerebral palsy) when she states
(Tom)
They wouldn't actually tell us ifanything was wrong with him. We had a
physio comingfor a couple ofmonths before they gave us a diagnosis. She
came when Tom was five months old, and she knew, she knew exactly what
was wrong with him but she wasn't allowed to tell us.
What these statements identify is the resistance by doctors to inform
parents about the possibility of disability. Indeed, it has been suggested that
until quite recently, the mean age for diagnosis of cerebral palsy was four
years. At this age positional deformity5 is often quite evident due to the
deleterious effects of immobility (Brown & Pulford 1984: 739) The
interesting point is, why should medical practitioners be so reluctant to make
5
This may result from the continuation of spastic muscle tension distorting, over time,
the child's limbs or body, or due to the effects of unsuitable posture and the lack ofmobility.
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an early diagnosis, given that medicine functions, in part, as a method of
surveillance, to identify deviance (illness and disease) and to regulate it?
Why, then, do many medical practitioners appear to be so slow to diagnose
children who have suffered brain injury?
There are several explanations for this. The first involves the
possibility that doctors may be reluctant to make a diagnosis as it involves
labelling the child abnormal. Whilst I am certain that many practitioners are
uncomfortable with this labelling rhetoric, the data does not seem to support
such a consideration. An analysis of the families' accounts identifies no such
medical sensitivity to labelling an injured child abnormal, though this, of
course, is not expressed directly as 'severe brain damage'. An 'inability to lead
a normal life' is often the preferred statement.
The second explanation for such a discrepancy is that practitioners are
reluctant to diagnose disability because they fear it may be positively
correlated with their (the medical profession) inability to do something about
it. As noted (see 2) doctors view the body as a type ofmachine, with illness
and disease regarded as malfunctions of this mechanical system. The purpose
ofmedical practice is to observe the body, identify the causal processes of
dysfunction (pathology) and administer treatment. As I shall demonstrate
later, brain injury tends to respond at best poorly to such clinical treatments.
Indeed, it may only be able to address symptoms of brain injury, such as
epilepsy and spasticity, by further reducing the child's personal functioning and
experiences through inhibiting drugs or short lived surgical procedures. The
latter is sometimes appropriately termed the 'birthday syndrome' (Patrick 1989)
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as surgery may typically need to be carried out annually. Such techniques
invariably act both to restrict the essential contact that the child 'naturally'
requires with his or her family and immediate environment, and rarely confer
any long term therapeutic benefit6. A third reason may be found in parental
unwillingness to accept negative information. For example, Karen's mother is
a health visitor as well as a parent of a brain injured child and when we were
discussing the problem of obtaining a diagnosis she mentioned that she had
personally found it very difficult to inform some parents that she suspected
that their child had a developmental problem. This was due, in the main, to
the difficulty of getting the parents to accept the possibility that their child
might have a problem. This is particularly interesting for in my own
discussion with parents I found them very eager and willing to identify any
specific problems their child may be experiencing. However, the families I
saw in the Kerland had made a leap to alternative therapy because they had
suspected a problem, sought diagnosis and needed to do something about it. It
may, therefore, be likely that those families who find it more difficult to accept
a developmental problem prefer not to engage in alternative therapies. This
might suggest that those families who prefer to ignore, for whatever reason,
the possibility that their child may have a problem do not seek alternative
treatment as doing this would confirm that which they do not wish to accept.
It can be seen, then, that medical procedures fail to cure the child and
in so doing seriously undermine clinical competencies. It is little wonder that
6
The lack of clinical efficacy in ameliorating brain injury is attested to by the many
families who attend alternative therapy centres.
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passive management regimens (as noted in the family statements above) often
structure the parents' encounters with doctors.
Resources are often a further factor affecting diagnosis and other
medical decisions, and parents are usually more than capable of identifying
when economic considerations underpin medical objectives. As Karen's
mother recalled
(Karen)
Yes, ifthey diagnose then they have got to provide money and once the
professional says "Oh there is something wrong", that's it. And it will he
worse when they go into the 'Trusts'system because there will be less money
to help decide what to do.
Using pharmacological agents to manage patients' symptoms not only
conforms to an ideological correct way of practice which involves a reliance
on science and technology7, but it avoids giving priority to that most expensive
of resources to place, human contact8. There is likely to be no substitute for
the labour intensive approaches which demand that considerable opportunities
are given to the injured child and his or her helpers to interact in a structured
way over extended periods of time. This is unlikely to find favour with the
economic managers of the regional health trusts.
However, it is not solely the economics of such considerations that is
problematic, but also the fact that this approach, adopted by many alternative
centres, requires that the child and his or her development is considered as
7
See Illich, I (1975) for an excellent critique on medicine and its reliance on
technology.
8
A discussion into the political economy of health care is beyond the scope of this




involving a meaningful continuum of attention and appropriate experience.
'The nervous system is responsive to what is happening all of the time and not
just during short intensive stimulation called therapy' (Levitt 1982: 17). Thus
contact with the child, in a stimulating environment that provides ample
opportunities for the child to experiment and practice behaviours that utilise
physical, perceptual, social and cognitive functions is essential, but difficult
and deeply involving for parents and carers. Indeed, it is often claimed that,
precisely because this treatment creates such familial pressures to care for their
child, doctors advocate pharmacological control as the best prescription for the
family.
The family is, of course, very important and their needs require careful
consideration, but so too is the child. What rights does the child have?
Indeed, are these rights inalienable to all children, irrespective of disability, or
do they require that the child should firstly function in ways appropriate to the
services already provided by the state? Is it not possible that many state
provided services institutionalise a process which serves to discriminate
against the injured body, so much so as to constitute a rationale for 'disablism'
(Abberley 1987)? Because many brain injured children rarely develop in the
ordered ways that state provisions typically support. This frustration is
expressed by one mother outlining the educational needs of her daughter.
(Karen)
They have to provide special education, which they really need before
the age offive, but they're not statutory (sic) obliged to provide it until they're
five, well these children need it much sooner.
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It appears, then, that not only does medicine defer a diagnosis and the
subsequent entitlement to treatment but education, too, is reluctant to initiate a
programme of pre-schooling to help combat some of the deleterious affects of
brain injury that may act to isolate the child. This, as we shall discuss in
chapter 5, is very often in contrast to the ideology of the alternative centre
which assesses the child's development and subsequently designs a programme
of therapy that provides staged input for the child and a daily routine of
involvement for the carers. Despite doctors fear of over involvement of the
parents this routine seems to play an important part in families subscribing to
an alternative centre such as the Kerland. As Philip's mother explains
(Philip)
Oh he was well even now ifI showedyou photographs, well we've
got the video when we left the hospital. His spine was curving because I was
just holding him to get him comfortable in one position all the time. His feet
had dropped and this hand here was in his neck like this, twisted. To pull it
down, well he just wouldn't let you, it was stiffand too painful. His shoulder
was sticking right out and I don't think that would have gone back all right
without the exercises. And things like his personality, not just the physical
side but I think the Kerland has helped him socially as well because he meets
so many people.
Interviewer: Your home is now your place ofwork then?
Mother: Yes, which is nice because you're working at home you can
have a cup of tea when you like so Iwould rather be doing this than out nine
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to five in an office. So its my job, my job is being with Philip, doing what I'm
doing.
It seems clear that economic restructuring is required to make such
provisions available. However, there are few incentives. Special education
teachers and other resources receive a similar treatment as do those who work
with geriatrics, psychiatry and community medicine, i.e. they are given low
priorities. Hillier (1986: 177) has argued that such specialities are regarded as
low status by the profession generally, and subsequently often deprived of
resources. This, once again, points to the social construction of brain injured
children, a construction which seems dependent upon ideal types of 'natural'
children decided, in the large part, by medical perception. Such a definition,
concerned as it is with clinical conditions, inadvertently functions to establish
the brain injured child as an imperfect construction by default. This process
suspends the diversities of childhood that are being discerned through
sociology and anthropology (Qvortrup et al 1994) in favour of a medical
reductionism that locates clinical pathology as the main focus of expression.
The child is now no more than an observational process within a clinical
discipline, and, as such, the brain injured child is reconstructed by medical
power to be no more than the sum of the pathologies he or she presents.
(Tom)
We had an orthopaedic consultant, and there wasn't any way to
describe him. He treated Tom like a slab ofmeat, he manipulated hisfoot and
hurt him and didn't talk to him, didn't treat him like a child.
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The alternative approach differs radically from this in its definition of
the brain injured child. Whereas medical practice discerns the overt pathology
presented in the child, the alternative practitioner is more concerned to
discover those behaviours that remain relatively unaffected, so that new
patterns of expression can be assimilated from present abilities. The issue is
not so much one of economics but of commitment which, as we shall see in
chapter 5, involves an entirely different construction of the brain injured child
from that inspired by medical practice. However, in order to explore, more
fully, the medical metaphors that express the brain injured child, and the
clinical decisions that result from such professional discourses, we need to
locate disabled children in both the larger category of childhood within which
they are typically expected to exist and function and within the 'gaze' of
medical speculation.
Doctoring the Score
In the second chapter I showed the influence the medical profession
exerts over the embodiment of brain injured children. At first sight this seems
appropriate since brain injured children are by definition injured and therefore
require the attention ofmedical practitioners. However this assumption,
although prevalent, may nevertheless be an erroneous one. As noted, many
children who have suffered a brain injury have a non-progressive form of
lesion, and although they may present with epileptic seizures, spasticity and
developmental problems their general health may be quite good. They thus
warrant little medical intervention. Often, however, parents with a disabled
131
Chapter 4
child receive a great deal of attention from doctors even though their child's
condition may not require long term and continued medication. The reason for
this is twofold. Firstly, parents have little recourse to detailed information
concerning their child's problems other than that given by the medical
profession9. As Tony and Fiona's father noted
(Fiona and Tony)
You know most ofus don't bring our children to places like the
Kerland until they are, perhaps 2, 3 or 4years old because we don't know
about them, we onlyfind out by chance.
Secondly, because brain injury implies illness, a term which we will
see is laden with moral judgements and accountability, it creates an access for
medicine to develop.... 'a potential for moralising and social control' (Zola
1972: 492). Indeed, as Freidson agues in his now classic account:
The medical profession has first claim to jurisdiction over the label of illness and
anything to which it may be attached, irrespective of its capacity to deal with it effectively
(cited in Zola 1972:492).
Medicine has not merely attached itself to the illness phenomenon but
with such involvements it has also legitimised its engagement with procedures
that attempt to professionally manage the very process of living (Illich 1975)
by what Zola (1972: 492) has referred to as 'The Medicalising of Society'.
Here Zola identifies an 'attaching' process which consists of four concrete
objectives. The first involves establishing social compliance to aid good
9
Although this is changing with many charity based organisations offering a wide
range of information such charities are, however, often viewed sceptically by doctors which
acts to reduce the legitimacy of such organisations.
132
Chapter 4
medical practice. Physicians change the behaviours and habits of their patients
in an attempt to negate the believed aetiological factors of a given disease
process. But deterring individuals from engaging in potentially harmful
practices necessitates a professional scrutiny, not only of their bodies 'but also
the symptoms of daily living' (1972: 493). Secondly, physicians have sole
jurisdiction over certain technical procedures. When one considers the social
consequences of abortion, major organ transplantation and cosmetic surgery,
all of which are the exclusive practice ofmedicine, it becomes almost
impossible to detach the individuals who yield such technical power, invested
in medical procedures, from those issues that are primarily concerned with
social policy, requiring a different set of competencies from those obtained in
clinical practice. Thirdly, medicine has almost absolute access to the most
private and intimate possessions of individuals, their bodies and minds. For
Zola, these normally 'taboo' areas are the very territories in which illness is
located. Once diagnosed the problem becomes, by its very nature, a medical
one. Zola argues that whereas once ageing and pregnancy were considered as
natural processes, they are now so enveloped in clinical supervision that
specialist physicians have transformed these natural events of the life cycle
into technologies ofmedicine (1972: 495 - see also Graham & Oakley 1986).
Furthermore, in America declaring alcoholism and drug addiction as diseases
serves to constitutionally affect the status ofmany so labelled individuals.
'Offenders' are, in such situations, far more likely to be the responsibility of
institutions supervised by physicians rather than penal reformers. The power
medical rhetoric exerts in social discourses can not be overstated.
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Today the prestige of any proposal is immensely enhanced, if not justified, when it is
expressed in the idiom ofmedical science, (Attributed to Wootton, cited in Zola 1972: 496).
Medicine, then, has insidiously expanded its expertise into almost
every sphere of society with many social issues given over to comments from
medical specialists. Furthermore, the language of the physician is continually
engaging moral metaphors (Sontag 1978) to explain societal misfortune, an
unhealthy economy, a diseased state or a cancer in the community. Such
medicalising terms serve to identify social and economic dysfunction or
pathology equally as well as their ability to label organic disease. Zola (1972)
and Illich (1975) are rightly concerned that such processes that 'medicalise'
social issues remove these very issues from a wider public enquiry and debate.
Social policy becomes engendered with technical considerations best suited to
the expertise of the medical professional, and disempowers the individual by
transferring concerns for public debate to the scientific stadium ofmodern
medicine. This is in contrast to the alternative centre. Although practitioners
here too have a specialised skill and knowledge, the language in which it is
expressed and the therapies undertaken tend to be less technological and more
readily understood by those who subscribe to them.
However, the fact that illness, both clinical and apparently social, is a
target for the aspirations ofmedicine must not prevent us from questioning the
validity of those assumptions that accommodate 'good' health into the same
medicalising schemata. That a person's health may well be compromised
through contact with medicine has been outlined by Illich (1975) who used the
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term 'iatrogenesis' to describe the pathologies, once again both clinical and
social, that result from the activities of physicians. This regulatory conquest of
medicine over nearly all aspects of the living process could have only been
made possible with the tacit approval and support of the political authorities.
Since both people's illness and health have consequences for a country's
economic system, clinical diagnosis does not, in Illich's view, merely attempt
to objectify biological pathology it also monitors financial loss and
unprofitability. In this way 'health' becomes associated with profit, whilst
illness represents underproduction of the Nation's capital. This reiteration of
economics, through medical metaphors, acts to further fix a scientific
rationale, although a borrowed one at that, to the prevailing capital needs of
the state. Indeed, Marxist writers have proposed that capitalism influences the
way medicine formulates the process of disease by attaching individual
culpability for illness. For example,
tuberculosis was regarded as a 'constitutional weakness' rather than something which
resulted from poverty and poor living conditions. Today, diseases like heart disease and lung
cancer are seen as problems of individual lifestyle (Hillier 1986: 182).
One thing however is clear, the role medicine plays in politicising the
body is not solely for the person's health but also for the nation's wealth.
The History of Political Doctoring
Medicine, however, has not always enjoyed the support of the
governmental authorities. Radical change in the needs of economic
production had, by the early 1800s, forced a closer alliance with medicine
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(Smith 1990). The early days, though, were fraught with official and
legislative conflicts for all those who aspired to professionalise and unite the
medical community. By 1842 Edwin Chadwick, following the political
economists' tradition of Sir William Petty, calculated the economic value of
man in order to coerce the political authorities to invest in an adequate health
service (Smith 1990: 420). Furthermore, changes brought about by
industrialisation required not only a work force but a productive and 'healthy'
one at that. People were now being calculated as unit investments of capital
production. Dr Fair's 'Vital Statistics' estimated the worth of a Norfolk
agricultural labourer's life to the state in the mid 1800s as being £5 at birth and
£1 at seventy years, peaking at £246 at twenty five years old when most
productive. Indeed, if he should survive to some eighty years old, his equity
would be negative to the sum of £41 (Smith 1990: 420 ).
At this time, young children, especially those under two years old, had
little economic value to the state, which most certainly was reflected in low
health provision. Britain was slow to introduce hospitals for children and it
was only in 1853 that the now famous 'Great Ormond Street Hospital' opened
up for the admission of children. However, even here children under the age
of two years were 'absolutely excluded' (Smith 1990: 152). Ironically,
however, the setting up of children's hospitals nationwide did much to
aggravate epidemics, as the outpatient rooms tended to be hotbeds of
contagion. Although vaccination to combat smallpox had been available
since the 1790s it was only really considered by the rich, as the poor
apparently had 'an acceptance of the inescapability of death' (Smith 1990: 158)
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Once the link between hospitals and epidemics was noted Parliament started
to move into state medicine with its poorly drafted Vaccination Act of 1840.
Indeed, by 1871 a fine of 25 shillings or imprisonment was to be faced by
parents who would not comply with the government's infant vaccination
programme (Beck 1960). By the late 1800s medicine could be seen to be
emerging with a greater regulatory and monitoring influence on societal issues,
as can be seen by the reaction of Anti-Vaccination League who regarded
medical inspection as the augmentation of state power and an intrusion into
the People's privacy (Smith 1990: 166). Thus, the family was being
scrutinised and inspected by the medical orthodoxy which argued that the only
effective way to improve children's health was to encourage 'indolent' and
'incompetent mothers' to develop 'total care' regimens (Smith 1990). Such
practices, it was argued, would provide self respect. Thus parenthood had
become the clinical gaze for the newly establishing medical profession. As
Smith notes
inspection was only worth while if it remained under professional medical control, distinct
from, but ancillary to, the state and state purposes. Only doctors could determine the defects
in sight, hearing and physique that marked out the mentally deficient and thereby rendered
them incapable of'becoming normal citizens (1990: 186).
Even by the end of the eighteenth century doctors had begun to subject
their patients to the physical examination. Pathology was now firmly fixed in
the interior spaces of the body, and new methods of examination were devised
to diagnose it (Armstrong 1983: 2). Regulations regarding hygiene sought not
only to medicalise the spaces within the body, where dysfunction was to be
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located, but space between bodies, i.e. social space, was also to be scrutinised.
With the introduction of such procedures childhood had now come into sharp
focus, as noted in Chapter 2, and by the end of the nineteenth century children
and, more particularly, their diseases warranted a special interest for medicine.
Moreover, the 'inventing' of childhood (that constructed children as a special
category no longer considering them as mere little adults) and the
accompanying diseases (more specifically, children's disabilities) were not
singularly identified by medicine through scientific rationalism. As we have
already seen other agendas of a social and symbolic nature (aesthetics,
innocence and purity) were embedded in this enterprise. Furthermore the
body, particularly that which presented overt disability, attracted not only a
clinical concern from medicine but also a re-emerging belief in corporeal
pollution. Physical completeness, or being without a blemish, was not only
biblically praised10, representing a social semaphore for purity, but also acted
as a procedural training in child management. That is to say, children must be
schooled in managing their bodies' functions and secretions in order to be
admitted into the structured society of the adult.
One problem with disease is that it threatens the moral management of our bodies by
robbing us of voluntary control and organisation. As a result, we need the social support of a
medical regimen and therapeutic intervention (Turner 1987: 85).
Perhaps nowhere is such a regimen regarded as being more pertinent
than in the medical attempt to manage brain injured children. Indeed,
paediatric medicine plays a central role in engaging management policies to
10 See Douglas (1966: 51).
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address the symptomology of brain injury. Unfortunately, a great deal of what
constitutes such a practice can also act to disable the parent's very coping
strategies.
Parents and Physicians
Cummins writes, in his critique of the Doman-Delacato method" that
medical professionals have the unfortunate tendency to conclude that
diagnoses vested upon very young children... have the air of the absolute. Such diagnoses are
usually pessimistic about the child's potential for development and are frequently wrong. The
reason for the pessimism is tied up with traditional and outmoded professional thought, that
the most that can be done for brain injured children is to provide medical help and then to
encourage both them and their caregivers to adjust to the handicaps. (Cummins 1988: 16-17).
That parental involvement is likely to be important in any structured
habilitation programme (orthodox or alternative) tends not to be considered,
and implies a serious loss of valuable resources- resources that would be
essential to combat disability and not simply adjust to the handicaps.
Furthermore, that such interventions should naturally focus on the family as a
whole, more than just singling out the child (Bristol & Gallagher 1982) is an
informed way to address the problem but, so far, seems to have merited little
concern for many orthodox doctors.
However, before parents can act in any effective way it is crucial that
they receive an 'informed' diagnosis based on professional understanding of
the child's disorder, rather than the vague professional speculations born out of
the ambiguities of developmental uncertainty which, as Chapter 2 notes, is a
common experience. This is not to suggest that ambivalence in discerning
11
See the Introduction and Appendage 2 for a fuller account.
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behavioural evidence for brain injury leads the physician to 'label' the child
with the nearest fitting syndrome (speculation) - this could and has, proven to
be extremely upsetting to the parents - but to say that parents have the right to
both be informed and to question the professional's underlying suspicions. If,
for example, parents were more encouraged to present their accounts of their
child's motor behaviour, cognitive function and general development in a more
positive and sympathetic setting, as often is the case in many alternative
settings, then much of the present misdiagnosis and pessimism to which
Cummins (1988) alludes might well be avoided. Bristol & Schopler (1984:
128) recall one child who had received no less than twenty four different
diagnoses, and their accompanying conflicting therapeutic programmes, before
autism was identified. Such clinical misinterpretations of a child's problem
and future prognosis are as equally negative to the family, as are the frequent
professional silences that keep the parents guessing.
(Philip)
But nobody told us for nearly twelve weeks that he was brain damaged.
We thought he was going to wake up and be normal. Nobody said anything,
nobody mentioned brain damage, nobody mentioned the future, nobody
mentioned anything at all until we went to Guy's Hospital. We said why hasn't
he woke up? 'Well, he's been through a great trauma, you know'. But why
doesn't he? ....He should be awake by now. 'Well, you know his brain is still
very swollen, he's been through a traumatic time, you don't know the
seriousness of it'. But no one actually said those words, brain injury or brain
damage, there was no mention ofthat at all.
The parents of this little boy, who had tragically drowned, were
allowed to assume that, because their son was alive, he would awaken and be
that same little normal boy he was before the accident. But it is not just after
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traumatic injury that doctors feel it unnecessary or unhelpful to inform the
parents about their concerns or speculations. Even in cases involving birth
injury the same procedures are often involved. As a mother with a cerebral
palsied daughter relates
(Jayne)
It was quite late before we got a diagnosis, I kept taking her to the
clinic and they kept on saying go away she's developed. Its a normal
situation, I know, because I have been talking to other mothers. I knew there
was something wrong and they kept telling me to go away, so it was about 22
months later before we got a diagnosis.
Chapter 2 suggested some of the motives for the professional's silence,
but from my own research with families over the last six years it is clear that
parents need information, not speculative prognoses. They want indicative
diagnoses, communicated with sensitivity and genuine empathy for their
parental situation. However, information is seldom given in the initial stages
when an injury may be suspected. The consequences of this mismatch may
lead to conflict between professional and parent. Professionals often fail to
recognise the ways parents relate to the impending uncertainties concerning
their child's development. In some cases this uncertainty can encourage
parents to believe that they had, in part, been responsible. As one mother with
a distonic cerebral palsied 6 year old daughter informed me.
(Rachel)
I thinkfeelings ofguilt come and go. Was it anything to do with us we
just don't know because they (doctors) won't say. We don 7 know if it was
genetic or if it happened at birth or what it was. From time to time it does
arise, were we to blame?
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That external factors, such as the tangible severity of the disability,
stress and the availability of social support are related to internal variables,
parents' beliefs and attitudes towards disability and its suspected culpability,
should also be recognised. It is within such variables that understanding of the
full impact of their situation is encountered and it is this that affects the
family's changing situation (Sewell Wight, Granger & Sameroff 1984: 52).
When we examine how intervention programs have dealt with parents, we find that
there has been a fragmentation among programs that focus on parents' educational skills,
attitudes and emotions,.... Each of these aspects has something to contribute to the
intervention process, but each taken alone may reduce the parent's competence in other
important domains (Sewell Wright, Granger & Sameroff) (1984: 52).
The effective communication between parent and professional is one of
paramount importance but appears to have been given little professional
attention.
(Fiona and Tony)
I mean we were told all sorts ofconflicting information, in fact,
conflicting information was written down on notes and caused a lot of
problems when Iwanted to have my second child. Because Fiona was born
premature and she developed hydrocephalus after 19 days. But on a note
from a doctor it said that she was born with hydrocephalus so anyfuture
children Imight have would have the possibility ofdeveloping this.
Increasingly more research is concerning itself with the 'internal' and
'external' variables that structure the parents reactions to their brain injured
child12, but there has been relatively little material that accounts for parental
stress in terms of the social relations, and tensions, that are developed with
12 See Sewell Wright et all (1982 P 53-57)
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doctors, although it has been well established in medical anthropology
literature that communication between professionals and their patients is often
considered unsatisfactory (Lauritzen & Saks 1994, McGhee 1961). The
culpability for this dissatisfaction has been recognised in the failure of the
professional to attend to the social and psychological requirement ofpatients
(Radley 1993, and Cartwright 1964). Korsch et al (1969) have, more
specifically, concentrated on the communications between hospital doctors
and mothers with an ill child. Indeed, as Locker's (1986) review confirms
a fifth of the mothers reported that they had not been given a clear statement of what was
wrong with the child and half had not been told what had caused their child's illness. In
analysing tapes of the consultations it became clear that the doctors did little to encourage
mothers to take an active role in the interview and few paid attention to what worried the
mothers about her child's health (Locker 1986: 99).
It has been suggested that professional attitudes, interviewing styles,
patient diffidence, differing cognitive styles and patient/doctor perspectives
(Locker 1986 p 99-103) all contribute to communication failures. It is also
possible that informing families in a clear and understandable way gives
knowledge to parents which might well compromise the authority of doctors.
In such cases speculations concerning the child's condition may be framed in
technical terms suitable for a specialised audience so that the parents are
excluded from the discussion. The following account from Cindy's mother
exemplifies this.
(Cindy)
We were sat on the bed and a consultant came in and started talking to
all his trainees, and he just chatted about Cindy to them and he didn't include
me in his conversation. I stood up and said, 'excuse me, I am here do you
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think I could be included'. Couldyou tell me what you are telling them'? He
just completely ignored me.
Although there can indeed be little doubt that such neglect is involved
in patient/doctor relations there are, as I have indicated in the previous
chapters, also other agendas operating here. Embedded in the very centre of
these medical communication problems, that all too often fail to facilitate the
exchange of information between patient and doctor, are the insidious, and
frequently ambiguous, prescriptions for regulation and control (Foucault 1971,
1973, Armstrong 1983 and Turner 1987, 1992). It may be due to the very fact
that doctors 'control' their interactions with parents, and make their invested
medical authority so conspicuous to the families, that so many fail to register
their dissatisfaction with the professionals concerned.
However, Turner (1987, 1992) et al, have simply aligned theories of
control, which they argue are ever present in the operations of the professional,
to that socio-biological entity, the body. As we have seen in chapter 2, doctors
have an invested authority over this entity. Their control is derived from the
attempt to manipulate both individuals and populations through regulating
practices which assert their influence directly upon the physical operations of
the body. Such propositions basically align themselves to the Weberian
interest in medicalisation as a method of control. Brian Turner, reiterating the
bio-politics central to modern systems of power (Foucault 1973) also locates
medicine at the heart of this endeavour (1992: 10). That such mechanisms of
control should be directed upon the body, to induce both change and greater
regulation, is not surprising given the increasing 'capitalistic' motives of state
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(Foucault. 1979). However, if the rationale for this endeavour is to
manufacture productive, disciplined and docile bodies that benefit the state
enterprise, then where are we to locate the disabled bodies of injured children?
They are perhaps found in the miscellany of disciplines that have evolved to
submerge the individual and collective potentials of childhood.
Muting Soloists
In their book "The European Family" Mitterauer and Sieder (1977)
argue that socialising or, more importantly in this study, controlling children
has undergone various historical changes. Not only are these changes
represented by economic and demographic operations but also, more
interestingly, by changes affecting familial responsibilities and practices. This
trend has been most visible in the transition of society from organisation based
around domestic production, to meet the family's needs, to the larger industrial
production that better serves the state. Where once the child acquired its
identity directly from the its interpersonal affiliations and immediate contact
with, and regulation by, the family and their occupations, institutions have
evolved to replace this traditional role.
The domestic group and its neighbourhood no longer form a relatively autonomous
society in which all types ofbehaviour patterns and ideas are to be found. Even the so-called
'private sphere' of people is interwoven with structures of economy and administration, with
politics and commerce. The primary group of the family no longer determines the
socialisation of the young to the same extent as before (Mitterauer & Sieder 1977: 94).
These practices have contributed, to some degree at least, to the
alienation of childhood, particularly adolescence, from the domestic group
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(family) into extra-familial institutions (Mitterauer & Sieder 1977) such as
nurseries, schools and clubs. As we have already seen, the establishment of
hospitals for children took over the responsibility for ill children from their
parents in the same way that education and other disciplinary institutions are
determining, more and more, the upbringing of children in systems other than
those developed by the family. The net result of these state enforced child
regulatory facilities has reduced the active role parents play in helping to
determine their child's mode of development, and with such practices in
operation the right of parents, especially those who have disabled children, are
likely to have been further eroded. Moreover, it is not just the parents who are
effected by these procedures of professional control; their children too are
often enveloped by these very same mechanisms of regulation. Parents may,
in such cases, interpret this underlying professional's authoritative conduct as a
failure to understand their experiences, i.e. clinical 'coldness'. As Philip's
mother recalls
(Philip)
Imean doctors are cold, aren't they ? I think they are, generally
speaking. You know they enter that profession because they care about
people, well, they have certainly got a funny way ofshowing it.
Such perceptions are not uncommon, as many parents with a disabled
child have expressed a similar concern. As we saw earlier in Zola's (1972)
discussion, the physician's medicalising knowledge transforms language from
one of social communication to that of scientific rhetoric. In this
transformation, the underlying personal expressions that naturally punctuate
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social discourse are likely to be lost or misinterpreted. It is therefore possible
that parents feel a coldness in their engagement with professionals or, at the
very least, an unwillingness to identify and address their child's problems. As
the father of two brain injured children stated
(Fiona and Tony)
one hell ofa lot ofmedicalproblems, orpotential medical problems, would
resolve themselves if the medicalprofession did nothing. And that seems to be
the first line of treatment, 'well, lets do nothing' and see if there is still a
problem in six months time.
The point I wish to make is that although the power invested in doctors
may not be perceived by parents in terms of Foucault's regulatory influence or
Weber's medicalisation, its effects are, nevertheless, recognised. They are
expressed in terms of a more personal individual level as a coldness or
reluctance to relate to their trauma. As a direct result of their experience with
professionals, with whom they are legally obliged to negotiate treatment and
care, parents and their disabled children may become increasingly isolated.
Since the family's very future seems dependent upon addressing their child's
needs with regular hospital visits and other forms ofmedical compliance,
which can only be achieved through professional contact, disempowerment
will most likely prevail as the common experience. And it is within this
helpless environment that the brain injured child is expected to be nurtured.
Parents are often only too aware that many doctors are simply going
through the motions, that those medicalising procedures which they initially
experience are not the attempts of professionals to address the condition,
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sometimes not even the symptomology. They understand that they relate more
to a theatrical production of medical practice:
(Fiona and Tony)
And then we went through a stage where we said, 'we're not really
happy with what you're doing'. Then they made an effort to do some more
tests its almost like they knew they weren't going to achieve anything but
they went through the motions for our benefit so that at the end ofthe day if
we made any complaints they would say, 'oh we've done everything we
possibly can'.
When a family encounters these ambiguous sentiments that seem to
run, at the very least, counter to that which they typically expect from the
professionals, they may seek an explanation for this discontinuity in their own
behaviour.
(Jayne)
I think Pete thinks to himselfwhether it is hisfault that she is like she
is because you don't know, and I think what did I do when I was pregnant, is it
myfault? That's why its importantfor parents to know what's going on so that
they can be assured that it's not theirfault.
The conclusions they now draw upon become internalised as the
helplessness of their situation becomes increasingly evident and guilt, anger
and frustration, together with a lack of faith with the provided services,
underscores their interactions with professionals. Rachel's mother describes




Mother: When you start analysing why she is as she is I think the
feeling ofguilt does come up. We still wonder because we don't know what
cause it. You know, its not like knowing it was a lack ofoxygen or something
to do with the hospital. When you don't know the cause you wonder was it
something to do with us.
Interviewer: Did you receive any advice about this?
Mother: We had genetic counselling, but because they can'tpin it
down to anything they wonder if it is genetic. But Iwouldn't say that really
helped, Imean we were just told what the riskfactor was for a family who
had a C.P. child having another. I didn'tfeel it helped in any way, I didn'tfeel
they helped..
The notion that disparities exist between the experience of parents
and those of the professionals has been investigated by Blackard & Barsh
(1982)13 who suggest that professionals exaggerate the impact of a disabled
child on a family's functioning whilst minimising the ability of that family to
manage the accompanying problems. But this can only happen once a
diagnosis has been provided. The issue I am addressing here is that of the
isolation parents encounter before such statements have been finalised.
Indeed, it is within this suspended marginality of clinical uncertainty and
familial anguish that communication first begins to break down. However, the
fact that parents and professionals rarely, if ever, share a common clinical
13
see Kaiser & Hayden (1984) for a good review.
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knowledge or personal experience may further contribute to communication
failure.
Moreover, it is not just failures in communication that may prove
detrimental to the child's development. Information that is not factual14, due to
poor assessment and diagnosis, will equally incite conflict between parents
and professionals. An example of this can be found in the work by Strauss et
al (1982)15 who reassessed the visual impairments of severely disabled
children.
(They),... experimented with several new methodologies for assessing visual acuity
in severely handicapped infants. Their research uncovered the startling fact that many infant
previously diagnosed as blind, (using traditional methodologies) were, in fact, able to see". "..
One wonders what changes in care giving patterns and intervention approaches might result
from such a marked shift in assessment results and how much damage may have been done
through the care givers believing that these infants were blind (Kaiser & Hayden 1984: 296),
Believing in professional statements is something that tends to come
naturally to parents when a trauma has threatened their child's future potential.
If the language used contains negative sentiments, which sadly is often the
case, such as 'he'll never walk', 'you know she won't ever speak' or 'its best that
you stick him in a home and get on with your own life16', then these statements
can and do affect the parent's interpretation of their child's behaviour. Thus
opportunities may be lost to both child and parent, simply because they are
14
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate about the 'scientific method' other
than to say there are many critics of it. Feyerabend argues that 'non-scientific' procedures can
not be pushed aside by argument. To say: the procedure you used is non-scientific, therefore
we cannot trust your results assumes that science is successful because it uses uniform
procedures.... (this) is not true.... there are lots of failures also (1988: 2). Science, for
Feyerabend 'should be taught as one view among many and not as the one and only road to
truth and reality' (1990: viii). Indeed, it is this fallibility of scientific medicine that kindles
parental interest in the alternative method which, generally speaking , communicates its
intentions in ways that are more understandable to the family
15
In Kaiser & Haydan (1994)
16 Statements reported from families with a brain injured child.
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following professional but also, perhaps 'misguided', advice. The
consequences can be far reaching, not only directly for child's development.
Negative information giving by doctors concerning infants can interfere with
the parent/infant bonds of attachment, which can further exacerbate
development. One of the dimensions of this phenomenon has been identified
as 'anticipatory grief (Kaplan & Mason 1960), which describes the ways in
which a parent might deliberately withhold feelings of attachment in
anticipation of the infant's death (Kaiser & Hayden, 1984: 294). Moreover, a
study by Clyman, Sniderman, Ballard & Roth (1979) reported that physicians
commonly underestimate an ill infant's chances of survival, even though they
may have knowledge of statistics that indicate that the contrary is in fact likely.
In such cases, with the emotional ties that help ensure a positive environment
broken, the infant's potential is likely to be further muted, not solely now
because of the effects of an actual pathology in the child but more probably
from a disorder involving the attachment that exists between child and parent.
However, in reality more brain injured children survive into adulthood
than was the case in the past (Logigian 1989). Consequently, the phenomenon
of "anticipatory grief is, for many parents, frequently displaced by an
irrepressible personal responsibility for their child's continual welfare. This is
often realised through developing strategies (sometimes commitment to
alternative therapies) that promote or encourage the child's development. For
example, Sarah's mother works as a teacher ofmentally disabled children her





I think, initially, when she was first born it was a bit ofa trauma,
realising that she is handicapped andpersonally it felt a bit ofa burden. But
once you realise and come to terms with the fact that she is never going to
leave the home so that anythingyou can do to help you and her enjoy life to
the best ofher ability is a bonus.
In such ways grief can be submerged by ameliorative action that works
for a better future for both child and parent.
Re-scoring the Accompaniment.
We have seen above some of the problems that arise from families'
encounters with doctors. Although early diagnosis presents many difficulties
for the paediatrician nevertheless for parents the amount of accurate clinical
assessment they receive often remains totally unsatisfactory. The general
trend, then, amongst many physicians, seems firstly to involve denial.
Secondly, when the child's problems become significantly conspicuous,
doctors may estimate the familial efficacy of parent's coping with their child's
problem differently from those estimates the family themselves might use
(Clyman et al. 1979). The phenomenal rise in alternative ameliorative
therapies, then, may be related to the largely negative and pessimistic





I have friends that I speak to who have children with disabilities and
one friend was told, 'your son's a cabbage he'll never do anything' (see Philip's
account earlier in this chapter where a similar point is made)
However, with parental dissatisfaction for the role of clinical medicine
comes the transference of responsibility from doctor to parent to do the best
for the injured child. It is usually at this point that parents begin to actively
search for alternative approaches to orthodox medicine. Some parents, then,
will recognise the unsatisfactory nature of this situation and attempt to redress
the problems by seeking out other forms of treatment. The following outlines
the events that led Cindy's mother to go to the Kerland Clinic.
(Cindy)
Interviewer: Was it that they didn't know what was wrong with Cindy
or was it that they didn't want to tell you what was wrong?
Mother: I think it was a bit ofboth, also we saw so many different
people. Every time she was in hospital, every time I went down the shift had
just changed and we saw different nurses. Doctors wouldn't talk to us they
would completely ignore me so I thought right, I don't want anyone else
looking at her, I'll be funny, you can go and train on somebody else.
Interviewer: So there was no continuity and little information?
Mother: There was no continuity, I go down every six months or
whenever and Iwonder why, because it seems to be a complete waste of time
they ask have you got anyproblems I say no and that's basically it. That was
another reason why we decided to do Kerland exercises, we thought we would
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do something instead ofbeing left on a list. Imean I never reallyfelt they were
doing anything, its hard to explain really and they never actually spoke to
Cindy either.
Many alternative approaches, as we will see in the next chapter,
involve direct familial participation but this in itself brings with it new levels
of responsibility, sometimes even guilt and fear of failure. The comment
below from a mother of a 8 year old girl who was bom with chromosomal
disorder demonstrates this point well.
(Karen)
I wanted to spend all my time stimulating her or doing something with
her. Its horrendous, you can't relax because you feel guilty all the time. You
know, I said to the paediatrician, the biggest thing that aparent wants is to be
doing something, ifyou're not doing somethingyou feel guilty. So it relieves
you ofthe guilt whilst doing the bestfor your child.
Whether or not adopting an alternative posture in therapy is, as this
mother confidently states, best for the child will be explored in greater detail
later. At this point it is my intention to show only the frustration and
dissatisfaction that often accompanies orthodox procedures and the relief they
may gain from alternative procedures.
In undertaking a programme of alternative therapy parents are
empowered, or at the very least feel that the passivity they experienced during
their encounters with the orthodoxy is largely dissipated. Many parents feel
that alternative approaches provide new windows of opportunities that simply
did not exist in orthodox medicine, for example finding the "child" within the
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mal-functioning body. Thus, although participating directly in their child's
therapy can place many new demands upon the family, it can also prove
therapeutic for both parents and child alike, particularly in the adjustment
period when parents are attempting to come to terms with the reality of their
situation17.
(Sarah)
When I didn't know anything, before I went to the clinic (alternative
centre), I didn't have anything to aim for, then all ofa sudden you realise there
is something I can do.
Moreover, from my own experience of the alternative settings of
therapy, the professionals who work on the fringe of orthodox medicine are
more likely to address the underlying psychological and social needs of parents
as well as patients, as a mother recalls when she first visited the Kerland Clinic
with her genetically disabled daughter. Sarah had been born underweight with
a heart murmer that required surgery.
(Sarah)
I think that one ofthe positive things was, that we were so 'down'with
Sarah, ... what we really got out ofthe clinic, (alternative child development
centre) thatfirst visit was that it boosted us so much that somebody thought
that something could be done with our little girl. That was the thing, it was a
tremendous boost.
The positive advantage of a low stress non-clinical setting can also
help in the two way exchange of information, so parents feel more comfortable
17
For a good review of the literature concerning familial adjustment and acceptance of
infant disability see, Blacher, J. (1984 )
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in communicating observations of their child's behaviour and concerns for his
or her future potential.
(Karen)
It was also the enthusiasm ofeverybody down there, (alternative
therapy centre,) instead ofwanting us to shove her up in the corner and get on
with our lives, somebody actually took us seriously.
Even with such obvious benefits provided by alternative centres it is
necessary to point out that unorthodox therapeutic regimes have attracted a
great deal of criticism (Cohen et al 1970, Charlton 1973, Chapanis 1981 and
Cummins 1988), in some cases deservedly so. Many of these criticisms argue
that there is a lack of 'scientific method' in their approach while others align
themselves to the level of unreasonable demands that may be placed upon
families that are already traumatised by infant disability. However, one feature
ofmany alternative procedures, irrespective of their level of clinical efficacy,
is the sense of optimism they create as well as providing increased access for
familial commitment to a given habilitation programme. These changes in the
behaviour of parents, which promoted optimism and a willingness to get
involved with their child's habilitation, were viewed positively in a
governmental report for the education of handicapped children (Warnock
Report 1978). This report recommended the direct involvement of parents in
their child's amelioration programme.
Why, then, are doctors generally so sceptical of parental involvements?
Illich (1975) and Cummins (1988) have argued that doctors' over reliance on
technology has reduced their role to that of a technician. Thus the social and
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psychological comfort they once had to provide, in favour of effective
medication, has been replaced by pharmacological wizardry. With this shift
from 'caring' to 'curing' technological procedures are seen as scientifically
validated, and thus those procedures that do not rely upon technology are
viewed with scepticism. Unfortunately for brain injured children, many of
their disabilities are not responsive to drugs which are, after all, the main
armament ofmodern medicine's control over the body. Thus parental 'needs'
and doctor's 'ideologies' become incommensurate with one another. As it was
shown earlier, drugs may manage the symptomology of brain injury but may
fail to address the underlying aetiology.
This is not, however, to argue that the alternative therapies have found
the key to neural dysfunction, although many alternative centres do promote
motor competence and other functional attainments which directly influences
the child's level of functional behaviour. This contrasts with the orthodox
medical regime which, in many cases of non-progressive brain injury, acts to
pharmocologically suppress behaviour. Thus a 'drugged' compliance with
medical management protocols is viewed more favourably by doctors than the
active routines of physical therapy that are engaged by many alternative
practitioners. In this way, for the alternative therapist, the disabled child's
problems are reconsidered. Within this approach, what the child cannot do
seems no longer a gauge to assessment. Instead the focus falls upon what the
child can or may achieve if given the right encouragement. With this, a new
optimism is installed into the family's daily routines that parents feel helps




I can't prove whether it was or wasn't what the programme (therapy)
did that made Sarah as she is (improvement in motility and awareness). But
what it did do, was to give us an impetus to actually do something with her
and to have somebody to say, 'yes, you're doing a great job, keep going'.
The very fact that families are working, on a daily basis, with their
child exacerbates the already fragile relationship that many parents have with
orthodox medicine18. Furthermore, the benefit derived from a parent's
involvement with their child's physical programme may affect more than the
child's motor development. For example, as one mother related.
(Fiona and Tony)
What you do in those sessions is start. You know you start with just
the physical exercises but the physical exercises then enable you to start doing
things at home andyou suddenlyfindyour child starts to eat andyou start on
potty training. You start then to use 'flash cards'19 andyou start to read
books. Then you find that its notjust physical sessions you 're doing, you
suddenly change your way oflife and everythingfits neatly into it. Suddenly,
you have a system for living which you probably didn't have with a
handicapped child. I'm sure mostpeople with a mentally handicapped child
find they don't have a routine, and its very frustrating.
What we see here is the child's physical therapy programme also acting
to structure a wide range of social and environmental stimulation that benefits
both child and parent alike20. Thus families who adopt an active role, which
18
Traditionally this level of involvement with the child's therapy as been regarded as
detrimental to the family However, a recent study showed that parental involvement was now
identified as being an important 'component of care' for both medical professionals and parents
alike ( Rosenbaum, King & Cadman, 1992 ). Furthermore, many families with whom I have
worked informed me that continuing to attend an alternative centre had jeopardised their
relationships with their GPs. In extreme cases being forced to find another doctor more
sympathetic to their personal habilitation programme.
19 Cards with different pictures, images or words drawn upon them, presented rapidly to
the child to stimulate visual awareness and cognition.
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usually involves the counsel of an alternative therapy centre, may often be
better placed to promote their injured child's development, though there are no
guarantees given except those which ensure a great deal of commitment and
heightened responsibilities for the parents. However, in this undertaking they
will attempt to animate not only their disabled child but also the general
passivity they frequently experience during their encounters with physicians.
In the next Chapter I shall show how parents, empowered by active
involvement in therapy, may find an alternative to the bio-politics of orthodox
medicine. In this way their needs and those of their child are reconsidered so
as to optimise their contribution to the ameliorative complex in which they are
situated.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to show the power and control doctors
possess in relation to brain injured children. As I have demonstrated, this
control does not only retain the brain injured child's 'clinical' considerations
within a medical enterprise but also empowers those professionals who have a
licence to practice it in divergent ways. For example, the social setting in
which both the child and his or her parents experience disability may be
overwritten with prescriptions that attempt to organise the family's behaviour
in line with those practices that lend support to medical management protocols
while, at the same time, ignoring those practices that may help to ameliorate
some of the accompanying problems. For many families such practices fail to
20
Interestingly enough, general infant stimulation programmes have also been shown
to advantage motor development ( Palmer, Shapiro & Renee et al, 1988 ).
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consider the daily dynamics and responsibilities that are involved with caring
for a brain injured child, thereby reducing the child to a product of its
disability rather than a person. The fact that some doctors may frequently
underestimate the possible value of familial input in the various daily routines
of child care and stimulation may act to encourage families to look elsewhere
for guidance. The shift in focus is often now to the alternative therapy centre.
As I shall show in the next chapter, with this move from orthodox to
alternative the balance of power, which is itself an emblem ofmedical
authority, becomes transferred back to the family. The effects of this are that
familial empowerment to address, in an active way, their child's needs is
increased, and so too is the threat to the competencies of doctors who are, by





In the previous chapter I discussed the events that led to the
surveillance and control ofmodern orthodox medicine and the resulting
dissatisfaction that many parents with a brain injured child experience during
their consultations with doctors. As was shown, this dissatisfaction with
doctors' inability both to effectively communicate with lay persons and to
address that which families perceive as their child's underlying problems often
results in some parents looking elsewhere for help. In this chapter I shall
explore in greater depth the help, method and appropriateness of an alternative
procedure to address what parents determine to be their child's problems, and
the consequence of these procedures on both the child and his or her family,
suggesting that this might allow them to see the person embedded within the
body. This may well in turn allow greater access to the child because it results
in a more individual manifestation of the idea of 'disability'. Such a view will
be contrasted with those notions that maintain the orthodox position with
regard to the medical processes that the child and family are often encouraged
to follow.
There has been an astounding corpus of knowledge generated by both
researchers and professionals (alternative and orthodox) whose concerns can
be broadly understood as exploring neurological dysfunction. What is most
surprising, however, is that little of this information is able to unite the
methodologies of both the orthodox and alternative practitioner's approach to
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ameliorate brain injury. As noted in chapters 3 and 4, specific doctrines bring
with them particular agendas: for orthodox medicine these respond to the
scientific validity of a given objective phenomena, so its diagnosis and
prognosis are therefore typically its focus. However, for the alternative
practitioner the subjective experience of a phenomenon such as brain injury is
paramount in framing the tangible and meaningful detail into a therapeutic
regime.
(Sarah)
Interviewer: At the most basic level could you say that the Kerland
programme listened to you and your experiences of Sarah?
Mother: Yes, but it also gave us a structure, because you can spend
hours and hours with your child and it can be a complete waste of time. You
need somebodyfrom outside to listen to you and actually assess your child.
You need somebody to stand outside yourfamily, but someone you know who
understands Sarah and herpotential.
Father: You're here, you do this (alternative therapy) you're now
there. Imean we wentfrom week to week and we didn't notice any difference,
but the health visitor did. She would only see her everyfortnight but she could
see the difference. Certainly, when we went to see the 'developmentalists' they
could say, 'look there it is, there's your chart, that's where she was and that's
where she gone'. And we would think, well she's got somewhere, whether it
was entirely due to the Kerlandprogramme was irrelevant the fact that we got
there and someone listened was a hell ofa boost to us.
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How are we, then, to understand the difference in opinions that result
from the conceptualisation of brain injury by these two contrasting
methodological approaches?
The problem might best be considered ifwe firstly understand that
these differing perspectives arise not from the notions relating to brain injury,
but from the collection of attributed facts (symptomology and its aetiology)
and, more importantly, their implication for therapy. That is to say brain
injury is not the issue, but rather the techniques that attempt to ameliorate it,
along with those professionals who devise them, are of greater concern to us.
Thus there appears to be a problem here between the supposed facts of
neurological trauma (what causes the symptoms) and their therapeutic
conclusion (how best are they treated). Moreover, this problem may not only
work to distort understanding of the issues involved, but may also prevent the
adoption of a suitable posture to enhance a given therapeutic procedure.
The problem, then, might well once again concern the concept ofmind.
As we saw in chapter 3, the higher operations ofmind are difficult to account
for in terms of clinical studies as their logical postulates, which dictate a
scientific method, rarely aid analysis. However, such speculations play only a
small part for parents. They prefer, instead, to rely upon their experience from





We feel she has actually reached, well she has not reached her
potential yet, but she has reached a level. She has reached this plateau really,
ifshe wanted to walk she could, 'she can walk' (both parents say in unison)
she's got her balance.
Such considerations are more typical of those techniques employed by
many alternative rather than orthodox practitioners. I use the term alternative
here because it best reflects those notions articulated be parents themselves
and also because it conveys 'the idea of a parallel but independent system'
(Sharma 1992: 6). This notion contrasts with that proposed by the term
complementary as this latter one implies 'the possibility of co-operation with
orthodox medicine' (Sharma 1992: 6),.a co-operation which remains
problematic1 for many in orthodox practice as they feel alternative therapy
fails to establish a credible scientific account of its methods and practice (BMJ
1980: 1-2)
However, the fact that the orthodox and alternative treatment regimes
adopt differing postures highlights their contrasting methodologies, which in
turn reflects the characterisation ofmind and body with which both groups
conceptualise the significance that neurological dysfunction has for the
sufferer. That is to say, although doctor, parent, injured child and alternative
therapist all have some experience of neurological dysfunction, there are no
certainties that their experiences share a commonality other than that given by
terminology alone. The fact that many alternative approaches rely upon
1 From my own experience many alternative therapists would welcome the opportunity
to develop some complementary role with medicine. In fact, they may often see their work as
complementing those services provided by orthodox practice. This position tends not,
however, to be entertained by orthodox medicine which often devalues alternative input
without knowing anything about it.
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familial experience to structure assessments is likely to help them empathise
more with the family's therapeutic objectives. These can, however, be
unrealistic in terms of clinical medicine and its expectations as Ursula Sharma
notes:
A fairly common view is that modern medical science has been a victim of its own success. It
has done so well in curing many acute and infectious conditions that people now expect
doctors to be able to cure everything. When they find this is not the case they may become
impatient and turn (unreasonably, in the BMA's view) to non orthodox medicine (Sharma
1992:115)
However, many families may simply believe their child has a greater
potential for development than that given by medical prognosis. Therefore,
alternative procedures that attempt to affiliate themselves with parental
ambitions may well be seen as threatening (Smith 1987: 192) and unscientific
(Cummins 1988)2 to the orthodox medical community. In view of this we may
now account for alternative therapies in terms of the way they interpret the
clinical detail and apply their methods with what sometimes appears to be a
singular irreverency to the principles of clinical medicine.
The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to account for the differences
that exist between the alternative and orthodox treatment procedures which
attempt to address brain injury in children, taking note that these differences
do not arise from the discernible facts of neurological trauma. They arise
instead from differences in interpretation.





In the last chapter I used a musical analogy to outline the way medical
professionals manage children with a brain injury. I suggested that a particular
score (clinical) is orchestrated to minimise the possible contribution that brain
injured children might make to the larger societal symphony. Moreover, the
effects of such medical management (orchestrations) may not only impoverish
the harmonic quality of the total work but are equally likely to discourage the
aspirations of those potential soloists (brain injured children) who have yet to
find their voice. Maintaining this analogy for a moment longer, I shall show
that many alternative therapies are also concerned with orchestrating disabled
children but their scoring procedures differ. They attempt to highlight the
brain injured child's 'instrumental' potential by allowing the body to be used as
a medium for social expression.
What seems to be crucial in deciding where to draw the boundaries
between the orthodox and the alternative is the collection of beliefs which
underpin each doctrine. For Brown (1987) the feature that moulds a fringe or
orthodox practice is its level of social cohesion, a shared set of beliefs and
practices that are commonly held among a group of individuals. This group
identity (alternativists) not only develops because of the 'assemblage of
interrelated ideas: (1987: 229) but because this cohesion proves even more
resistant to dismissal by the orthodoxy. The important point is that though
demarcation between the alternative and the orthodox may well be one of
medical theory, it also involves the social boundaries that maintain the
cohesion of shared ideology and identity. Furthermore, in relation to the
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alternative therapy for brain injured children, as I shall show, it is the very
ideas that parents have concerning their child's future which draw the lines that
demarcate their position from that of the orthodoxy. It is also the case that
their ideas may appear to be most sympathetically voiced in the procedures of
the alternativist and therefore seem to offer new levels of encouragement (see
Tony and Fiona's parent's quote at the end of chapter 4).
Moreover, parental belief in the hidden capacity of their child to
achieve more than that which is speculated by clinical medicine acts to
catapult parents into alternative therapies which 'feel', to the family anyway,
more sensitive and more aligned to their beliefs. An example of this is
provided by Tom's mother. Tom was born by emergency caesarean section
when at 36 weeks he showed signs of foetal distress, his weight was just 51bs
he also had a lung infection and heart murmur. He spent 6 days in an
incubator and returned home; after 3 weeks torn was subsequently diagnosed
as being cerebral palsied.
(Tom)
One ofthe reasons we went to the Kerland was because this particular
physio started saying, 'oh well its far to early to tell what level ofability he
will have at 15 months'. Yet he could tell her car from all the others and
would start crying when he saw it because he hated her so much. We knew he
was bright, even ifshe didn't.
As briefly mentioned, a great deal of research has been carried out
relating to brain injury and its myriad manifestations to personal function.
Furthermore, this enquiry has established pertinent facts which cannot be
disregarded. However, such facts can also be no more then speculations. As
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noted, the professional's attempt to predict the functional outcome by
presented 'facts' may result in inaccurate speculations which often further act
to the detriment of a family's future hopes and beliefs of habilitation. This
demonstrates the tension between the 'objective' analysis of an orthodox
medicine and the 'subjective' concerns of a parent with a brain injured child.
In this light, the methods which I term 'irreverent', unlike those of orthodox
medicine, are not fixated with the objective clinical facts but refer, instead, to
the observed dysfunction and its supposed immunity from a positive course of
treatment. In this sense alternative procedures rely on empirical accounts of
the child's disability to structure the varied programmes of habilitation3; that is,
personal observations and experiences, or perhaps phenomenology, act to
advocate a particular therapeutic stance. Thus, the empirical accounts that I
shall present in my argument, against the frequent clinical myopia of a singular
medical methodology, relate not to the neurological facts but to their often
debilitating conclusion.
Before continuing, however, I should reiterate some of the implications
of neurological dysfunction and the beliefs which attempt to impart a working
knowledge of brain injury so as to affect some level of amelioration. These
beliefs, and beliefs they must be until a clearer notion of the brain's global
manifestations are discovered, relate to both the varied aetiologies of disability
and their impact on our understanding of brain injured children and their lived
experience.
3 Although this in itself has become problematic, as the term 'empirical' is often used in





The clinical characteristics of neurological dysfunction depend almost
entirely, in the living child, on the cataloguing of behavioural disabilities. If
such problems are overt then they may be considered symptoms of some
underlying neurological pathology. However, there need be 'no correlation
between the localisation of a symptom and that of the function which has been
impaired'4. That is to say, a diplegic child (e.g. spasticity affecting both legs)
will have great difficulty in walking, so we may now be tempted to assume
that the problems that prevent this child from walking arise from the fact that
spasticity renders movement impossible. However, this need not be the case.
There may well be some deeper underlying neurological trauma of which
spasticity is but one expression. Therefore, spasticity is just one manifestation
of some neurological lesion while the lack of purposeful control of the legs
(which in itself would render walking near impossible) may be another. These
two symptoms of disability may have no other link to one another, other than
that both are expressions (perhaps even diverse ones) of some underlying
neurological lesion. In such a case spasticity may not be the cause but rather a
confounding symptom of disability. Indeed, it has been suggested that greater
understanding of neurological dysfunction might be achieved if those whose
interests involved clinical pathology showed an equal concern for the living
brain injured children in whom such pathology is detected (Thomas, 1969).
There can be little doubt, however, that new clinical methods, aimed
primarily at maintaining life support after neurological assault, have by far
32)
4This statement Luria (1966) attributes to Hughlings Jackson, cited in Thomas (1969:
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outstripped the management procedures which deal with the residual problems
that exist after the child has been medically stabilised. This is a crucial point
that has both moral and ethical implications for the medical attendants, the
child, and his or her family. However, perhaps our first concern should be that
of the child. It is almost impossible to conceptualise treatment without making
some appeal to prognostic factors. Yet any authoritative prognosis based on
early diagnosis alone may be no more reliable in predicting the outcome for a
brain injured child than guesswork. Philip's mother recalls the information
she was given after her son had been resuscitated following his drowning
accident.
(Philip)
Well one consultant told us that he probably would not live to double
figures because ofthe extent ofhis brain damage. He had to be tube fed. He
said his liver, kidneys and bowels will 'pack-up' because he's only having
liquids. There were all sorts ofthings and drugs and they said 'we can't see
him surviving'. And now, four years later, they say he could live into hisfifties
because the way he is caredfor and the way he is now.
Statements are often made which offer little hope to parents but
provide instead, feelings of inevitability and impotence to do something
positive to help their child. This is given expression by a mother whose
daughter suffers from athetoid spasticity and hydrocephalus.
(Cindy)
And then we wentfor another check-up.... and I said, 'well look, you've
given us three different statements, you don't know, do you? And she said, 'no'
and I saidfine, I can cope with that. But don't make all these statements
because I've got to go home, we've got to live with her
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Why, when so little is understood about recovery mechanisms, do
orthodox medical personnel still tend to underestimate the possible future
expectations for the brain injured child?
Particularly problematic, for the parents of newly diagnosed infants, is
the often negative speculations concerning 'outcome' offered by orthodox
medicine.
(Cindy)
It was all sorts oflittle things, I don't know, they didn't treat me as
human. They kept on spilling out all these words, hydrocephalus, she's got
this wrong with her, she's got that wrong with her, theyjust don't consider that
at the end ofthe day you've got to go home with her and worry about it.
Such statements show how the clinical formulations of orthodox
medicine only offer uncertain outcomes, and yet are couched in a discourse
which attempts to maintain an air of authority. It is, of course, possible that
there are confounding variables that blights prognosis. For example, these
may be due to the fact that improvements in childhood outcome can either
reflect the true long term insignificance of the trauma itself, or some
mechanism associated with the lesion and / or the recoverability and plasticity
of the young brain (Bruce 1990). That is, it may be possible that some
children regain function simply because the initial trauma was in the long term
superficial (see chapter 3), or that the brain readjusts to the lesion through
some, as yet unknown, process of repair. Or indeed, that new areas are
stimulated to 'take over' the control of that 'lost' function, demonstrating a
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possible plasticity. These 'internal' factors, broadly concerning tissue recovery,
are themselves independent of any benefit derived from 'external' therapy
aimed at habilitating the child. To add a further confounding variable to the
present ameliorative complex there exists, as I have already mentioned, that
which may be referred to as a 'discontinuity of perspectives' between the
orthodox and alternative approaches to treatment. This seems largely based on
medical 'protectionism' which 'denies the common ownership of knowledge'
(Smith 1987: 192), and establishes the 'social boundaries' (Brown 1987) that
retain 'professional' cohesion and identity. Is it possible, then, to identify those
factors in the working medical rationales that maintain orthodox clinical
distinctions and those practised by the alternativists? I believe it is, but before
tackling this issue the problem must be more clearly formulated.
Differing Perspectives
That trauma to the brain can result in damage to its specialised neurons
and interfere with functioning, either focally or diffusely, is unimportant for
the present analysis. Instead, what is important, are the implications for the
brain injured child and his or her parents. In contrast, then, to the clinical
speculations ofmedicine many families feel that the alternative therapies offer
a more positive approach to both the problems of brain injury and the general
familial concerns that establish the whole trauma experience.
(Timothy)
Imust admit I do think the 'child centre' was really good, Ifelt that
they knew exactly what we had been through, what we were going through, so
that it was a sigh ofreliefthat we didn't have to explain anything.
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Many alternative centres offer an approach to treatment that is often
considered more controversial than the sum of its procedures. Underlying this
controversy, for the orthodoxy at least, is the alternative practitioner's disbelief
in the finality of brain injury. It is, of course, true that much of the criticism
levelled at unorthodox approaches refer to the lack of scientific support for the
theoretical tenets which underpin their method5. However, it is worth
mentioning that although theory and technique are frequently associated with
one another they can, nevertheless, be mutually exclusive. For example, that a
theoretical proposition does not support the application of a particular
therapeutic technique can as equally imply an unsound proposition as
invalidate the technique. Many alternative therapies, particularly those that
involve manipulations of posture, position and physical stimulation, use a
variety of techniques that have little scientific rationale to locate them in
clinical practice. They are designed, instead, in terms of parental aspirations:
what they want their child to do. Similar to physiotherapy, these techniques
are however usually much more intensive, which is often a source of conflict.
Many families feel that the service provided by physiotherapy is too
intermittent and not challenging enough. Physiotherapists, on the other hand,
may be so angered by families attending alternative centres that they refuse to
work with the child.





We hadphysio but I didn'tfeel it was doing a lot ofgood but as soon
as we told them we were going to the Kerland Child Development Centre she
dropped us completely, refused to see Tom and we had no more physio for two
years. She was coming once a week before that, she treated him up to the
week we went and then stopped, she was Bobath trained and didn't believe in
what we were doing at all.
This is often the very point where the ongoing controversy between
orthodox and alternative procedures clash. The focus of medicine concerns
the clinical and scientific management of the condition, while that of the
unorthodox practitioner is typically more child/family centred and proactive in
relation to the body. Once again it can be seen that the notions at the
foundation of this discontinuity of perspective involve those claims, by
orthodox medicine, that the child's condition should be objectively dealt with.
This doctrine tends to negate the possibility that subjective inferences,
generated by the family and alternative therapist, can be useful in determining
a positive course of action. Thus, for the alternative therapist, concern is given
to how the child's development might be encouraged with the appropriate
stimulation, while that of medicine and its employment of physiotherapy is
concerned more with bodily maintenance, at the biological level. The issue,
then, is not neurological dysfunction but its subsequent treatment, and the
differing perspectives are thus the result of the way each approach views
possible treatment rationales. For doctors the brain injured child is
constructed as an impersonal 'clinical case' presenting the symptomology of an
objective orthodox medicine. In contrast, the alternative therapist's position is
more willing to regard the child and family's phenomenology as an incentive to
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habilitation. The difference is that for the alternative therapist, the child and
his or her whole phenomenology is central to the ameliorative process. On the
other hand, orthodox medicine's concern for pathology often occludes those
person centred dimensions from consideration. In so doing the brain injured
child receives no more concern than the clinical pathology that serves to label
her.
The Child in Alternative Therapy
Many of the surgical procedures practised on diplegic children have
proved to be of little use in improving walking (Patrick 1989). Even though
this mainstream approach has generally failed there seems, however, to be an
unwillingness for the profession to adopt or consider alternative procedures.
This might well be related to what Foucault, (1973: 1977: 1979) Armstrong,
(1983) and Turner (1987: 1992) have noted as a general inability of clinical
medicine to understand that the patient or- in this case, the brain injured child -
is, in essence, more than the sum of the disabilities with which he or she is
labelled. Such a proposition underscores much of the alternativist's approach.
They do not view clinical assessment as a separate phenomena from the social
trauma that it accompanies. They tend to see the child as being far more
significant than the condition he or she may present.
From my own experience of the Kerland method, initial assessment of
the child required somewhat detailed histories to be recorded. This not only
involved collecting information about the child's present level of ability and
what concerns the parents might have with regard to physical and mental
potential but was also concerned with those issues that provide the child with
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an opportunity to encounter a more normal experience of the world than that
often traditionally prescribed for disabled children. Reminding parents that
the needs of their brain injured child were not, in nature, any different to those
of his or her siblings helped to make the Kerland clinic a centre where
dialogue could replace rhetoric and where discussion would have victory over
dictation. In this way parents were empowered to explore those options of
therapy that had been previously withheld. However, seeking out alternative
procedures does not just have a long historical precedent but remains a
common practice for a variety of conditions, as testified by the amount of
people using self-treatments with non-prescribed medicines (Wadsworth et al.
1971) and alternative treatments (Sharma 1992). Furthermore, it has been
estimated that
approximately 20000 people in Britain are practising 'medicine' without any official
qualification or approval, about a quarter of them deriving a full time living from their various
therapies. Moreover, it has been estimated that alternative medicine is growing five-times as
rapidly as orthodox medicine (Scambler 1986: 51).
This increase in alternative services and their frequent usage,
particularly the self help groups, has resulted from 'the lack of adequate
understanding, care, treatment or support from the various health
professionals' (Scambler 1986: 52). Such sentiments are frequently articulated
by parents of a brain injured child. A perceived lack of continuity and a





We kept on seeing different doctors and we had gone down to Bristol
and saw this women doctor who I had never seen before. She came in late at
night and Cindy was ill and she said 'you do realise that this child is brain
damaged'? And I said no and that was the first time I knew. I said, 'can you
explain to me what that will entail'? Well, 'she will have mental problems'
replied the doctor.
There are, of course, other contributing factors that affect orthodox
treatment regimes, such as the large scale service they must provide with its
attendant managerial and administrative difficulties. Many medical
professionals are aware of the importance of addressing both the child's and
family's social, psychological and environmental needs, but the fragmentary
way in which such support is given tends to minimise its efficacy. This may
leave parents dissatisfied and make them feel that their child would be better
offwith a more concerted approach. As one perceptive mother noted
(Tom)
Speech therapists don't get involved with respiration, the physio does it.
Ridiculous, isn't? Because when you think about ityou can't speak without
breathing.
In order to combat the fragmentation of services, the injured child - a
child within a body, not just the body as a maladapted phenomenon - needs to
be conceptually restored to that of a complete individual. The restoration of a
clinical subject to that of a human being is something many practitioners, both
orthodox and alternative, are striving for.
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The patient's essential being is very relevant in the higher reaches of neurology, and
in psychology; for here the patient's personhood is essentially involved, and the study of
identity cannot be disjoined (Sacks 1985: X)
However, as we have already seen in chapter 2 much of the rhetoric
associated with the patient's personhood is far more likely to relate to the adult
than to the child. Indeed, though children may well be a legitimate object for
orthodox medical enquiry they have little social status to negotiate a viable
identity for themselves within it. This is possibly even more difficult for brain
injured children to achieve. However, for the non medical approaches the
acceptance of the child as an individual is frequently less problematic, as the
reliance of therapy rests on observing the child's immediate problems in terms
of physical function and behavioural aspirations. This is often the result of
seeing therapy as a mediating process between the brain injured child and
personal functioning. This process must accept the child as a child with his or
her attendant capacities or incapacities. In this light the child is seen as not
some incomplete adult, awaiting the chronology ofmaturation, but as a
striving person in need of assistance to fulfil his or her potential.
Thus many alternative procedures work, through therapy, to integrate
the child, his or her personal functioning and the family into 'meaningful'
routines. Although some therapy centres localise the staff and provide space
for assessments, therapy is typically done at home by family, relatives and
friends on a regular basis. There is, therefore, little or no clinical space to
impose a medical discipline upon the child (Davis 1982). Although a
discipline is being exercised by the requirements of daily therapy, its focus is
(or at least should be) in concord to those routines that attempt to establish
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new levels of personal potential. They need not, then, ensure clinical
compliance to a management regime.
Thus, the sterility that is the investment ofmedical space and the
control it exerts (Zola 1972, Illich 1975) is tempered with the normalising
environment that is the child's home in alternative practice. Though regarded
as a contentious issue for many orthodox physicians, who argue that such
therapies disrupt family life to an intolerable level, the passivity that families
experience while subscribing to medical management policies is often far
more intolerable than the activities they may undertake at home6. Karen's
mother points this out to a doctor when questioned about the alternative
treatment she sought to help combat some of the problems associated with her
daughter's chromosomal disorder.
(Karen)
I had a long discussion with the paediatrician... about the fact that we
were doing something, (alternative therapy). He was concerned that it was
actually a form ofcruelty and that people might be overdoing these excises.
Well I disagreed, you can say that about any treatment,... after I had chatted to
him he did change his attitude because I know from other professionals that
he has spoken better of it since. We had a long talk about it and I told him
that I thought it was actually a boost to the parents because they were doing
something instead ofjust sitting back and expecting something.
Understanding that the requirements for a child with a brain injury are
essentially the same as those of an uninjured child would be a fundamental
shift in perception for orthodox medicine. It involves focusing on the method
6 There has been some controversy over the amount of time home based therapy
programmes impose on the child and family. Traditionally, with those centres that offered the
Doman-Delacato approach this would involve an excessive daily commitment. However,
there are hopefully but a few practitioners who would advocate such a detrimental, regime the
majority preferring to involve short but frequent sessions of therapy.
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of delivery and not just the appropriateness of stimulation. This highlights yet
another one of the basic perceptual and conceptual conflicts that exist between
orthodox medicine and the unorthodoxy of alternative practitioners. The
needs and desires of a brain injured child and his or her parents differ from
those of the non-traumatised family, not in their common wish for a successful
future, but only in the chances their child will have of achieving one. Of
course, any possible future outcome will depend almost entirely upon two
essential but sometimes conflicting factors. The first of these concerns the
child's encouraged propensity to develop when given optimal opportunities.
The second depends on the overriding clinical considerations of a detected
pathology which, owing to the special status afforded to the clinician, may
receive more attention, and therefore has greater influence on 'outcome', than
the child's own possibly submerged abilities. One mother recalls the
misdiagnosis of her hydrocephalic daughter and the resentment this caused.
(Cindy)
Then she had a 'shunt'1 revision at sixteen weeks, this is when that
woman doctor announced she was brain damaged. Every time I said, now
look, come on something's not right they would say 'don't worry she's had the
ops she's all right'. But my health visitor, she was excellent, she kept on
saying 'I'm going to measure her head' and every day she said her head is
getting too big. And this is from the time when things were getting blocked up,
only through her that we found out her head was growing too big. Because
her head control wasn't very good they kept telling me that she was deaf I
said she's not it was because she couldn't (physically) turn her head around
when they made a sound.
7A shunt is a procedure that involves inserting a device into the head so that the excess
fluid can be drawn out from the brain in the hydrocephalic patient.
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As this example shows the doctor has authority in clinical decisions
even if, as this parent suspected, the diagnosis may be incorrect. If these
parents had accepted that she was deaf the possible lost opportunities for
normal auditory input might well have contributed further to her disability.
Thus the authority and control of orthodox medicine can, and often does,
provide doctors with the ability to override the parents in therapy decisions.
Once again we see the clinical agendas ofmedicine (notions regarding organic
pathology and its speculations) orchestrating the disabled body with little
reference to its possessor, the child. In this way the brain injured child may
remain a prisoner of his or her disabilities because clinical notions of
pathology dictate therapy, or a lack of it, more so than the child's unique
qualities that may lie submerged under an overt disability.
In alternative therapy, by contrast, the child is far more likely to be
considered as a 'particular' child, an individual possessing unique capacities
and special problems. In this way children are re-individualised in accord with
their personal needs and their particular familial situations. Whereas orthodox
medicine requires brain injured children to be a taxonomic class, a group
defined by types of organic pathology which adopts a generalised approach to
their management, the alternative practitioner's concern is for the particular.
This view holds that the child is unique and though similar problems may be
observed in other brain injured children they are highly particular to this child.
Therefore, any general therapeutic techniques must be individually tailored,
not solely in the attempt to combat the manifestations of disability, but also to
acknowledge the unique individuality of the child.
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Humanism as a Counterpoint to Medicine
It is not my intention to devalue the work being carried out by both
clinical and experimental investigators with regards to brain pathology. Their
task is as difficult as it is necessary. The point I wish to make clear, however,
is simply that their subject matter is far greater in breadth and depth than
merely the observation of pathologies. Indeed, if they were ever to completely
lose sight of the essential human character of their enquiry, how could their
work have meaning to the human condition and its continual struggle to
understand disability at both the social and medical level? With this in mind,
the progressive way forward may be not to follow a single path but to make
several advances in all possible directions. In this way, many alternative
approaches are attempting to make a valuable contribution to the problems of
brain injury by positing the child as a possessor of potential. The key to
alternative therapy lies in finding the processes that may help the child realise
this potential.
At the centre of the alternative approach are the child, the child's injury
and the child's family: behind them lies the child's clinical diagnosis, whilst
ahead there is a chance of discovering that the child's prognosis is more likely
to be a reflection of the orthodox clinician's negative dogma than an
understanding of his or her available options if given all the necessary




Although I didn 't agree with what I was doing initially, I had to give it
a go and then, ofcourse, it didn't take very long to realise that it was working.
The veryfirst change we saw was at the first visit because theyput Tony on a
ramp he had never moved and then he came down it. Not under his own
volition, he slid down it but he moved, and on his face was 'I've just done
something, I've just moved'. So they did somethingfor us that veryfirst
session so we had to keep going.
This is not to suggest that the alternatives have found a panacea for
the amelioration of brain injury. However, unlike orthodox medicine, they
regard the child as being not at the end of her future, but possibly at the start of
a new one. As I mentioned in chapter 1, my knowledge and information is
particularly relevant to those procedures that in some way 'pattern'8 the child's
body in an attempt to establish functional behaviour. Indeed, the majority of
alternative and mainstream procedures for brain injury are fundamentally
focused on the body as the physical, manipulatable, experiential and often the
only tangible manifestations of the child with a brain injury.
This focus on the child, his or her disability and the child's family is
frequently visible in the stance taken when alternative practitioners make an
assessment of the child and his or her future potential. For those centres of
'good practice' this requires: (1) that the child becomes the focus of concern, as
it is the child that will be the ultimate measure of any therapeutic benefit that
may be achieved: (2) that disability will be regarded as the focus of a therapy
which is therefore specifically designed to effect a positive change in the
8
"Patterning" is the term given to a sequence of passive manipulations of the body that
are intended to programme the child's brain with developmental experience. These
somatosensory experiences are then utilised by the child as templates for purposeful
behaviours. This method was pioneered by Doman-Delacato but has been extensively
modified by many alternative therapy centres..
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child's functional capacities: (3) that it is the family who, when committed
and permitted to contribute to their child's habilitation, are likely to be their
child's therapists par excellence. Addressing these basic requirements helps
form a tripartite operational mesh which structures the alternativist's concerns
and their resultant therapeutic implications. In this sense the alternative
programme does not attempt to evolve management strategies, as is the case of
orthodox medicine. Neither does it restrict its perception to a fixation on the
symptomology. Nevertheless it is generally believed that an appropriate
therapy will offer support to both these considerations but it is not guided by
them alone.
Indeed, the alternative practitioners' responsibility is to ensure that they
address what Sacks (1985) refers to as 'the suffering, afflicted, fighting human
subject', in this case, the brain injured child. It is certainly true that any
therapy that maintains this underpinning ideology may seem unconventional.
This is particularly so when one considers that its therapeutic tenet is to
provide the child with the most basic experiences of normal development so
that further emergent behaviours have a relevant substrate on which to build.
For example, the Doman-Delacato method is directed on the tangible
body and its disrupted patterns ofmotor behaviour, for these are the
summation of present functional output and as such play a significant role in
the child's holistic capacity. By establishing incremental "patterns" for motor
expression the latter hierarchical requirements of development are believed
satisfied, leading to greater motor control. Procedures such as these (as
outlined in chapter 1), simple though they are, may provide the disabled child
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with greater personal control over his or her environment. They may promote
exploratory behaviour, spatial awareness and self motivation, processes which
can help establish a feedback link to further encourage more refined motor
development9. It is also likely that any technique that helps to enhance the
child's ability to purposefully engage with the environment might well act to
lessen the effects of some of the accompanying cognitive deprivation that may
result from severe disability.
Magician or Musician
As in the past, there remains a great controversy over the validity of
alternative therapies to provide an effective recourse for brain injured children.
In his paper "Magical thinking" (1989) Robert Cummins champions the
orthodox medical position when he attacks the Doman-Delacato method (see
appendage 2) by referring to it as "nonsense". Once again his criticisms are
based on the failure ofDoman-Delacato to account for their method in a
scientifically acceptable fashion. The fact that much of his argument is well
articulated, and with reference to the Doman-Delacato indeed at times valid,
does not establish the certainties that he considers must apply to all alternative
therapies. Furthermore, his comments regarding parents as 'vulnerable to the
seduction of 'magical thinking', which he establishes as a derogatory cognitive
process of self delusion making them susceptible to 'therapeutic predation',
does much to undermine the sophistication that many parents possess with
9 The possible beneficial effects resulting from an increase in exploratory behaviour
and motivation have been postulated by Palmer & Bruce (1988) to contribute to enhanced
motor development in children with spastic diplegia.
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particular reference to their child's condition. The father with two disabled
children stated:
(Fiona and Tony)
We're not ignoramuses you know, they don't realise (doctors) that we
know more about Tony's functioning, and what he needs than they will ever
know.
It is likely that many parents traumatised by their child's brain injury do
look for understandable explanations and remedial techniques to reinstate that
child they feel may be lost to them. In doing so they may well be, at the initial
stages at least, more vulnerable to the persuasions of any practitioner who
offers a brighter hope for a positive future. The point is, however, that such
hope is as likely to be peddled by the legitimate orthopaedic practitioners with
their often debilitating surgical procedures10 as it is by unsound and unethical
alternativists. Indeed, the higher the status of the professional involved the
more credible the information may appear. In this sense medical decisions are
likely to have far greater negative impact upon the child and his family than
those of the committed alternative therapist. Moreover, as alternative
practitioners cannot prescribe drugs, surgery or hospitalisation any help they
give can, under the supervision of an interested parent, be monitored to ensure
that what is being done makes sense. This is rarely experienced by parents
who submit to the medical regimes of the physician11 even when they know
their child's real needs are not being addressed.
10 See Patrick (1989)




Ifind him totally useless, I usually end up cancelling appointments and
making them some months further on. I know there's nothing else medically
wrong with her.
It is not, then, that alternative practitioners are magicians creating
illusions to trick vulnerable parents. Though such charlatans exist, the role
played by the many alternative therapists in relation to brain injured children
can, as I have already mentioned, be likened more to that of a musician. The
therapist manipulates the child's body to give expression and purpose to
behaviour in the way a musician manipulates raw sound to create a melody.
This, I would argue, is not magic but appears to involve a particular skill, and
one that cannot be easily dismissed by 'naive rationalism' and scientific
protectionism which acts to maintain a different set of beliefs (Brown 1987).
There are, and must certainly be, 'down sides' to all approaches that
attempt to deal with the trauma of children with brain injury, and in this sense
the alternativist is no better placed than those who operate in the mainstream.
However, considering that the problem involves all aspects of the child's
social, physical and psychological functioning, there is unlikely to be a single
method that can address all of the manifest issues.
A Therapeutic Rational
There has been little scientific fact accrued in support of alternative
therapies that address brain injury. The problem has been that for many such
professionals their practice has rarely lent itself to the testable hypotheses that
would substantiate their therapeutic claims. Hypotheses must, of course,
187
Chapter 5
reflect a series of formulated statements which outline a testable form of
action. Furthermore, the fact that some alternative practitioners12 have, in their
attempt to make credible their techniques of therapy, been over zealous in
proposing many of the supposedly substantiated neurological models as
evidence of their efficacy, need not devalue the good work that can be
achieved. It is worth remembering that there has been, as yet, no convincing
physiological model to explain the effects of placebo, but nevertheless its
affects can be overt. This returns the argument back once again to those issues
which support the 'objectivists' viewpoint, largely denying, as it does, the
subjective phenomena of disability.
My point is simply that the lack of a convincing (i.e. in the presently
acceptable scientific schema) neurological model should not in itself negate
the application of a particular technique. For example, this is especially
relevant when the techniques which many practitioners have evolved allow the
child to experience a graduation of sensory-motor patterns (facilitators of a
conscious embodied potential, Merleau-Ponty 1962: 109) which were
previously unavailable to her or him, and which have no medical
contra-indications. Families, and even therapists, might not always understand
exactly how the therapy works but have little problem in identifying
improvements. As the parents with a developmentally delayed daughter recall
12 The Doman and Delacato method provides a good example of those therapists who
postulate scientific rationales to support their therapeutic claims. Moreover, it is this method
that has received a great deal of criticism from other professionals. Another example is that of
the Peto Institute and their 'conductive education' programme which has attracted much




But then I thought, you yourselves (alternative therapists) had said,
'you don't always know how the programme works', but it does, and any child
thrives on attention, andphysical exercise does promote development.
We know, obviously better then you do, the programme (therapy) has
definitely helped her to improve.
Thus those not utilising alternative therapy may be deprived of such
'common sense' stimulation due to the institutionalised inability of the
attending orthodox physician to see that the child's requirements are more than
the suppression of symptoms alone13. All therapy need not be antagonistic to
orthodox medicine since, ideologically, alternative therapy should supplement
that which is provided by physicians14 i.e. complementary medicine.
However, this is rarely the case as the alternativists' approach pays little
attention to the scientism that underscores medicine (although this is not to
argue that objective scientific practices are the only ones that operate within
medicine). Furthermore, we should not be seduced into believing that rational
science regulates all orthodox medical conduct. Indeed, that which Thomas
Kuhn (1970) saw operating in general science is also true about much that is
prescribed by doctors. Procedures of both are equally likely to result from
events that have more to do with the sociological factors that maintain
"Physiotherapy, on the other hand, if sensitive to the child's needs, can be of some
value when delivered on a regular and consistent basis (Patterson 1989: 46). However, owing
to the increasing financial constraints placed on the NHS Trust systems this is unlikely to be
realised in the present economic climate. The use of drugs and surgical procedures can prove
particularly distressing to both child and family and have, I believe, proved themselves to align
closer to management practices than to therapy (Patrick 1989, Patterson 1989 & Gans, et al
1990). The primary responsibility for the alternative therapist, then, should not attempt to
manage the associated distress but work to improve it, if not to resolve it. In view of this the
alternative approach will no doubt continue to be available to those parents who are
dissatisfied with the orthodox system.
141 agree with Ursala Sharma's definition here, when she suggests that 'alternative
medicine' conveys the idea of a parallel but independent system whereas 'complementary
medicine' 'implies as it does a co-operation with orthodox medicine (1992: 6).
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cohesion in their professional community than they have with the principles of
scientific logic and methodology alone15. Given that the alternative approach
attempts to enhance the child's functional ability through structured
programmes of physical, sensory and cognitive stimulation, why should such
practices be perceived as so antagonistic to the medical profession? The data
suggests that orthodox medicine may be threatened by the fact that parents,
committing to such therapies, might prove the doctors wrong. Therefore, it
may challenge their professional authority to supervise such matters. As one
father commented.
(Sarah)
Yes, Imean it does change your life (receiving alternative therapy), but
the thing is with Sarah, we have fought against what we see as the National
Health system because they wouldn't do the things we wanted them to. And
they thought they were right but they were wrong, they were definitely wrong.
What many therapists do is by no means remarkable but can often
prove effective. The conflict of rational assessment, lies in how such
procedures are to be measured. The efficacy of family based therapy is
measured only by its relative success in habilitating the problems associated
with brain injury. It therefore need not appeal to the objective clinical criteria
that regulate medicine15. This does not imply that therapy must not make good
its account to a peer group, as there does exist an authority to whom it must
15 Thomas Kuhn (1970) has shown considerable interest in the sociological dimension
of the scientific community, which can strongly influence the perceived nature of science.
Indeed, Kuhn's 'paradigm anomalies', (fundamental assumptions which direct scientific
endeavour but begin to lose favour because of their inability to resolve relative problems) may
resist rejection due more to their ability to retain a functional level of social contract then to
their capacity for pure scientific appeal.
16 That is, the underlying neural pathology may have not changed but this does not
always correlate with functional change and improvement.
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answer. But this authority, however, is not invested in the medical
institutions. Instead it is found ultimately in the child and his or her parents.
This does identify a possible problem which concerns regulation. Alternative
approaches need to open discourse with other professionals, orthodox and
unorthodox, to ensure that standards and good and ethical practice are being
observed and monitored. However, this is in itself is unlikely to evolve when
medicine, which could lend a welcomed professional expertise, seem so
unwilling to consider that some alternative postures could advance
therapeutics in strictly non clinical ways.
This same unwillingness to address the alternative therapist's concerns
is further implicated in the disparity that exists between doctor and parent.
That is, unlike Cummins' (1988) critique, which sees conflict arising from
parental naivity and unrealistic goal attainment (which is, I believe, not the
source of the problem but its product) the most likely contributing candidate is
found in professional misconceptions. The problem, then, is not what can be
done for the child's brain injury but what can be done for the child. This
simple but vital category mistake, which recognises the clinical but not the
human condition, is fundamental to both the intellectual and emotional
disparities that separate the medical from the other primary considerations of
personhood.
The majority of alternative therapists do not let their senses become
overpowered by the neurological complexity of the brain and its myriad
processes, as this is the work of others. Their concern is to help the child with
a brain injury to establish, firstly through improved motor behaviours, a better
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relationship with the world ofwhich this child is still a part. After all, the
criteria with which he or she is likely to be assessed will necessarily reflect
this world so, by all possible means, the child must obtain some experience of
it. After all, this is the nature of the embodied enterprise, disabled or not.
Therefore, against this backdrop the techniques of the alternative therapist can
be seen as pragmatic attempts to mediate the suppressed, but nevertheless
primary, experiences of normal development to the child from whom such
vital needs have been withheld due to injury. Providing motor input (passive
manipulations that imitate a desired function) helps establish both a physical
potentiality for the particular behaviour and the corresponding awareness of
what is required to achieve it. As one mother with a six year old cerebral
palsied daughter recalls
(Sarah)
It was the crawling, Imean even right at the beginning she crawled to
the pattern. It was incredible, she started crawling exactly like the 'cross
pattern' (input exercise).
Such a rationale (providing children with embodied experience), then,
may not require scientific detachment, but perhaps is better served by those
who operate through an informed humanism. Thus, alternative therapy need
not be considered as a failure to apply a scientific method but more as the
champion of common sense, and in so doing it restructures the body for its
intended capacities.
However, as it is the parents, their families and friends who provide
this therapeutic input on a daily basis it is only natural that such a sustained
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level of commitment may give rise to parental anger and frustration.
Sometimes this frustration is directed inward towards the child.
(Jayne)
I could have killed her sometimes, I was so anxiousfor her to do her
patterning and she wouldn't. We were all doing this hard work, we were
restructuring our whole life and she wouldn't do it and she has got to, because
ifshe doesn't how is she going to get better?
Sometimes it has an external focus and the alternative therapist is
blamed for the problems they may be experiencing.
(Jayne)
So there is this sort ofpressure and I thought you (alternative
therapist) have given us this and left us with it and she won't do it. You never
told us that she wouldn't do it. And it was so demoralising and at time I
thought, I wish I had never heard of it, because it was almost like I had been
given a goal and then because ofthe situation here, we couldn't even attempt
it.
The reality of the situation is that it is extremely hard work and often in
the beginning the injured child fights this new discipline of therapy. Tied in to
this adjustment phase is also the suspicion that they are responsible, if not for
the cause of their child's injury, then for the therapies success.
(Sarah)
I think its quite natural to feel some responsibility, and even guilt
perhaps. But there's nothing more you can do in many cases but ride through
all the complications. So you may be apart ofall these complications but you
did not cause them.
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I shall examine the responsibilities and guilt that families experience in
the next chapter. For the moment, however, I simply wish to show that
making such a contribution to the child's possible future demands a
considerable fortitude from both parent and child. After these initial
adjustments families and their brain injured children tend to settle down to the
routines of therapy. This is, of course, made much easier if they perceive
some benefit for all their hard work and see the therapy as a practical
application.
(Jayne)
Its the practical things thatyou can do you know. How do you help a
child with brain injury? Its a substantial thing, there's no technologyyou can
apply then all ofa sudden you're given something reallypractical to do, it's
just what we need.
Therapeutic Responsibilities
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to maintain a humanist rather
than a clinical posture with regards to a therapeutic rationale for the treatment
of brain injured children and have argued that the therapy designed by the
altemativist is only alternative inasmuch as it does not adopt a pseudo medical
explanation of it's practice17. Instead its focus is upon the developmental
requirements of the child with behavioural impairment. In this sense the
alternative therapists are exclusively non-medical agents, which sometimes
does not, however, preclude them from their responsibility to ensure that all
17 The Doman-Delacato method has, in fact, been criticised for this and thus have
soured much of the good work that the alternative therapies have achieved..
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programmes of therapy are commensurate with the child's ongoing medical
needs. However, considerations that align themselves to some form of
therapeutic activity remain important, particularly for parents concerned with
the subject of how to access their child.
(Fiona and Tony)
One ofthe things we wouldfeel guilty about is ifwe hadn't done
everything that we possibly could to overcome the problems associated with
their brain injury.
Encouraging parents to work with their child is a hallmark of the many
differing alternative approaches and is often the very reason that many parents
subscribe to these therapies. George Storm (1983) has quite a different notion
to explain the parent's selection of an alternative therapeutic centre. He
suggests that parents are
often confused by diagnostic interpretations resulting from their child's evaluation because of
their own emotional state, which can impair information processing, parents may pursue
opinions and unproved interventions endlessly (1983: 1160).
Here yet again, as with Cummins' (1988) reappraisal, the critics of
alternative practice attempt to discharge any responsibility from the medical
profession by assuming that parental inadequacies (i.e. information processing
failures) are now responsible for a family's shift to alternativism. Although
both Storm and Cummins concur with the idea that medical professionals may
at times be insensitive to the family's position, they nevertheless fail to
appreciate that general medical behaviour plays a crucial part in initially
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alienating families from their services and, due to their continued censure,
maintain familial disparity with medically recognised objectives.
The following account from a mother and her cerebral palsied
daughter's encounter with a paediatrician demonstrates how an alienation from
medicine might occur.
(Cindy)
But she doesn't like him and he is apaediatric doctor and was trained
to work with children and his attitude is, well, we're trying to get Cindy into
mainstream school, his attitude is they should all be loaded together. He
actually said it. and he wonders why we don't go down and see him. So
when you've got that sort ofprejudice againstyou from somebody who is
supposed to be on your side andyour child's side, what do you do? You give
up andyou don't bother with them.
Such failures, on the medical side, are further aggravated by the
general lack of training, experience and counselling many doctors have in
these situations (Carey and Levine 1983). For many families, to participate in
some therapeutic objective, even if remote, is perceived to be the better option
than the helpless criticisms of a therapeutically passive orthodox medicine.
For parents this may be because alternative therapy provides a focus of
the mind situated in the body. For example, ideas concerning the mind
become more imaginable when the body is referenced as a key to
understanding its myriad associations. Consider vision for a moment, not
merely to register light, shade, colour and texture but to process all such hues
into a recognisable pattern with particular meanings. Now how could one ever
know that such information is capable of being processed by the brain injured
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child if that child cannot speak to inform on what he sees? How might we
gain some insight into the 'visualised' experiences of this child? One possible
way would be to observe the child's bodily expression, or indeed changes in
the character of expression, to various exposures involving differing stimuli.
This is, in fact, what many parents do, almost unconsciously.
(Philip)
We've noticed a couple ofthings about him with people we know and
strangers. We askedpeople he didn't know to walk up and stand in front of
him without saying a word and he would look and study them. Then we got
somebody else who he really knows well to do exactly the same and he would
be like giggling and laughing, he recognised them!
Such experiments are unlikely to be regarded as good science. But
they do help to 'fill-in' some of the uncertainties between parent and injured
child and allow families to see their children as truly embodied beings. This
might well play a role in the development of effective attachments that
maintain a familial persistence to their child and perhaps therapy. The need
then to understand what is going on 'inside' is not just of clinical or
philosophical interest it is also a necessary concern for the parent.
Conclusion
I have suggested, in chapter 3 that 'dualist' notions concerning
mind/body questions are still prevalent today and perhaps influence much of
what parents encounter during their consultations with the medical profession.
Most simply, this involves a narrow clinical focus on the child's underlying
neural pathology. However, this is not so much to criticise biological
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reductionism, as it is to question why concepts involved with mental
existencies are so often ignored by the practitioner? Is it possible that physical
and mental events have been artificially demarcated because the former have
more relevance to medical exploration than the latter? Although there are
likely to be close associations between mental and physical events (Hodgson
1991: 58), is the reason why the 'mental' states are largely ignored by the
medical attendants of these children that they can only be understood if they
represent some 'ghostly possession of the brain-injured machine'18, and are
therefore beyond medical scope? Or do they, in fact, believe that simply
because the brain is damaged therefore the mind, too, is beyond redemption?
Gilbert Ryle (1947) may provide some insight in his suggestion that one of the
agents responsible may be the idiomatic use of 'in the mind statements' which
act to over-sophisticate the actions or behaviours we wish to describe.
Moreover, it
habituates its employers to the view that minds are 'queer' places, the occupants ofwhich are
special-status phantasms (Ryle 1947: 40).
Could such an assumption contribute, at least in part, to the separation
of physical from mental events and the specific allocation of these former
events to the confines ofmedical propriety? Cannot minds, which are both the
genesis and result of physical functioning, be pragmatically associated with the
body so as to achieve a better understanding of disablement through
embodiment?
18 This expression owes much to Gilbert Ryle's (1947) thesis on the 'Concept of Mind'.
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Now we must think of the human body (and not of "consciousness") as that which
perceives nature which it also inhabits (Merleau-Ponty 1970: 128).
In this way the category mistake that regards issues of brain injury as
purely the physical manifestation of pathological neuronal tissue, without
reference to the implications of physical disability on the spectrum ofmental
operations, does not confirm an absence ofmind, but rather neglects one. The
assumption that both mind and body are the association of a single entity,
exchanging, sharing and producing essential input, seems not to be a
consideration for the clinician. The integrity of the living system, that is the
whole embodied child, must be maintained if therapeutics are to prove
successful in addressing the needs of the child and parent. As I have
suggested, the goal of alternative therapy is to attempt to mediate vital external
stimuli, via the child's body, so that continuity between physical and mental
events are reconfigured into 'purposeful' behaviour. Although the exact
mechanisms which provide such continuity remain largely unknown, the
multiplicity of cortical and somatic representations which affect a given event,
mental or physical, suggest a variety of stimuli are necessary to achieve union
between physical and mental associations as we have seen earlier.
This rationale gives meaning to those procedures that are frequently
employed by alternative therapists. Since the nature of physical and mental
events that ensue from an individual are not considered separate phenomena,
stimulation of one is likely to be conducted to the other and vice versa. In this
way it is believed that programmes of therapy directed at the body can
influence mental functioning19. Thus many alternative therapies employ
19 Indeed, the sensory-motor cortex reflects this arrangement. Gardener (1975) makes
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techniques that use the afferent20 system to conduct input from the exterior
body to their appropriate cortical centres. In a way this provides a template for
organised neurological communication, partly expressed by input (motor
patterns), to articulate strategies of purposeful behaviour21. Over the last few
years some researchers have looked at family therapy systems and concluded
that the popularity of this practice rests in either parental dissatisfaction with
the orthodoxy (Cummins22 1987 and Storm 1983) or the contrasting view
which considers that benefit may in fact be derived from familial participation
with their child's habilitation programme (Palmer and Bruce23 et al 1988).
an interesting point about the muscular (physical) influences on cortical (mental) activity.
'Discharges from, or the result of, stimulation of the motor cortex are modified, or even
determined, by the state of contraction or activity in the muscle group supplied by the
stimulated region. Even passive alteration of the position of a muscle may alter its subsequent
response or even abolish it. In other words, the proprioceptive impulses reaching the cerebral
cortex condition the motor cortex' (Gardener 1975: 405).
This has serious implications, because if therapy does not attempt to correct the
abnormal physical patterns that the child presents the absence of directive treatment rationale
will likely condition them instead Moreover, this may be one possible explanation why at
birth spasticity is unrecognisable but as the child matures, particularly without therapy to
correct abnormal muscle patterns, spasticity becomes more prominent.
20 Refers to the conduction of sensory input inwards as opposed to efferent which
would conduct impulses from central nervous function outward to the muscles.
21 For example if, because of an underlying pathology, such a dialogue is absent then
one must be initiated externally with therapy so that the child may experience the possible
benefits of this intimate conversation between physical and mental events. Continuing this
linguistic analogy we could describe the single physical event (the raising of the heel) as
constituting a morpheme, a sequence ofwhich would provide the syntax, or in our case a
purposeful movement (the lifting of an entire leg and placing it forward). A dialogue would
now result from the complex co-ordination of both serial and parallel motor events under the
guidance of deliberate mental control. This, at its most basic, is the rationale for passive
manipulation which can only ever be the introduction to purposeful movement. Independent
mobility, and other fine tuned behaviours, may only develop by succession from these primary
events. Such a dialogue between movement and its genesis (purposeful motor behaviour)
within the child is monitored, assisted and, if need be, corrected by the child's parents whose
familial and therapeutic role acts as a complement for increased levels of development.
22 There is a great deal of literature concerning parental dissatisfaction with orthodox
medicine. A brief summary can be found in Cummins (1987: 15-24). This source, however, is
better suited to finding a useful bibliography of related material than it is at giving an objective
account of relevant information which support parental shift to alternativism
23Not only are such possible benefits to be found in the sociological and psychological
literature but the notion that positive parental involvement can influence outcome is suggested
by medical agencies also. See," The effects of physical therapy on cerebral palsy". Although
this paper found little support for traditional physical therapy it does suggest that cognitive




This controversy will no doubt continue for some time. However, the
fact that many parents prescribe to alternative therapy regimes confirms that a






Interviewer: When Sarah was diagnosed as developmentally delayed
did you have any coping strategies or techniques that helped you?
Mother : No, we just kept going really. But now we tend to be well,
this has happened lets get on with it. Imean I have my bad days when I think I
just can't cope with it we've got to manage Sarah for the rest ofher life. Its
been made a lot easier with John (father) coming here (moving to be nearer
mother's family home) but that has caused a lot ofproblemsfor him also.
Father: There's no doubt about it and with a child like Sarah it turns
your life upside down completely. Myphilosophy in life has changed because
its had to whether Iwanted it to or not. I mean I was trying to run my own
business, boy I was going to go places and I was going to be a
millionaire, ( but now) my aims in life are different. Certainly, Samantha
(wife) is more important now than what she was, she should have been before
but she wasn 't or I didn 't think she was. Tommy and Sarah are paramount to
us and it wouldn't worry me ifI didn't have any more money now as long as I
can get by and we're happy, thefour of us, and the dog and rabbit.
Introduction
The above parents' statement illuminates what appears to be a common
theme in the emotional and intellectual adjustments that families attempt to
make when coming to terms with the knowledge that their child is brain
injured. This is not merely to effect some psychological accommodation of
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the problem but also, more importantly, to actually change the very meanings
and behaviours that were present before the all consuming trauma was
discovered. In lay understanding, coping implicitly assumes that we manage
the problem whilst continuing with our lives as normally as possible. This is
simply not the case. Coping, and the strategies we adopt to facilitate this
process, often require fundamental and pertinent changes to all levels of
personal and familial functioning (Lazarus & Folkman 1984)
In this chapter I wish to explore the coping strategies that families
employ in order that those issues and feelings that underscore every aspect of
their lives can be located in their wider social context. I will argue that these
modifications of behaviour have their genesis in the multiplicity of human
encounters. The spaces in which these take place are not, therefore, isolated
within or restricted to the immediate family but are, at one level at least, an
expression of a social reason that attempts to both explain and ameliorate the
whole social context of their child's disability. In this way both the brain
injured child's resources (to encounter greater habilitating opportunities), and
social handicaps (which may act to disrupt effective social engagement) are
enacted through both familial contacts and those with the larger society. If'the
level of esteem and the social standing of disabled people is derived from their
position in relation to the wider social conditions and relations of a given
society' (The Equality Studies Centre 1994; Finkelstein 1995, cited in Barton
1996: 13), then brain injured children are also a product of this social
construction. Acknowledging this, coping strategies allow the involved
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individuals to deal with or attempt to deal with their personal trauma in a
manner that is both socially definable and defensible.
Throughout this chapter one of the central issues I shall attempt to
demonstrate is that the process of coping can often be enhanced when it is
attached to outside agencies. In some way this extends the public dimension
of coping by turning the child into a member of society. This may not merely
help to dissipate some of the personal trauma but can also provide a method of
action that is personally beneficial through the fact that it is publicly overt.
Parents may take on a new professionalism that revolves around their
increased 'specialised' activities. Traditional parenting roles now become
adapted with the new abilities of informed carers. As a mother confirms
(Jayne)
You have to be pretty dedicated andwant to do itfor your child.
The facility to externalise or present a public account of coping with a
brain injured child may act to establish a link with the societal dynamics that
underscore a broader meaning of this trauma, and one which is more
understandable (through frequent observation) to those who have had the good
fortune not to be in a similar position. By externalising (making public) the
personal trauma, participating in therapy acts like a two way mirror. It
provides a course of action to deal with the child's disability whilst at the same
time making the family's coping routines more public. In doing so, of course,
a greater number of people gain increased awareness of not only the child's
204
Chapter 6
disability but also what it might mean to have such a child yourself. In this
way personal trauma, through its external contacts (going out in public, doing
therapy, joining support groups and special centres etc), can leach into the
empathetic resources of society. Indeed, such processes may help to provide
society with a broader social understanding of non-personalised trauma, whilst
those directly employing these strategies may benefit from increased
sensitivity or tolerance to the personal changes that might result from coping
with such great trauma.
However, although encountering the public can benefit child and
family in many diverse ways there is, nonetheless, a negative side to be
considered. First of all, some of those public encounters attract the
anonymous gaze of unsympathetic bystanders who, failing to recognise the
sensitivity of the situation, may scrutinise the child with wondering stares or
make 'unthinking' comments.
(Tom)
Tom has always been fairly small and before he had his wheelchair his
pushchair looked quite normal, people oftenfound it difficult to make up their
minds as to whether there actually was something wrong with him
Naturally enough, some parents find it difficult not to respond to the
enquiring stares of an uninformed public. As one mother recounted whilst





Ifeel a bit tempted at times to stare back and then at other times, I
think that it is more my attitude at the moment, (I feel I should) say, 'what are
you looking at'? I don't know, my husband thinks I shouldn't say anything but
I think I should sometimes.
Secondly, the fact that the child has greater public exposure may act to
increase public prejudices, since many of the brief contacts the child and
family will make with a 'by-standing' public are observational and not intimate
enough to be informing. This does little to counteract seeing the child's
disability as having singularly negative implications for the family. The
consequences of such are likely to be further implicated in the liminality these
children often experience. Murphy, Scheer, Murphy and Mack (1988) have
been concerned that the deviance model of disability proposed by Goffman
advocates a culpability for impairment to their possessors, the disabled.
Following an anthropological methodology that uses symbolism as a referent,
Murphy et al propose instead that the physically disabled might be better
understood if they were considered within the framework of social liminality.
They are persons having an undefined status: they are neither ill nor well, neither
socially alive and active nor socially expunged and removed (Murphy et al 1988: 235).
That which makes brain injured children socially liminal is now not
just physical impairment but also that which arises from their own and their
families' desires to engage in the social world. However, it is these encounters
with the social world that facilitate, in the public imagination, the notion that




Millions of disabled people lead an almost cloistered existence, detached from the
mainstream of society by loss of communicative functions- as are the blind, the deeply deaf
and many other kinds of physically impaired persons- or loss ofmobility, as in the case of
paraplegics. The former are able to go out into a world with which they cannot fully exchange
meanings, and the latter are inhibited from such exchanges by physical inability to go out into
the world. This isolation is one among many reasons for the fact that many 'normal' people
find them opaque and enigmatic- almost alien and rather suspect- which further compounds the
problems of communication (Murphy et al 1988: 237)
For Murphy et al liminal people 'have been declassified but not yet
reclassified' (1988: 237). They have not, therefore, moved from one status to
another but remain between both the socially alive and dead. The point is that
like other 'rites of passage' the making of status changes is public, but for the
disabled there is no social confirming of a new identity. There is no mediation
between disability and ability and there is no socially prescribed way for
parents to gain full public recognition that their child is indeed a child and that
is merely disabled.
The fact that for both child and family making 'public appearances'
have negative consequences, however, does not exclude the fact that they also
have positive outcomes. These might eventually challenge the public
'ignorance' that serves to displace these children from that group to which they
rightly belong. However, before we consider the positive aspects of public
contact I should mention the underlying stress that accompanies the coping
routines for families with a brain injured child.
Stress as a Situational Component
In their article 'Managing Stress in Families', Falloon and Fadden et al.
(1993) argue that the family 'constitutes the greatest natural resource for the
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management of the wide range of stresses associated with life in our
communities' (1993 :1). Indeed, they argue that research indicates that the
family is critically involved in the recovery mechanisms that address the many
stresses that families may face. The question is now, what is stress? In what
situations does it arise, and are there quantitative and perhaps qualitative
differences in its presentations? Although these questions seem very general,
stress affects people in a multiplicity ofways. Before an account of the unique
stresses experienced by families coping with their injured children can be
explored we firstly need to review the less specific ways stress affects people.
There is an abundance of psychological literature referencing stress but much
less in the sociological and anthropological annals. However, the following
examination will concern most the sociological aspects of stress as they relate
to families with brain injured children.
In order to account for the diverse responses to stress one may be
inclined to imagine a plethora of differing forms of stress. However, stress is
very much the individual's response to threat which may be experienced
through psychological, behavioural, and or physiological reactions to a
particular situation, (Falloon & Fadden et al 1993). Threats, moreover, are
likely to be woven into everyday social life and to play an integral part in
conditioning one's own behaviour and that of others (Milburn & Watman
1981). They also have differing aetiologies that encompass almost every
situation and can be found not only in action but also in speech. In this way,
stress has implications for both the way people behave and for what they might
say. In such situations communication tends to be largely scripted with
208
Chapter 6
consequences involving promises or threats that, in some way, are intended to
influence other peoples' behaviour.
While all attempts to influence another by messages that link requests or demands
conditionally to explicit, implicit or tacit indications of intention to produce outcomes of
interest to us, our particular focus here is upon threats whether clear and explicit, or hinted at
or implied, that persons and groups use to influence one another; the conditions under which
these occur, which in part serve to influence the meanings; their consequences; and of course
the correlates of these (Milburn & Watman 1981: 4).
The literature concerning threat identifies two main categories of threat
perception, external (Sawyer & Guetzkow 1965) and internal (Brody, Benham
and Milstein 1966). The former is the type of threat with which most will be
able to identify. It involves a scenario something like the following statement
- 'if you don't do this for our child, we're going to see our solicitor'. (In this
case the family want a particular procedure or service from their doctor with
which failure to provide will result in them commissioning a solicitor in the
attempt to legally compel (threaten) him or her into compliance).
However, other forms of threat are less tangible; these may be regarded
as 'internal'. As such, they are much more likely to be associated with the
cognitive and emotional reactions that occur in response to a person, or in our
case a parent's, perception of harm resulting from anxieties, anger and
frustrations that arise from beliefs about their child's condition. The important
difference is that unlike an external threat, the internal form requires only that
some sensation of threat is perceived; it need not be validated, but just
assessed as being threatening. With particular reference to families with brain
injured children, the fact that they feel concerned about their baby's
development is sufficient to illicit anxiety and anger. These are the very
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components that induce stress, especially when uncertainty and the lack of
information induce a helplessness.
(Jayne)
Because we saw the wrong doctorfor about the first six weeks we were
running around like chickens with their heads cut offbecause we were told
there was no special schooling available for her, there was nothing. We didn't
know what to do or where to go and I kept on phoning the Social Services but
because we hadn't been referred to the correct doctor I couldn't get into the
system and that made me very angry.
The opportunity to exercise some level of control over uncertain
situations, such as the future developmental potential of an injured child,
seems to be an integral component of engaging successful coping strategies.
However, circumstances change, especially with age. When disability appears
to be continuing to affect the child, whose physical growth now makes
impairment more pronounced, this can affect familial perceptions and
particularly those that involve possible future scenarios. Coping with these
changes is rarely a permanent state but one of spasmodic fluctuation. Thus
stresses that arise from the fear that your child may actually never walk (even
if unconfirmed by the professionals) can radically impinge upon the ability of
the parents to cope with the day to day routines of caring for their child.
(Karen)
I think up to a couple ofyears ago we thought she would be all right,
we thought she was going to be a bit slow but OK. eventually we thought
she's not going to change by any stretch ofthe imagination. Ifshe can achieve




Karen's family above, like many other families with a brain injured
child, experience stress as a continual changing dynamic which is, moreover,
fundamentally located in specific situations or, more correctly, parent's
responses to these situations. Stress, however, affects us all and although
certain situations are more stressful than others (going out and socialising) the
family with a brain injured child has to deal with these specific highly charged
situations with differing stratagems from those employed to cope with the
'ambient stress' (Falloon et al, 1993: 2) that is likely to be experienced at
home. Situations, then, play an important part in exciting or pacifying
stressors. Hospitals, for example, are often regarded as more stressing to
families than their home when they are required to make general visits.
Consider, for a moment the following mother's struggle to visit a hospital
consultant with her severely disabled son after his drowning accident.
(Philip)
We had been home for aboutfour weeks I suppose and we had an
appointment to see a hospital consultant and I struggled with Philip to get him
into his pushchair and get him up there, and we sat in a waiting room for
nearly an hour with Philip moaning. So we went in and sat down and she said
'how is he'? And I thought you have made me sit in that bloody waiting room
for an hour to ask me 'how is he', I'm here for you to tell me what you think.
These situations, however, can be less stressful when their child
presents problems that need resources or expertise not available in the home
providing, of course, that the professionals they see can relate to the child and
parents in a sympathetic manner then hospitals can be a source of comfort. As




As I said he (orthopaedic surgeon) has seven children and he talks to
Cindy and says to her, 'I'm going to checkyour hips because as you know such
and such is wrong with them' or 'this isn't right', and she doesn't mind going to
see him.
Or as another mother recalled
(Rachel)
but ofcourse we were hoping, in the long term, that it would work out
favourably. I think we were livingfrom hospital appointment to appointment.
In such cases the hospital can help reduce the parents experience of
stress by providing a continuity to structure the coping process over extended
periods of time. The diverse accounts above act to demonstrate that situational
factors are proportionally related to an individual's experience of stress as a
social event. Not only is the stress experienced by a family with a brain
injured child related to the situations in which it is encountered, it is also an
expression of the ways particular individuals within the family may uniquely
respond to different events.
Public, as opposed to private, situations can further increase anxiety
and aggravate stress. That social factors, such as being out in public, increase
an individual's level of 'autonomic nervous system arousal' resulting in
enhanced reactions to a given stressor (Davis 1969) further demonstrates the
impact public situations have on the family. The following account shows the
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impact that visiting a hospital waiting room can have on those parents and
children who are confronted by other brain injured children in a public setting.
(Karen)
There was another child there who was severely brain damaged
screaming incessantly, you know, and Karen got upset. She was quite
disturbed, so it shows you that even in her case shefound this really abnormal
behaviour frightening, you know she didn't know how to take it. That was the
general atmosphere in the waiting room, even the adults were uncomfortable,
you know, should we look or shouldn't we.
Indeed, much of the literature on stress is peppered with accounts
concerning the detrimental effects of exposure to stress which, in certain cases,
can induce both mental breakdown and physical disorder (Falloon & Fadden et
al, 1993), thereby exacerbating the family's general ability to cope with their
injured child.
Although particular episodes in life and the general ambient features of
living regularly produce stress, the continual heightened parental concerns of a
family with a brain injured child require a differing analytical approach to
those usually accounted for in the literature. Stressors, for the majority of us,
are typically accounted for in an episodic fashion. That is, the coping
strategies employed deal with the immediacy of the problem giving 'time' the
opportunity to help dissipate the daily anxieties that associate with a particular
stressor. The old adage 'things will be better in the morning' exemplifies this.
The loss of a partner or the threat of unemployment, for example, have a
temporal component to which an 'ending' or some other adjustment can be
envisaged. This 'temporal component' is structurally different for a family
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with the long term anxieties that are associated with the life time of a brain
injured child. The following statement gives some insight into the realisation
that providing care may have long term implications for coping.
(Sarah)
Ijust didn't look beyond today. You know I livedfrom day to day, I
didn't go any further. Imean it was difficultfor me because having Sarah, ....
well that was my career gone as well and I suddenly thought 'I can't do this
job (looking after Sarah) for twenty four hours a day....
Therefore, the coping strategies that are devised must be more
open-ended than those which address the more 'temporally fixed' stresses, such
as bereavement1 or unemployment. I shall consider the temporal elements
later in this chapter. For the moment, however, the question now is in what
ways are such stressors dealt with, given the reality of the situation and the
persistence of associative stress?
Acceptance and Maintenance
At the start of this chapter I argued that parental coping with the trauma
of a brain injured child involved more than simple practical accommodation of
the impact that disablement brings to the family. That there is great grief in
the families concerned is an understatement, but if the child is to remain with
1 It is certainly not my intention to minimise the profound effect grief has on
individuals and though it may be true to say that one never really gets over the loss of a partner
or close relative one does learn to cope. However, although this form of coping is temporally
extended, as with that associated with a brain injured child, it differs in respect of tangibility.
Whereas grief for a deceased person involves corporeal loss, the grief for a brain injured
child's parent is continually challenged by the hope that this situation is not that final. The
child's persistent corporeal presence fixes new aspects of grief to every day that ideally should




the parents at home then acceptance of the disabilities, and maintenance over
time and the challenges this itself brings, must be successfully adopted2.
Acceptance that a child is brain injured rarely occurs spontaneously. It
develops spasmodically, as does the awareness that a family's life will never be
quite the same again. Early literature concerning family counselling, for
example, often advocated institutionalisation for severely disabled children
(Kozier 1957). According to Blacher (1984) social class might influence the
decisions that parents are likely to make.
Some parents, particularly those from middle class families, regarded the
institutionalised child as "dead or depersoned" and maintained little contact with him or her.
Lower class families, on the other hand, regarded institutionalisation as a form of living away
from home, and appeared more willing or ready to reincorporate the child back into the family
(Blacher 1984 :27).
However, for the families with whom I have worked, who incidentally
represent a wide spectrum of the class system, the unifying factor was that
their children all lived at home, though it would be fair to acknowledge that
some parents do entertain ideas of institutionalising their child at some future
point, particularly if amelioration proves unsuccessful. Indeed, this is yet
another reason why many adopt a therapeutic activity. The acceptance, then,
that their child is brain injured is not necessarily acquired by experiencing a
different 'adjustment phase' to that of other parents in traumatic situations,
2 Lip to this point I have not mentioned those families that choose not to keep their
children with them but prefer, instead, the services of an institution. I make no moral
judgement about such placements or those who elect this provision, rather my thesis relates
purely to those families who have sought, and sometimes with great difficulty, to keep their
children at home. This does not make them, by this fact alone, morally superior, but does
introduce them to considerations and experiences that would not otherwise be encountered and
as such are the basis of the present work.
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such as bereavement. Both traumas require the family to adjust to a 'loss' in
terms of the child or how he or she was before the injury. The difference is
that the brain injured child's parents must face the growing acceptance that
their child will need a continuity of coping throughout life3. The literature is
heavily skewed with accounts relating the negativity that a family with a brain
injured child experiences, and as Hewett (1970) has suggested, there is little
published material to reflect the views of those families who meet with
'resilience and common sense' those demands that disability places upon them.
The fact that doctors' statements concerning the level of disability may
influence the parents to regard their child in a similar manner as that posited
by the clinician (Voysey 1975: 101) may further compound the problems.
In one sense the accounts presented here concern those families that are
fighting to salvage something from their trauma which can help shift the
situation toward a more positive experience. Because definitions of the
disabled child are constructed in interaction with others, families must manage
these interpersonal encounters so as to maintain normal appearances (Voysey
1975: 57). To achieve this families may adopt a levelling procedure that
enables them to imagine that the situations they encounter with their disabled
child differ but little from those which accompany the development of other
siblings, even if the disability itself involves developmental delay as in the
following example.
3 For a good review of adjustment stages and the methodological problems for their




Because I think ofall the other aspects ofbeing a teenager today,
periods, and ifshe takes an interest in men. Imean Iworry about things like
that. But I suppose anyperson with a six year old can't imagine them being
sixteen. You know, what I said to you about Jayne, not being very much
different to (that of) an ordinary sister to Kate, in ways maybe there's not very
much difference in the feelings you would have for any child growing up. I
just think about everything she is going to do.
Considering the injured child as one would any other child is also
structurally reflected in the ways many parents clothe their children, using
fashion to help 'normalise' the child's presentation in public. This not only acts
to minimise detection but also more importantly displays and structures an
equity between siblings.
(Karen)
Yes, she has the same as George, Imean I don't think, oh it's not
worth doing that because she is ill.
Focusing on those aspects which engender childhood can help to offset
much of that which is diagnostic of disability. Placing disabled children in
fashionable clothing and 'levelling-off the imagined differences between them
and their siblings provides parents with constructive opportunities to
reconsider their child's possible potentials. Clothes can also act to displace
anxieties of an uncertain future, which are often conspicuously displayed by an
inappropriate (non-conforming to trends of age and gender) attire that further




I have always said that Iwould never dress Cindy in anything I didn't
like. You know, because to me it brings back memories ofchildren who were
slightly slow or something, you would always see them in short trousers when
everyone else was in long trousers.
Dealing with these issues is, in itself, enriching the personal resources
required to maintain effective coping strategies. However, for many parents
with severely disabled children, acceptance means that more evolved
adjustment mechanisms (to their child's disability) are engaged to maintain the
level of familial care that their child requires. The important point here is that
the child is not a passive receptacle into which the parents pour their loving
acceptance, but rather that the child is expected to meet the family halfway.
This typically involves him or her achieving some developmental milestone, or
at least the appropriate behaviours that help to accomplish them. In one sense,
parental acceptance moves almost parallel to the child's 'encouraged'
developmental accomplishment. I use the term encouraged, because many
parents believe that you only get out what you put in. Even so, there must be
some return for familial effort in terms of developmental improvement. This
is demonstrated in the comments recounted by Sarah's parents when they were
attempting to encourage their developmentally delayed daughter to crawl and
walk.
(Sarah)
Father : I'm not sure that we would be doing the programme (therapy)
ifafter 2 years we got nowhere. Imean I could see the difference, at one time,
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every 2 months. In one year it was ridiculous, we were going back to the
clinic every eight weeksfor a reassessment, she was like a gun going off. We
would do somethingfor a week or two and she had got it. I would have to
phone up (the clinic) and say, 'what can we do next'? .
Mother: It was like once she got it she would say OK I've done that
what's next?
Father: Ifwe would have had somebody who just didn't get anywhere,
well then, that would have been it, but a lot ofpeople kept ourfaith in it
because they would come after a week or two and say, 'oh I can see a
difference', now we couldn't see it but they could.
Mother: It doesn't seem possible that 2 years ago we couldn't get her
to move and she just lay there, on the crawling strip, we couldn't even get her
to push with one leg. And then, all ofa sudden it was wham-bam, we were off,
it was incredible. I shall never forget coming back and the devlopmentalist
saying, 'we're going to have her stand against the wall, just hold her and get
her to stand up with her back against the wall'. I thought to myselfshe will
never do anything like that and in about a week she just stood up one day and
they said (alternative centre) get her to walk awayfrom the wall, one step at a
time. Andyou wouldpull her towardyou and she would do one step ifyou
were lucky and then collapse. We did thatfor about one week andyou just
couldn't stop her, she was across the room. It was really amazing!
Establishing new behaviours, whether small or major, are exceedingly
encouraging to the family, and in a way fuel acceptance of the child.
219
Chapter 6
Frequently, however, disabled children reach a plateau where development is
temporarily arrested. The following account is provided from a father who has
two young disabled children.
(Fiona and Tony)
The nice thing about going to the clinic was that there were dramatic
improvements, and then you find that the improvements get slower and slower
andyou reach a plateau where there's no improvement. We used to despair
for a while and thinkfor three months we've been doing this and nothing has
happened. Then suddenly one small breakthrough and there's another surge.
What seems to happen is that the children learn some basic or small skill,
upon which they can build, so you get some dramatic improvement. Then the
improvement slows and they have to make another vital improvement upon
which you can build again.
It appears that when the child is progressing with a repertoire of
behaviours that enable accomplishment of specific skills - crawling, walking
or talking etc - acknowledgement that things are happening make for
optimistic acceptance of the child problems. The plateau that disabled
children reach, however, often acts to frustrate this essential process. At such
times, it is interestingly, the routine commitment to therapy, and the very
effect this has on familial life, that offers some consolation until a new skill is
acquired.
(Karen)
Suddenly you have a system for living which youprobably don't
(normally) have with a handicapped child. I'm sure that mostpeople with a




And each day you find a great long tunnel in front ofyou andyou just
can't waitfor the end ofthe day, but when you start 'patterning' (therapy) we
find there is an order to our lives
It is the lack of order when living with a brain injured child that makes
acceptance so difficult. Thus, routines that maintain an order help promote
acceptance, since they provide a structure that permits the lives of those
affected by disability to progress with similar daily cycles to those routines
that define other families. In so doing, the family not only attempts to manage
some of the associated stress but also to give their child an opportunity to
express his or her embodiment. For example, the family who have dedicated a
time for daily therapy have also created non-therapy intervals in the day. It is
in these periods of discharged therapeutic responsibility that the family can
engage in those 'normalising routines' that reflect typical family life. This also
provides ample opportunities for their child to experience the real or imagined
experiential detail of a personal phenomenology (see chapter 8). Moreover,
for the present, being able to maintain some attachment to normative familial
patterns releases much of the anxiety that can interfere with the process of
acceptance and the ability to maintain it in the future.
It would, however, be unrealistic to imagine that acceptance of the
many factors that impinge upon the family with a disabled child are solely
addressed by commitment to a structured programme of therapy or, indeed,
that such a commitment is the sole provider of their child's capacity to
experience embodiment. Friends, relatives and the larger community, as well
as the families' own responses to their input play an important role. They can,
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for example, encourage a positive approach to both the child with a brain
injury and his or her parents by offering support and understanding of the
whole social system in which the family and child live. This is particularly
important when professional advice is not forthcoming.
(Philip)
But luckily enough we had a supportive family, you know, my mum, my
dad and my sister, everybody tried to support us and help us. But apartfrom
that we had no counselling.
On the other hand, their input can also be very disabling, particularly
if the family have an ambivalent view ofwhat they should be doing. As
Blacher points out, in such cases a relative's concerns can stir an uncertainty
that perhaps was always there, but un-voiced.
Such conflicting views from members of one's own close personal network can create
considerable conflict and stress for the parents, with the result that the severely impaired child
has a more negative impact on the family than might otherwise be the case (Blacher 1984 :
32).
Acceptance of the brain injured child is a process that involves
acquiring a positive attitude of the child's disability through a series of
adjustments that primarily affect the family. The child is, essentially, an active
agent in this process in as much as expectancies, to acquire specific levels of
functioning for example, are often a requisite (see Sarah's case above). In this
way the child's experience of embodiment is shaped by the ways in which
brain injury is accepted and dealt with by the parents. Moreover, because of
the complex social interactions with others (see Voysey 1975) the family's
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ability to accept the child's disability is, to an extent, a confirmation that those
outside the immediate family empathise with and support the family in some
positive way. These are typically those neighbours and friends who
unconditionally offer their support either directly as 'patterners' (therapy
assistants) or indirectly as with offering to do the various household chores.
(Sarah)
Imean a lot ofpeople (patterners who assist with the child's therapy)
kept ourfaith in it, ifthat's right, because they would come after a week or two
and say 'oh I can see a difference'.
Helpers though, can themselves be problematic. This is experienced
in particular by those families who feel that their home has become a constant
'open ground' wherein little privacy is afforded the family's personal enclosure.
As Sarah's mother confirms 'patterners' can be both a blessing and an
aggravation.
(Sarah)
I know they're (patterners) doing something to help but you still have
got all these people in and out ofyour home, morning, noon and night, and at
times, does get on top ofyou.
The positive side, as I have shown above, besides helping in the
physical routines of patterning, is that they do often provide a 'sounding-board'




Well I know that some people don't like patterners because theyfeel
their home is being invaded. I suppose Ijust get on with it, it gives me
someone to talk to, adult conversation.
Parental acceptance of their child's disability involves many
interrelating factors concerning the immediate family's adopted coping
strategies. The injured child's ability to conform to therapeutic goals and the
support given by friends, neighbours and helpers all serve to position the child
in the present, a day to day response to coping. However, as I shall now
explore, time has more that just a passing significance to families with a brain
injured child. If coping, for any length of time, is to be achieved it needs to
extend its expression further than today, it must deal with the many tomorrows
that each day precedes.
Temporal Considerations
' each moment of time calls all the others to witness' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 69).
This statement has great relevance to the coping strategies that parents
utilise to deal with the stress they daily encounter. For Merleau-Ponty the
past, present and future are not discrete temporal events wherein a given
occurrence remains engaged, for the present is actually the future's past. In
this sense the traumatic event that precedes a brain injury did not simply start,
happen or conclude itself at a specific point of time. Brain injury is not
experienced, by the parents or perhaps the child itself, as originating discreetly
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(in time) but develops following the same emotional, situational and cognitive
processes of realisation that accompany those individuals who are inseparably
tied to it, the brain injured. In this sense brain injury is not simply a case of
being aware of trauma at one point of time. Rather it is the capacity (or
incapacity) of growing to realise its effect on the individuals, and those who
will care for them, in the years to come.
My point is not that a brain injury did not occur at a given point in
time- although clinicians themselves can rarely confirm when such events took
place- but that the confirmation has historical antecedents and future
expectancies that possibly stir before detection. At what point injury occurred
is purely academic for the families concerned, although the confirmation that
their child is brain injured does give rise to some form of temporal location.
The consequences of this process act to establish a vague impression of time
that is experienced as being largely disengaged from those temporal routines
that position other families with children and their ongoing development.
Indeed, this notion has, by one unthinking and insensitive paediatrician, been
used as a form of comfort for a family whose child was diagnosed as brain
injured.
(Jayne)
Just think, mostparents have children who grow up but you will have a
childfor the rest of its life.
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Thus, the fact that time is experienced as being in a state of suspension
for many families with injured children requires that their coping strategies,
too, need to operate in a relative fashion.
(Karen)
I try not to think about the future because you could be torturing
yourselfwith things like, what happens when I get too old to pick her up and
lift her around?
We know we have got those decisions to come (whether to actively
prolong life) but I think it is more short term, at the moment we are all going
to Florida in May.
So families tend to function, that is cope, by the avoidance of situations
wherein future expectancies are seen as threatening. In the future, parents fear
that things will get worse, and in this sense time is considered negatively for
many of these families; i.e. the future is regarded as the harbinger of increased
despair. This is likely to be related to both the fact that the parents' own
ageing process will be likely to impede on their ability to care for their
growing child
(Philip)
I think that ifsomeone said to me, rightpicture this, you're going to be
sixtyfour years old andPhilip is going to be forty or whatever andyou're
going to have to lift him into bed and bath him, Iwould do myself in now.





Well I took her to their party, didn 71? And when I came home I said,
never again, because that does make you look into the future because you see
them all (disabled children) at different stages ofdevelopment andfurther on.
And the thing is you see a child that is not your child butyou compare them
and say, 'will she turn into that'? And seeingfifteen or twenty of them, all in
the same place, and all these adults trying to be nice to them, Ijust couldn't
cope with it. Ijust said Twould never take her again'.
This illustrates that as well as needing to cope with the daily temporal
routines of a disabled child, the future has to be distanced so that possible
negative thoughts do not impinge upon the present. Indeed, the notion that
future events are largely perceived as negative may itself be a result of some
pragmatic fixation with the present. For it is in the present, and its historical
precedents, that the future is cast in the imagination of the parents. This is
clearly expressed by the mother whose son tragically drowned.
(Philip)
IfI sat and thought about the future, well, that's not going to
happen see, Iwon 7 have that or I kidmyself that it won 7 happen. Today is
today.
Today is today, and we all hope that tomorrow will be another day;
there are no tomorrows, but to carry on today requires great fortitude. Myra
Bluebond-Langner had noted a similar phenomena of suppressing the future in
her research on children dying from leukaemia.
The children's view of time itself changed. It was no longer, as it is for most other
children, endless. It became quite finite, marked by relapses and remissions. One of the




For terminally ill children the future locates that point in time where
death is inevitable and finally reached, and as Bluebond-Langner shows, the
child develops through five stages of gradual acceptance. Although some
families with brain injured children occasionally entertain the hope that some
time hence their child may achieve a level of independence -
(Tom)
Now whether he is then going to be able to live by himself, I don't
know.
- the majority of families consulted try not to envisage their present lives in
future scenarios.
(Philip)
Sometimes you really relax and have a drink and sit there, and with the
alcohol and one thing and another you think, god, what are we going to do in
the future ? I don't even imagine what he's going to be like when he's
twenty one. I don't even want to know to be honest, because I don't think I
would get through the next ten years or whatever.
Suppressing the future then is one temporal coping strategy that acts to
tie the emotional life of the family to segmented routines. These can be dealt
with and understood as recurring daily events. The only expectancies now that
need to be addressed are those that arise from the limiting confines of the
present day. Such coping strategies avoid the potential distress that is
envisaged for the future.
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Nevertheless time, and the inevitable changes this brings, often forces
some consolidation of the threatening future. In such cases an alternative
stratagem is required that can not only accommodate a realistic future outcome
for themselves and their child, but one which can also provide a level of
parental autonomy. That is, in order to imagine a future that is tolerable two
sets of requirements must be satisfied. The first of these addresses their child
as an adult.
(Tom)
I think our aim for him is to leave school educated to a level where he
can earn his own living.
This stratagem involves considering the child as able to develop to a
level of self sufficiency, thereby disengaging parental responsibility for his or
her daily welfare. This certainly can happen but rarely does, due in part to the
positional deformities that can accompany a growing brain injured individual.
These are often further aggravated by the decreasing physical abilities of
ageing caregivers to deal with the demands of a maturing disabled person.
The second stratagem for dealing with the future involves some level of
displacement. In this case parents may hope that, with increasingly better
social services, facilities commensurate with their child's home care will
become available.
(Tom)
We were kicking around with an idea and were saying, wouldn't it be
nice ifhousing associations builtflats, warden controlled, for physically
disabledpeople. You know, you could have a couple offlats for carers. We
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certainly don't envisage him living at home. He's going to be kicked out into
the big wide world (mother laughs).
This suggests that the future, if not suppressed by day to day routines,
will inevitably surface at some point and require attention if coping is to be
successfully maintained.
But even the best coping strategies develop fatigue and in such cases
the ability to address the demands of an uncertain future with some envisaged
stratagem, real or not, relieves much of the stress that accompanies
uncertainty. Here, I believe, is an important location for the role therapy plays
in the daily routines of a family with a brain injured child.
(Karen)
We don't worry, Imean we have fleeting anxieties about the future but
we certainly don't worry. I think ifwe had to stop 'patterning', just think ofall
the time we would have, I'm sure we would miss the therapy, (and)
especially the people'.
Therapy might or might not address the child's functional problems to a
level where total independence results. What it does do, as I have shown
earlier in the present chapter, is structure daily routines so that notions of the
future are displaced or given an air of optimism.
(Sarah)
We never used the word hope, everyone said we can't give up hope and
we saidwhat is hope ? As my wife said, once we went down there (the
alternative clinic) they didn't say there's nothing (we can do) they said there
maybe something but we don't know how far we can go with it. But it gave us
something to work with, and ifyou like, workfor.
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Therapy, then, helps provide routines that are, if families commit to
them, perceived as beneficial. This, then, acts to not only provide structure
but also give reason to the daily duties which critically fix time to the present.
However, fixing time presents an analytical problem for understanding
the temporality that locates childhood. Brain injured children are also
inextricably involved in the same temporal paradigms that structure notions of
'ordinary' childhood, which are themselves conceptually 'tied-in' with
movement in time. That is, the future is where children 'evolve' into adults
and as such many researchers consider the temporal aspects - moving on in
time, ageing and development - critical to understanding the social
representations of childhood phenomena (see James & Prout 1990: 216-237 ).
However, as suggested above many of the coping strategies that parents of
injured children adopt suppress the future. Thus the brain injured child's own
experience of time may be amorphously4 lengthened.
Although the continuity that children bring to the linkage between
present and future is as much the investment of parents as it is of society,
unfortunately for the parents of brain injured children many of their children
will not be active agents in the replication of society. They are confined, by
disability and general attitude, into a perpetual state of child-likeness without
experiencing the social metamorphosis that results in adulthood. This is not to
argue that tensions do not arise in the conceptual or pragmatic voyage the child
ordinarily makes to adulthood (Jenkins 1990), and that many ideas concerning
the worlds in which children are generally constructed present methodological
41 use the term 'amorphously' here since it gives an inclination of some movement of




problems5 in terms of time span, but for brain injured children and their
parents chronology is physically enacted (the ageing process, for example)
with, sometimes, only slight developmental engagement. That is, time passes
with all the negative attributes but with few of the associated rewards. It is for
this very stasis of experience and expectation that families must devise a
coping device that addresses the present. This 'fixing' the present with day to
day routines is recounted in the following father's statement concerning his
daughter developmental problems.
(Sarah)
I still don 7 think about what will happen in ten years, I thinkyou
would go berserk ifyou did. You know the long term problems, you've got to
cross that bridge when it comes. 'You take it day by day' (mother interjects), I
mean you don't think about it, there's no way, you wouldjust go mad.
However, as I have shown, displacing the future with daily routines
such as therapy does not completely suppress the temporal dimension, it rather
submerges it. Many events can arise which force parents, and perhaps even
their children, to address the inevitable implications of an uncertain future. In
such cases acceptance of the child's present condition as having consequences
for the future needs to be structured into a broader familial coping schema.
5 The notion that childhood is, to a fashion, idealised into a "mythical past or magic
present" needs to be accounted for in the contemporary study of children's lives (James &
Prout 1990). Moreover, the fact that temporal problems affect our understanding of the issues
pertinent to the lives and experiences of non-injured children acts to illuminate the depth that




Parenting, as any parent knows, involves diverse responsibilities for
the nurturing and general welfare of their children. However these
responsibilities are not just the private affairs of families, for they also impinge
upon the interests of society. Therefore parenting has a public arena as well as
its private dimensions that largely revolve around the home. This societal
function has been noted by Goodnow and Collins (1990: 109) who state that
parenting
is carried out under the eyes of children, partners, relatives, friends, "and the
state", all of whom feel the right to judge, and with varying degrees of openness, to comment.
The standards applied are not simply one's own. Such a feature suggests that one way to
consider ideas about parenting is to ask when parents feel the need to explain or to justify
family events It also suggests that one way to describe a social context-for parents or
children- is in terms of the people who perceive themselves as having the right or obligation to
judge, praise, criticise, and perhaps over-ride a parent's decision, and who are accepted by
parents as having this role.
For Goodnow & Collins this highlights dynamics pertinent to the
development of a parent's self-concept and, as such, impacts on the sense of
satisfaction that may be derived from parenthood. For a family with a brain
injured child, however, the most sensitive situations are likely to be those
which arise in public and which involve some display of coping. Whether this
is manifest in the waiting room of a doctor's surgery or in the aisles of a busy
supermarket, the brain injured child is often typically conspicuous, if not by
active display then by an uneasy passivity. The 'public gaze' and the child's
ambiguous body fuse in a performance of uninformed and uncontrolled




The 'public' rarely fail to recognise the presenting symptoms, even if
they are at a loss to understand them. The glances, stares and staged shows of
disinterest that ensue serve to simultaneously inform and request some
explanation from the child's caregiver. Families with a brain injured child are
often, then, publicly recognised as being in a state of continually 'coping' with
their child by displays of selflessness parenting.
(Karen)
I think it's made me more caring, I don't worry about whether I need a
new carpet or coat, Ijust think there are more important things in life now.
This is, of course, part and parcel of the typical repertoire of parenting,
but with extended responsibilities and, in some situations, with obligations to
account for their injured children in an attempt to minimise the discomfort it
may cause others.
(Sarah)
They would walk up and say, 'hello darling, what's your name'? And
ofcourse, they get nothing and then they go 'oh', and then I say 'yes, she's
mentally handicapped and she can't speak'. I don't get angry, Ifeel
embarrassedfor them a lot ofthe time, Ifeel embarrassedfor other people. I
mean, we go out and about andyou tend to forget that Sarah is Sarah and
everybody who knows her or who is in the family know that's how she is and
you forget about it. Then you go out, andyou're walking along and she goes,
'arhhhhh' at ninety decibels and everybody is turning around and looking and
then they look and realise that you've noticed that they have looked, and they
look away.
However, it is not just the injured child's behaviour in public that
draws audience attention. Perceptible also are the contours of bodily
ambiguity that serve to identify and even spoil the aesthetic nature that
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underlies the 'ideals' of childhood (see chapter 2). When families go about
their daily routines, particularly in public places, their performances take on
what Goffman (1963) would call 'visibilityIndeed, even though the
disruption to bodily character is slight, encounters with others makes some
form of detection likely. As Goffman himself states
The consequence of a presentation that is perforce made to the public at large may be small in
particular contacts, but in every contact there will be some consequence, which taken together
can be immense (1963 : 65)
The management of such contacts plays an important part in familial
coping, and although one might imagine that it increases what has been
referred to as 'caregiver's burden'6 (Montgomery 1989) it can nonetheless
function to illicit a positive reaction from those whom a family encounters.
(Cindy)
Well we were in the supermarket one day and a lady came along to us
and she knew that there was something wrong with Cindy, she was in her
buggy, just like a normal child but because she had those boots on
(conspicuous orthopaedic footwear) and she was lovely. I'd rather people did
that, it was nice actually, she said 'I hope you don't mind me talking to you'
and then we had a lovely chat.
Initially, however, many mothers may seek activities outside the home,
away from those routines that define the social and physical space that typify
the caring needs of their injured child. In this way they may attempt to leave
the situations that continually remind them of their trauma.





Ifound it quite important to have at least one outside interest that had
nothing to do with Tom. That helped tremendously, I mean it was something
very banal to start offwith, a mother's club you know, just something to get me
awayfrom it.
Moreover, such activities also act to reintroduce a family, and usually
more frequently the mother, back into the mainstream of society so that a
greater amount of contact between the parents and the larger community is
realised. As a consequence of increased social engagement and other routines,
like shopping and recreation activities in the outside world, parents and their
disabled children establish contact with the broader aspects of society. It is
often the case that these pioneering engagements a family makes with the
larger society are orchestrated to minimise any overt disability that their child
might possess. In such situations items of clothing, spectacles or any other
required commodity conform to the norms of the prevailing fashion. As
Karen's mother recalls
(Karen)
Iwould go over the top to buy her normal things to make her look
normal you (must) give these kids every chance to survive out there so
that they look and appear as normal to the population out there as possible,
(this, as the child's father remarked, is) not to deceive them but (to help them)
to fit in.
Clothes that reflect the current trends not only act to make the child





She was a bit over dressed, but Ifelt it was important in a wayfor me
that she always looked nice. And I wantedpeople to realise that I did care for
her even ifshe did have problems, I do love her, I still do.
Nevertheless adjustments, and not only with regard to aesthetics, are
made so that the daily presentations of the family in public align to popular
normative expressions7. In this way an etiquette is being maintained.
Although it may often fail in its attempt to disguise the child's disability it
nevertheless acts to illicit a mutual acknowledgement that the rules of social
interaction are in play and the observance of a recognised social etiquette are
being met. Thus the public performance requires that the family acknowledge
the norms of social engagement through their attempts to minimise the
conspicuous behaviours that signify some level of familial trauma.
I have suggested that coping has a public dimension, and that this
facility may also help to enlist greater empathy with, and support for, the
family with a brain injured child. Indeed, it was as a direct result of'going out'
that one mother was able to secure the benefits of 'stair-lift' for her brain
injured daughter.
(Cindy)
Another lady in a shop said, 'how do you manage to carry a big lump
like that up the stairs ? You know having a giggle with Cindy, anyway she
gave us a stair-lift, we couldn 7 get one from the social services.
Practical, as well as emotional, benefit may be the result of excursions
out into the public world. However, any successful coping strategy must
7 See Voysey's (1975) discussion on 'normal appearance and official morality'
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certainly achieve its specific personal function which, in some way, helps to
manage the increased demanding routines and familial concerns that a disabled
child places on the various family members. Moreover, in the family's
attempts to achieve this they are, at the same time, providing an enriched
experiential background in which the disabled child may merge. That the
child's embodiment may be expressed in relation to these new situations may
act to charge disability with new meaning, not solely in terms of the child's
personal corporeal experience, but also in ways which provide the parents with
greater understanding of their child as an embodied capacity. Indeed the very
process of coping seems, at times, a coping strategy in itself - i.e. the process
of coping, irrespective of goal success, often acts to alleviate familial tensions
that arise in response to childhood disability. Therefore doing something
which may be intended to address a specific problem, frustration or concern
gives purpose to action, and in doing so may displace some of the stress and
tensions that result from having a child with disability. Furthermore,
strategies such as making a public performance help to extend the
responsibility for a child's care into the wider community. This not only
enriches that community, and enhances the disabled child's personal
phenomenology, but helps also to dissipate some of the family's pain that ties
them to the trauma. Seeing that some others do, in fact, care acts as an
analgesic, whilst the long term benefits of successful coping strategies can be




The extending out, through relatives, friends and sensitive community
media coverage, of the commitment that a family is making to their disabled
child establishes the substrate on which 'coping' and the associated strategies
are cultivated. It is not just the genesis of coping that originates in the
interstices of social space, but also, its fruition. That is, the efficacy of coping
strategies to maintain a positive commitment to the child over extended
periods of time is a product of the acknowledgement of an underlying social
reason. For without the cultivated acceptance and support from those outside
the family who make possible the family's engagement with the larger
community, isolation would otherwise confound familial resources. These
resources, as I have suggested, not only permit a maintaining of a coping
rationale, but also shape the family's experiences of their child's embodiment.
Social reason, then, in the terms applied here, is an acceptance that what the
parents are attempting to do for their disabled child is not just good for the
child and immediate family but good also for the larger society. Put simply, if
parents did not care for these children what would be the impact on the already
over-stretched resources of health and social services? This is irrespective of
the cost in terms of the brain injured child's personal embodiment that might
further frustrate any hopes for an positive outcome. Finally, when considering
the fortitude required there are likely to be few others more willing to commit
so much effort and time to a disabled child than his or her family. For parents
this, in itself, is a reaffirmation that the social cohesion of the family should
remain stable for the benefit of all society.
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Altered States and Audience Perception : An
Anthropology ofBrain Injury.
Introduction
The last chapter looked at the processes of coping with the trauma of
having a brain injured child. I argued that such familial trauma inevitably
produces stress and anxiety which requires a method of dealing with the
changes that these events have on family life. Furthermore, I demonstrated
that the private world in which such concerns are manifest has strong public
points of access. Not only are the clinical procedures bound to engage the
family and child with new external' responsibilities, such as those following
therapy and administering medicines etc, but social input is also commonly
encountered as the family attend to their changed daily routines. Having a
disabled child thus puts the family on a public stage2, some would even argue
trial, so much so that when the curtain rises the audience may treat the
performers as if an interactive moral play were being performed that begs
public comment. Although going out and moving around in public space is
what families do, public comments are likely to be registered more painfully
by parents who are accompanied by their brain injured child. Discriminating
firstly the artefacts of disability, and following swiftly with judgmental
11 use the term 'external' here because these are procedures that originate from outside.
They reflect a 'professional' knowledge and power base to which the family can often only
blindly follow, and where non-compliance can result in increased isolation and despair.
2 This is in reference to those ambivalent public responses that occur in supermarkets
and doctor's surgeries, in such cases the brain injured child's behaviour is seen as some form of
performance that enacts disability (See family comments in chapter 6).
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comments is, naturally enough, deeply upsetting to the parents of a wheelchair
bound child.
(Cindy)
Because they look at the wheelchair first, then they look at Cindy and
then they look at me. I've hadpeople look me up and down and then look at
Cindy like, 'what's wrong with her'? Especially, ifshe's gotplaster or
something on. The other day someone actually said 'that little girl has got
broken legs'. She had an "A-Plaster" on for her hips to go back in. I said
excuse me, her legs are not broke her hips are out ofplace, and she went
beetroot.
The media in recent years, of course, has done much to publicise child
abuse and neglect Thus the often conspicuous presentation of disabled
children in ambiguous therapeutic plaster may, not surprisingly, incite some
concern as to the cause. This can be seen in the following grandmother's
comment.
(Cindy)
Ifyou can't look at a child and see whether she's a 'battered child' or
not Imean you only have to look at Cindy's healthy and happy little face to
see she's perfectly normal (not abused).
Such public perceptions of disability are the focus of this chapter and
act as a starting point for a consideration of what I believe is a fundamental
feature of the interactions that exist between families with brain injured
children and the community in which they live. It highlights that perception,
both personal and public, is the favoured tool used to discern what 'appears' to
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be the nature of the problem with those perceptually ambiguous individuals,
brain injured children.
In this chapter I examine, however, the interpretation of perceptual
encounters with disability. In doing so, I attempt to disclose the ambiguities in
the physical character of brain injury and the subsequent interpretation of these
children as the dysfunctional embodiment of pathology. This postulates a
'deficit mode' for the child which is 'rooted in a view of disability as a
problem of the individual', legitimising their exclusion not only from 'narrative
research', which could give them the opportunity to express their own
concerns, but also from the wider society (Booth & Booth 1996: 67).
Central to this interpretation is the assumption that these children are
regarded as ambiguous. More precisely, that they are anomalous; at the same
time as they deviate from the norm of'idealised' children they also,
paradoxically, confirm it. Brain injured children, made conspicuous by
problems affecting motor control and muscle tone, highlight a deviance of
form, but the incapacity that results from such physical disorder paradoxically
strengthens the helplessness and innocence that serve to typify childhood.
They are therefore simultaneously consonant with childlike meekness whilst
establishing an opposition to childhood aesthetics. To be one thing and yet
another at the same time does not so much depend upon the child, but depends
instead upon the interpretation of the child and, of course, the categories
employed by those who interpret them.
Anthropological research has a rich and diverse history in both
demonstrating and interpreting the embedded social categories that operate
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within differing societies. One of the major contributions to this line of
enquiry has been Mary Douglas (1966). She has developed a fascinating
account of the conceptual anomalies that appear in the categories that some
traditional societies use. For example, these anomalies may be items or
creatures that should belong to one group but, due to some ambiguous detail,
are perceived as inhabiting two discreet and separate categories at the one
time. That is to say, they possess some feature or aspects that confirm and
corrupt the arbitrary distinctions that people use to order their world:
Above all the subject of this chapter is impossible to discuss except in the light of
men's common urge to make a unity of all their experience and to overcome distinctions and
separations in acts of atonement. The dramatic combination of opposites is a psychologically
satisfying theme full of scope for interpretation at varying levels. But at the same time any
ritual which expresses the happy union of opposites is also an apt vehicle for essentially
religious themes. The Lele pangolin cult is only one example .... of cults which invite their
initiates to turn round and confront the categories on which their whole surrounding culture
has been built up and to recognise them for the fictive, man-made, arbitrary creations that they
are. Throughout their daily, and especially their religious life the Lele are preoccupied with
form If they consistently shunned ambiguity they would commit themselves to division
between ideal and reality. But they confront ambiguity in an extreme and concentrated form.
They dare to grasp the pangolin and put it to ritual use (Douglas 1984: 169-170).
Here, Douglas is describing the conceptual anomalies that the pangolin
represents for the Lele. Animal categories, then, do not just concern what is
edible food and what is not but such notions are reflected in a total Lele
cosmology. The pangolin
contradicts all the most obvious animal categories. It is scaly like a fish, but it climbs trees. It
is more like an egg laying lizard than a mammal, yet it suckles its young. And most significant
of all, unlike other small mammals its young are born singly (Douglas 1984: 168)
Such a creature is conceptually anomalous to the Lele's categories which
impose order on their world for it possesses features akin to both animals and
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man. In dealing with these man-made ambiguities the Lele have devised a cult
that enables such oppositions to be translated into a meaningful system that
has concord with their beliefs.
My purpose in mentioning the above Lele example is simply to suggest
that we have yet to establish the same unity for the ambiguities that people in
our society perceive in those who present brain injury. As for the Lele, form is
critical and this perhaps offers a key to understanding the ambiguities that
surround brain injured children. As I shall now show 'form', or more precisely
the physical manifestations that usually accompany brain injury, (spasticity,
athetosis and ataxia) is fundamental to the interpretations made of these
children. Moreover, it is not just the brain injured child's physical adjustments
to a chaotic body orchestrated by dysfunction that are important here, but the
implications that such corporeal states may have for the child's
self-consciousness are both likely to be involved to a corresponding level.
Altered States: Dimensions of Interpretation
For the anthropologist, altered states of consciousness are perhaps best
demonstrated in the many possession cults that exist throughout the world.
This is not surprising when one considers that
Given the belief that there are non-human spirits, and that these affect living human beings the
idea that men may be possessed by them is an almost inevitable corollary (Beattie 1964: 229).
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More important for our purposes are the distinctions Beattie (1964),
following Firth's earlier notions, makes between the various manifestations of
possession. Spirit possession contrasts with mediumship and shamanism,
.... when a person assumes a state of apparent auto-hypnosis or dissociation, and his
behaviour, which is not that of his ordinary self, is understood to be due to control by some
spiritual agent normally outside him (Beattie 1964 :229).
The important point is that for spirit possession to take place there
must be a belief in spirits and their power of occupation. Therefore in many
traditional societies illness, abnormality, mental derangement and dissociation
may give rise to spirit possession. Historically, western cultures also held
similar explanations for the perceived aberrations of a person's behaviour.
However, with the renaissance of scientific experimentations such notions had
been largely submerged and lost in the 'rational' intellect of Freudian
psychopathology (Porter 1991). But the problems of recognising unusual
patterns of behaviour and making sense of such aberrations remain.
Psychologists may use 'attribution theory', which attempts to make sense of
another's behaviour through analysis of the underlying motives, intentions,
traits and situations that give rise to a person's behaviour3. However, for both
the anthropologist investigating an alien society and the clinician attempting to
research brain injury, understanding these often subtle and embedded causal
'agents' can prove somewhat problematic.
In such cases one's experience of another's behaviour is greatly
restricted and constantly open to review. The attempt to interpret an
3 For a good general overview of attribution theory see Kelley (1973).
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individual's actions gives rise to the possibility of bias which may be due to
'actor-observer differences' (Jones & Nisbett 1972) which in turn result in the
observer ascribing a different set ofmotives for his own behaviour than he
would give to others in a similar situation. All in all, the problem of
understanding the behaviour of others is essentially the problem of
understanding the influences that affect perception. The causal agents, be they
real or imagined, spirit possession or cerebral palsy, not only affect their host's
behaviour but also the interpretation of it. I shall return to this point later. For
now I must ask whether or not considering altered states of consciousness is a
useful model for understanding the various expressions of brain injury.
From the biomedical point of view brain injury can result in disruption
ofmotor, intellectual and developmental processes. In traditional societies, to
a greater or lesser degree, these same functions, with the exception of
development, are affected in states of possession or trance. A first major
distinction between these two types of events is that in the former such
behaviours tend to be persistent, whilst in the latter they are usually transient.
A second distinction refers to treatment regimens. In Western society treating
brain injury involves drug management or therapies which attempt to confer a
lasting positive outcome on the injured person and minimise the level of
dysfunction to his or her behaviour. On the other hand the induced state of
possession in traditional societies is argued, in many cases, to facilitate
communion with ancestors or spirits who can offer some relief or insight into
the largely temporal and corporeal concerns of those involved (Lindblom
1920, Harris 1955, Obeyeskere 1981 and Stirratt 1992). As with alternative
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therapy for the child with brain injury, possession may therefore benefit one's
well being. Janice Boddy's excellent ethnography of spirit possession in the
Hofriyati women of the Northern Sudan goes even further to understand the
unique experiences amongst those in whom possession illness occurs, as
diagnosis and participation in the healing rites provide the individual with
scope to 'recontextualise her experiences' and generate self identity (Boddy
1988:4).
According to villagers, since possession trance fulfils their part of the bargain with
the spirit world to restore and maintain human health, it is not pathological but therapeutic'
(Boddy 1987: 12).
Boddy demonstrates that the zar rite (in which the possession trance is
meaninfully fixed into a cultural context) is a therapy to address what Boddy
believes to be the Hofriyati women's problematic selfhood. The fact that
selfhood is also a problem for the brain injured child may act to register yet
another piece of situated commonality to the experiences of brain injury and
possession. However, it is unlikely to be the case that the therapeutic
treatment of the brain injured child involves those issues of self identity that
appear to be so important in structuring the Hofriyati example. On a more
superficial level it can be seen that they do, in fact, share requests for
appeasement through socially prescribed procedures, be they the zar rites or
clinical therapeutics. Of course, their underlying rationales differ due to the
beliefs that each society holds concerning the amelioration of the presented
problem. There is a temporal component at play here and it involves the
immediacy of prescribed actions (therapy) to affect that which is afflicting the
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individual4. If possession trance permanently occupied the body, as does brain
injury, and did not improve even after the correct practices were observed,
might not this provoke a shift in the underlying beliefs to consider spirit
possession as some expression ofmedical pathology? My point is that
permanence of the phenomena, and its resistance to accepted treatment
rationales, whether brain injury or possession, is crucial to interpreting the
afflicting event. Furthermore, this permanence would need to be explicit in
the visible body.
More importantly, then, both brain injury in Western ideology and
possession in traditional societies involve specific manifestations of the body
and its behaviour. Indeed it is, in many cases, the overt activity of such bodily
action and presence that kindles our suspicion that a particular individual is
affected. The interpretation of these physical manifestations is based upon
culturally appropriate inferences, designed to provide understanding of such
events. But ifwe were now to exchange not the affected individual, but
merely the observer's position from traditional to Western setting and
vice-versa, the explanation of cause and effect may also be modified.
Presumably, might not the prescriptions of treatment aimed at recovering the
individual from their present condition also be modified5? Here, then, is
perhaps one of the primary social contrasts between the conceptual
frameworks of brain injury and possession. While possession may be thought
4 One wonders how the Hofriyati woman's possession would be interpreted if it
persisted indefinitely, would some other condition now be evoked to explain the permanence
of corporeal disruption?
5 Cross cultural responses to mental 'illness' has been a problem for psychiatry as
different taxonomies occur in different cultures which in turn specify different treatment
rationales (see Littlewood & Lipsedge 1989).
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of as a transitory state to request favour, or contextualise one's identity (except
of course when it is regarded as demonic possession6), brain injury in Western
society is generally accepted by the medical orthodoxy7 as an incurable state
with few available options. Possession is often understood, by those more
traditional societies in which it occurs, as an event controlled and managed by
readily available prescribed actions, usually ritual and spirit mediumship,
whereas brain injury reflects a taxonomy of distress for which little action is
available to modify the event. My argument is not that these two phenomena
have homogenous aetiologies, but that both these different phenomena affect
the body's corporeality in quite similar ways. As such, these somatic
manifestations are perceived, by others, to involve some crisis in personal
embodiment.
Although spirit possession need not necessarily involve healing
practices it does often tend to offer a way for individuals to deal with personal
and social dissatisfaction (see Gell 1980). In this light possession may, for our
purposes, be analogous with Young's (1983) definition of healing as being
efficacious from the point of view of those who suffer, whilst curing concerns
those
practices which are efficacious from the point of view of biomedical science (Young 1983
: 1210).
6 Demonic possession differs from that which we have considered here by the fact that
it is malevolent, reflecting the destructive nature of evil spirits, a cause of much illness and
turmoil. Interestingly it is considered by those involved to be best dealt with through the
powers of other benevolent spirits working through a possessed individual. See P.C. Ray
(1969) for an account of possession amongst the men of the Lodha.
7And perhaps for many parents due to the authority orthodox medicine has to
influence parental decision (see Voysey 1975).
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It is from within this latter definition that we find the rational medical
statements concerning the outcome for children with brain injury most often
argued. In contrast to this, for many parents using alternative therapy, the
acceptance that some treatment might assist their child in a positive way
makes coping with the coming years (permanence of injury) more plausible
and the future more positive.
(Karen)
I think, initially, when she was first born it was a bit ofa trauma
realising that she is handicapped, andpersonally on me itfelt a bit ofa
burden because I knew that I had got someone that Iwould have to look after.
With a normal child in twentyyears your obligations, theoretically, are
discharged but you know with a handicapped childyou've got herforever. So
I think once you realise and come to terms with the fact that she is never going
to leave the home, anythingyou can do to help you and her enjoy life to the
best ofher ability is a bonus.
In this one important sense, then, the parental beliefs of brain injury,
and those people who subscribe to possession, share the hope that some of the
trauma will be, if not resolved, accepted by those involved. This suggests that
therapeutic efficacy could be considered more constructively, from the patients
view at least, if it attempted to measure its success at the same personal level
that makes possession so meaningful to those societies in which it occurs i.e.
not 'objective' in the strict sense.
As noted, both events are also likely to be perceived primarily by the
outward bodily aspect, that is physical form. Indeed, the very issue here is that
deviations of posture, dissociation and general untypical motor activity is
likely to be perceived by an observer as a sign of perhaps possession in some
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traditional societies and as brain injury in the Western context. Whereas other
manifestations of the body i.e. anger, grief and frustration work also to modify
physical activity, the person's behavioural integrity remains unaffected because
such expressions of posture merely act to highlight the action. In fact they are,
in a way, purposefully used to communicate the very emotional state which
inspired them8. However, for brain injured children in our society such fine
tuned expressive behaviours are submerged or lost beneath the spastic and / or
athetoid muscle conditions that most typically attract public attention. The
tendency is to at once perceive the abnormal postures of body, and the
sometimes accompanying distortions to the face, as the deviated manipulations
of a person out of control.
Ekman (1977) identifies several types of non-verbal behaviours or
kinetics which can contribute to observer perception, the three main types
being 'emblems', 'body manipulators' and 'illustrations'. The former and latter
have the effect of conveying supporting information about what is being said.
However, 'body manipulators' concern'.... movements in which one part of the
body does something to another body part' (Ekman 1977: 47). It is important
to contrast this activity with both 'emblems' and 'illustrations' since 'body
manipulators' are more likely idiosyncratic, unconscious and non-supportive of
the speaker's dialogue. That is, they do not facilitate an extra-expressive
dimension to the speaker's statement as would both emblem and illustration.
However, because such actions are likely to, albeit unintentionally,
inform the observer in some way or another, they are of interest here because
8 For a good account of the body aiding emotional expression and the various actions it
performs, see Ekman (1977).
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similar kinetic expressions are often operating during contacts with brain
injured children. Although such interactions are not intended to transmit a
message, they do provide an observer with information. For example, it has
been shown that people who demonstrate these idiosyncratic body manipulator
actions are characterised by observers as tense, awkward and untrustworthy
(Ekman 1977: 47). I would suggest that the spontaneous reflexes or
contractions which occur extraneously to intentional activity in the cerebral
palsied child are read with a similar interpretation. Such manifestations can, at
times, be so conspicuous as to inform other brain injured children that an
individual is, in some way, affected.
(Karen)
Because Karen got offmy lap, and she is the size ofa six year old with
the behaviour ofan eighteen month old, and I had to keep retrieving her
because this child was screaming and stuff in his wheelchair and Karen
stopped in her tracks and looked at the child and instantly saw that this was
not normal and came shooting back to us. She was a bit upset and quite
disturbed.
Of course, no real responsibility can be attached to the injured child for
such actions as it is due to the underlying neurological trauma. This is likely
not to be the case for other individuals who must, to some degree, assume the
responsibility for their supplementary kinetic behaviours. Ekman states that
parents, of course, hold their children accountable for body manipulations, but it is for being




Although these responses are not wilfully inappropriate, they
nevertheless provoke a certain level of discomfort in the observer. I would
argue that the perceptions which result from such encounters are actively
constructed by the observer in response to his or her own anxiety toward a
particular situation they find in some way threatening.
Furthermore, these perceptions may reflect a shift in focus by the
observer to explore, in greater detail, the extraneous behaviours in order to
negotiate a fuller understanding of the causal agent responsible. The purpose
of such perceptual responses by an observer may be to identify the elements of
personal anxiety as resulting from maladaptive patterns and actions that are
manifest in the behaviour of the person they are observing, and which are
discontinuous with their own. As individuals tend to be culturally situated any
explanations sought may now reflect the prevalent view of the society in
which the observer operates. Such a view may help to confirm that these
extra-expressive kinetic actions, observed in a child within our own society,
are perceived as resulting from some form of brain injury, whereas similar
modifications to behaviour occurring in a traditional society might well be
indicative of spirit possession. Thus whether observing the behaviour of a
brain injured child or a spirit possessed person the tendency is to adopt a
focused account of the physical activity that orchestrates their bodies in the
attempt to reposition the extraneous elements of the affected person's
behaviour away from one's own typical actions.
In this way bodies, in both form and expression, occupy a space laden
with meaning, a space which must be interpreted by all those who encounter it.
253
Chapter 7
For this reason even the lack of deliberate purposeful action in the brain
injured child becomes understandable as the deviated expression of typical
behaviour. In this way we are all likely to be critics of the corporeal
manifestations of embodiment. One of the explanations for such an
active interest with the body is given by Merleau-Ponty in the 'Phenomenology
ofPerception' who postulates the significance of the body as being
no longer conceived as an object of the world, but as our means of communication with it, to
the world no longer conceived as a collection of determinate objects, but as the horizon latent
in all our experiences and itself ever-present and anterior to every dominating thought (1962:
92).
The idea that the body enables communication with the world in which
it is situated may help to explain our interest with it, but does it answer how
valid such introspection is to the appreciation of therapeutic procedures
designed to address the disability we perceive in others? This question is
especially relevant when our experience of disability results from the
imaginary contrast between that external disability which affects others and the
internal abilities which we regard as central to one's self. In another sense this
same dilemma is likely to be faced by those who must transform their status to
communicate with spirits in order to effect changes that can only be achieved
when they are no longer under temporal and corporeal constraints. Thus
although spirit possession, in the general terms used here, may not be directly
analogous to brain injury it could be relevant to the activities of the therapist,
who must transcend his or her own physical and mental accomplishments in
the attempt to bring the disabilities of the injured child into the light of
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personal experience. This would clearly be impossible for the therapist who
intellectualises over dysfunction from the security ofmedical science, thereby
favouring physiological knowledge over personal experience. If to perceive
the injured child's problems requires such reductionism, we are perhaps no
longer dealing with the child. In fact, this is the situation many parents fear
during their consultations with clinical medicine.
(Cindy)
Ijustfelt that soon as they (doctors) had given Cindy a handle (label)
that was it, theyfelt they could slot us away.
This, then, highlights the different interpretations of brain injury that
exist between those who attempt to gain experience of disability and those
who intellectualise it9. The point I wish to stress for the moment is that
'altered states' do not just depend upon postural, cognitive and aesthetic factors
for their determination. They also require a conceptual framework into which
such detail can be located and socially interpreted. Interpretation, then, is not
just important for the reconciliation that some problem is occurring in the
individual but is also required for the appropriate directing of action. Talle's
(1995) monograph concerning childhood disability and equality amongst the
pastoral Maasai in Kenya provides a good example of this by noting that
disabilities that are caused by humans may not differ in kind from those inflicted by the deity,
but the former may be identified and can be healed (Talle 1995: 63)




Making sense of a such anomalous behaviour allows the Maasai to
recognise which individuals can be effectively treated. That is to say,
identification of one 'type' or 'condition' is not only exemplified by observing
the physical character or aesthetics of the individual, but also by how well the
condition responds to procedures that attempt to ameliorate it (see Chapter 5).
This not only reinforces the notion that temporal factors (in terms of long-term
resistance to treatment protocols, be it magic or medicine) are important but
also confirms the notion that the physical presentations of the body
(anomalous behaviours) in any given society require the 'appropriate' i.e.
culturally situated schema. This is crucial if observers are to find meaning in
the 'overt' displays of disability. Not finding this meaning may gives rise to
statements that are unsympathetic to the personal trauma of disability. This is
typified in the following mother's account.
(Cindy)
People look and stare and sometimes say stupid things. Sometimes I
ignore it, it really depends on ...('its hurtful', Grandmother interjects)
perhaps ifI've had other problems within the family or things have gone
wrong in the day then I can get really upset.
These culturally fixed schema act not only as the genesis of
interpretation but are instrumental in creating and maintaining the perceptual
categories or states in the first place and, as I intend to show, these schema




In summary, I have suggested that when one encounters a particular
behavioural pattern accompanied by atypical motor activity, an explanation is
sought to understand the deviant expression as a reflection of some specific
causal agent. In those societies where spirit possession or brain injury are
socially recognised, the presumed responsible agent underpins the observed
action and orchestrates the body in such a manner as to make abnormality
evident. I shall now consider such manifestations of the body's motor activity
and their direct affect upon possible cultural interpretations.
Audience Perception.
Fine tuned motor behaviour is a complex event involving a well
integrated central nervous system. It requires that cortical, cerebella and
ganglionic systems function in unity to express well articulated movement
(Gardner 1975: 206). The precision with which we navigate our bodies is
rarely appreciated unless its accomplishments are contrasted with those of a
person with motor impairment. In order to make this point clear I shall now
attempt a symbolic\semiotic sociological analysis ofmotor dysfunction to
discover the level to which underlying causal agents may be implicated.
However, it should be noted that the patterns ofmotor activity that concern us
here should not be confused with the variety of 'Les techniques du corps' that
Mauss (1936) has postulated to be specific to gender and to determinate
societies, although in fact these same techniques may well be implicated, at a
submerged level, in the dysfunctional motor processes with which we are
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concerned. I shall return to this point later. For now, however, I shall describe
some of the more salient features of affected motor behaviour.
The co-ordinated actions ofmotility go largely unnoticed by the other
'specialists' who have also mastered the precarious ambulance of bipedal
dexterity. We take for granted the unity of co-ordinated mechanical action of
the musculature in response to vestibular (balance) information operating
through cortical systems informing the purposeful body as it skilfully operates
in space. The fact that this complex action ofwalking is even further enriched
by individual, gender and cultural artefacts imposing their character on the
person's gait, adds an apparent infinite variety to the action10. Of course, as we
are specialists in this enterprise any falterings observed in the mechanical
competencies of others are immediately noted and an explanation is usually
sought. An accidental slip on the mythical banana skin seems hardly ever to
fail to give rise to a smile, if not an outburst of contagious laughter. Indeed,
the popular TV shows that transmit the unfortunate mishaps of individuals
provide great comedy for the viewing public11. Why should such misfortune
attract so much attention? Is it because, for a moment at least, they have lost
control to the prevailing influences of gravity or have succumbed to some
incompetence wherein poise, posture and motor control have been
momentarily superseded by chaos? Or can one interpret such misadventures
ofmotility as evidence of interest not in cause but effect? In this way, the
banana skin, spirit possession, and brain injury can all be attributed as the
10 See Mauss (1936).




causal agents of atypical motor function, and work to provide
symptomological proof for the varied social constructions of such behaviour.
Only through the employment of a specialist can the true diagnosis be
recorded. As the shaman must discover which spirits are involved in the
possession, so too must the clinician attempt to define the problem of brain
injury by identifying the underlying pathology. Lewis (1989) demonstrates
convincingly that many of the accounts of spirit possession among traditional
societies provide an ideological way for individuals, particularly those who are
in some way marginalised, to readdress their misfortune by spiritual
intervention. This may involve requests for items of clothing, food and
foreign goods, from which they are normally prohibited12. In contrast,
however, although the clinical diagnosis of brain injured children may well
aid medical thinking, it is not a satisfactory model on which to base educational provision
(Brown 1984: 705).
Therefore the benefits derived from the clinical treatment of brain injured
children may have less value to the child and his or her parents than those
procedures that operate in possession cults. Indeed, within those societies
where spirit possession occurs the affected individual is believed to be either
12 Lewis provides a well developed view of spirit possession as involving 'female
problems ofmany cultures, whose diagnosis and treatment gives women the opportunity to
gain ends (material and non-material) which they cannot readily secure more directly' (1989:
77). Lindblom (1920: 237) refers to such states as, 'deceitful feminine tactics', employed to
obtain or extort her desires from her husband (see also Grace 1957). Men are not immune
from possession although it seems a more frequent event amongst low status men. 'Those men
and women who experience these afflictions do so regularly in situations of stress and conflict
with their superiors, and, in the attention and respect which they temporarily attract, influence
their masters. Thus adversity is turned to advantage, and spirit possession of this type can be
seen to provide an oblique strategy of attack' (Lewis 1989: 105).
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cured or favoured by a particular spirit. This is not the case in Western
societies where disability is 'clinically managed' even though
the needs of the physically handicapped (my italics) child are to some extent independent of
his medical condition ( Brown 1984: 705).
As such, spirit possession is likely to result in a more sensitive
appraisal of the individual's needs than that offered to children with brain
injury by medical professionals.
(Cindy)
They don't listen to mums, they think mums are overreacting.... When I
actually had her she came out ofthe incubator and was put in her cot this
doctor came to do his rounds and I said to him 'why is Cindy's big toe stuck
out? He said, 'you're beingfussy mother, push them down'. Well that was her
spasticity in herfeet.
The contrasts between diagnosis on the one hand and therapeutic
efficacy on the other are evident in the specialist's approach, be it medicine (as
in the insensitive example above) or shamanism. These contrasts are not
present, however, when describing the character of the physical manifestations
which serve to typify a given condition. In both situations the detail of
anomalous behavioural patterns, which are, incidentally, what initially inform
on the occurrence of some change, 'deviation' (Goffman 1963) or 'liminality'
(Murphy et al 1988) in the person reflect the various aetiological agents
believed to be responsible in that particular situation i.e. spirit possession or
brain injury. In this way hypertonic episodes of the arms (spasticity) may be
considered to involve a cortical or pyramidal tract lesion, epileptic seizures or,
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in some traditional societies, the first stages of spirit possession. Of course,
my intention is not to argue that the suspected cause ofmotor disruption
entirely depends upon an interchangeable notion reflecting only the situation in
which it occurs. It is instead to suggest that organic forms of dysfunction may
not always be interpreted as being discrete from spiritual types in traditional
societies. Lewis confirms this when he states that
we should note that where spirit possession is a regular explanation for disease, that fact that
certain forms of insanity and epilepsy may also be regarded as manifestations of possession
does not necessarily mean that the people concerned are unable to differentiate between them
and other forms of possession (Lewis 1989: 165).
Indeed, although the conditions Lewis describes, namely insanity and
epilepsy, are 'usually clearly distinguished from other possession states' (Lewis
1989: 165), it is not clear from his account how such distinctions are made,
particularly when the overt behaviours of cerebral palsy, for example, and
possession can sometimes be similar in their motor expression.
I have mentioned earlier that the fact that such events occur in space
and time is likely to be of great importance: for example, the deviated
extortions of body and accompanying loss ofmotor control that tend to typify
both events would be almost undifferentiated from one another if not for the
mediating feature of time. Transience and permanence of a particular incident
may greatly affect its subsequent interpretation. However, another way of
determining the origin of a condition might be dependent on how well change
is effected when the particular specialist is called in. In the case of spirit
possession, if the condition is ameliorated by the involvement of an
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appropriate person it is likely that the possessing spirit has been contacted and,
to some degree, appeased. The failure of an otherwise successful shaman to
negotiate success might suggest, however, that a causal agent other than that of
a spirit is involved. Could now brain injury be conceived as being at least a
possibility? The point I wish to clarify is that bodies and their functioning are
embedded in a socio-cultural setting, and as such their actions are constantly
being interpreted by other members of a given cultural set. Overt disability is
often culturally represented as being a product of brain injury for mothers of
impaired children in Western society, while for a child born in another society
a different explanation is likely to be sought. An ethnographic example from
the Punan Bah of Central Borneo confirms this, as here a child disfigured by
impairment may well be classified as a 'non-human spirit' (Nicolaisen 1995:
44). As Douglas (1984) has shown with the Lele example categories that
maintain boundaries between human and animals or children and non-human
spirits have at their centre an interest in the form which typifies the nature of
its possessor. In this way a child born to a Punan Bah family with conspicuous
disability breaks the rules that govern how a human infant should be. The
child's essential human spirit is now compromised and must be reclassified as
non human. Somatic manifestations are therefore not aetiologic in themselves
but rely more upon interpretation then mere presentation. In discussing the
importance of the somatic manifestations of the body for anthropology John
Blacking suggests that
somatic idiosyncrasies are the concern of an anthropology of the body only if they need to be
evoked to explain a person's action in a particular situation (Blacking 1977: 13).
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Thus, similarly, aspects of physical form are only relevant to an
anthropology of brain injury if they can be shown to affect awareness and
subsequent interpretation of some process. Deviations from typical somatic
expression, as would be associated with spasticity, not only act, in Western
society, as clinical indicators of central nervous system pathology but are also
here laden with social and cultural meaning, a point that some clinicians seem
unaware of.
For example, doctors not only believe in their clinical diagnoses but are
also subscribing to current, and socially informed, lay ideas that nothing can be
done to help brain injured children. As one father recalls
(Fiona and Tony)
Certainly, a lot ofdoctors, after we had gone away, must have said 'gosh,
those poor naive parents they think there is something that could be done, and
we've told them there isn't'. And that came across several times.
This may, for some parents, have a debilitating affect on the brain
injured child and his or her family who are attempting to both ameliorate the
condition and cope with the stress of their situation in the community. As
Voysey (1975) has shown, parents may often comply with such medical
speculations.
Negative audience perception, then, generated by both lay and
professional perspectives, may act to de-structure their social relationship with
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others. Furthermore, these perceptions do not only arise from adults since
children also are sensitive to the physical expressions of the body.
(Karen)
I sometimes see other children ask our children 'what's wrong with
your sister'? We had afootball team come to school and some boy said 'oh,
what's wrong with her?' And in fact, it wasn't my son but his friend who said
'she's handicapped that's why she doesn't move'.
It is because the ramifications of neural injury inform on a body, in
both a reflective and overt fashion, that social detection of a personal traumatic
event is recognisable. More importantly, it is not just recognised, it is actively
interpreted to either the benefit or detriment of the child and family in
question.
(Karen)
Yes, you can always pick out the 'Downs' kids who are born to old
mothers as compared to those born to young mothers You can spot them a
mile off, with the girls they have their skirts and 'twin sets' and their hair cut
round here (pointing to the forehead) and their long cardies over the top and
you think 'oh look at that girl'. The 'Downs' kids that are dressed normally
you wouldn't notice them, its only when you come to talk to them. Imean you
would notice Glyn (a young Down's syndrome boy) when he starts to run.
Clothes, as we saw earlier, are important indicators, not just to make
the brain injured child more or less perceptible but also as a social statement
that relates in some way to the child's parents. However, if clothes can act to
camouflage the overt contours of disability, the child's 'cover' is given away
the moment the body becomes active and moves out into the wider field of
view (Goffman 1963). In this way, even the smallest movements of body
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become detectable and signal to the observers that some rule ofmotoric
etiquette is being compromised.
It is for this very reason that the issues of audience perception are more
than theoretical. I shall now consider more closely the characteristics of these
'somatic idiosyncrasies' and attempt to analyse their social significance.
Social Meaning and Physical Form
Many researchers have emphasised the role of body actions and
expressions in human communication systems (see Blacking et al 1977). In
perhaps a more subtle fashion, an historical legacy given by Mauss (1937) and
Hertz (1909) has demonstrated that functional techniques and preferential
asymmetry, respectively, also enrich the social identity that bodies implicitly
express. It is no wonder, then, that deviation of physical form and its
consequent expressions also convey information. This information is,
however, ambiguous because it fails to conform to the typical processes that
are believed to be present. Thus there is an expectancy that the behavioural
performance of individuals will conform to appropriate cultural patterns in
particular situations. In the new-born infant, the mother and enlisted
professionals observe carefully that infantile reflexive responses are
superseded by more purposefully integrated activities as the child develops.
Likewise, many of the ecstatic convulsions that possess cult initiates conform
to stereotypes that confirm spirit involvement. It is such events that I shall
now attempt to explore so that a deeper insight into the situational dynamics of
bodily interpretation can be disclosed.
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Cerebral palsy is a generic term that covers a variety of neurological
disorders ofmovement. More precisely, 'cerebral palsy is the motor
manifestation of non-progressive brain damage sustained during infancy and
childhood' (Brown 1984: 706). For children with cerebral palsy, neurological
diagnosis could include such statements as hemiplegia, ataxia or dyskinesia13.
Although these conditions are often clinically regarded as discrete it is not
infrequent to find that the brain damaging event may have affected other areas
of CNS functioning. Thus, the child with spastic diplegia (affecting lower
limbs) may present other problems which are not neuro-motor in origin.
Epilepsy, learning or behavioural problems and hyperactivity may or may not
be present, but should not be solely regarded as complications of cerebral
palsy. More specifically, cerebral palsy 'results in abnormal posture and
movement' (Jani & Sapienza, 1989 : 41) and it has, therefore, at least a tenuous
relationship with those features that characterise the physical disorder induced
through dissociation and possession. The idea that processes of the vestibular
complex (balance) play an important role in motor management highlights the
contribution that some anthropologists have made to our understanding of the
cultural specificity of bodily function. Huxley, for example, in discussing the
use of drum beats in voodoo, argues that
we can trace the physical pathways by which they (dissociation and possession) have their
affect without much difficulty: they centre on the inner ear whose automatisms, when thrown
into disorder, affect posture, heartbeat and the use of the eyes (1977: 36).
13 Hemiplegia refers to neural injury that cause problems to one side of the body.
Ataxia concerns those behaviours the are affected by balance and cause voluntary movements
to be clumsy and uncoordinated. Dyskinesia involves involuntary movements and abnormal
muscle tone to be prominent.
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This vestibular complex, as we shall see later, is often a central feature of
dissociation and possession and has, not surprisingly, equally important
implications for the brain injured child.
Alfred Gell's (1980) excellent monograph concerning 'Vertigo and
Spirit Possession in Muria Religion' shows not only how vertiginous activity
'becomes a means to religious awareness' (1980: 218) but also that such
activities, which encourage deatomatised states, may have theoretical parallels
in childhood autism. The participating Muria, a tribal people of Central India,
achieve 'certain special experiential states which perhaps border on ecstasy'
(Gell 1980: 225) with the use of specific techniques and items associated with
the gods. Gell demonstrates that dance, swinging and possession trance
(particular somatic activities) help to disembed sensori-motor integration and
alter consciousness. One such item employed by the Muria is the anga, a
quadrangular wooden framework with a forward projection likened to a horse's
head. During the Divine Games, a religious festival wherein an assault on the
equilibrium sense seems compulsory, the anga is supported on the shoulders
of two, sometimes four, youths. The music, which establishes '.... a mood of
excitement and dissociation' (Gell 1980), is provided by the ganda cast
(weavers). As the dance continues the anga, imposing its gravitational
influence upon its supporters, seems to be compensated by the almost
autonomous somatic and kinetic energy of the youths.
Gell is careful to point out, however, that such responses are not those
of the intellect reacting to the forces imposed by the presence of the divinity
articulating the anga, but concern the kinetic forces generated by the dance.
267
Chapter 7
These forces act to create a gap between the initiates' intentions, i.e. those
kinetic compensatory mechanisms that attempt to maintain a degree of
homeostasis, and the consequence of their own action with regard to such
influences. The results of these procedures affect vesitubular system function,
which allows the individual to regulate his own behaviour relative to the
external actions of others. Thus, a state of dissociation is achieved. The
Muria employ several techniques that affect or alter consciousness during their
festivals of religious awareness, but it is particularly those altered states that
induce Muria possession that are ofmost interest to my discussion. Arguing
that the psycho-physiological mechanisms, normally described in the
literature, play only a small part in Muria possession, Gell suggests that
we should recognise that certain patterns ofmotor activity are capable, in and of themselves,
of producing alterations in consciousness, as well as being signs that such an alteration has
taken place. The external indicators that a particular medium has been entered by a divinity
are certain motor patterns which produce changes in the medium's own internally monitored
self-world relationship (1980: 233-234).
In a similar way patterns ofmotor activity, or even their absence or
frustration, are indicated in non-progressive states of brain injury. The crucial
point in both Gell's analysis ofMuria possession and the observations of brain
injury recounted here is that the physical manifestations of these two events
act as a semaphore signalling to bystanders that ordinary corporeal conduct has
been compromised. For example, an observer witnessing a person with rigid
body, an extended neck and an increasing tremble affecting primarily the
forearms and hands, while the eyes maintain a fixed stare until, with eyelid
flutter, they droop, naturally seek an explanation for this behaviour.
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Moreover, the violent extensions of the limbs accompanied by repetitive
yawning, staring eyes, groans and trembling body, escalating to a total and
sudden rigidification whereupon he falls to the earth in a contorted position,
would surely indicate that this person is in need of assistance. Indeed,
assistance he receives from those around him who, having recognised a break
with motoric convention, attempt to bend and massage his stiffened limbs.
During this phase one notes the apparent loss of normal muscle tone,
especially in the neck and arms. The head rolls loosely to and fro, and the
arms limply rest at the sides while he lies prone on the earth. Ifwe now
compare the above observations with another description of anomalous motor
activity we might be able to discern similar and variant features occurring in
dissimilar situations. For example, in this next case an observer notes bizarre
and uncontrollable movements, tremor and or writhing and jerky movements
of the limbs. The face and tongue may also be affected. There is a paucity of
controlled movement, affecting fine tuned behaviours and causing general
weakness. Muscular tone fluctuates with hypertonia and hypotonia, they may
be unable to maintain their weight, giving rise to a strange dance of alternation
of the supporting leg whilst the other paws or scrapes the ground. A paralysis
of gaze is noted, as is a fixed stare, and dystonia or twisting of the head, trunk
or limbs may also be present.
There are, without doubt, behavioural similarities between these two
events, even though they are not at all related to one another in any way other
than their presenting atypical, that is from the normal, range ofmotor activity.
As in the former case, this latter activity elicits succour from those around who
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recognise, by abnormal motor patterns, that some form of help is required.
However, in order to interpret these two situationally discrete events one must
first enquires into their cause or aetiology.
In the former case I have narrated the ecstatic religious event of a
Muria medium who has, in the possession state, become the steer of the
divinity, and as such mediates communion between the Muria and their god
(Gell 1980). In the latter example I have related the observations of a
physiotherapist with some considerable experience of children with athetoid
cerebral palsy (see Levitt 1982: 8-9). One possible link between these two
cases of abnormal motor patterns is the experiential deficit with reality that
results from the motor manifestations of such activity. As mentioned, in the
Muria possession example Gell shows that the Muria
represent their divinities as experiencing the world in the same modalities as the
Muria employ when they seek to have access to them. The Muria, that is to say,
experience their divinities through engaging in certain activities involving the body,
and in particular, the equilibrium sense: when they represent their divinities through
enactments (as with the swinging of the mediums) or by icon (temple images of gods
on elephants, swings, horses, etc.) they do so in situations in which this same sense
modality is brought into play, (Gell 1980)
The effects are transitory, for in Muria religion the medium engaging in
these vertiginous activities is not emulating the gods he is the 'divinity
performing the actions which render experience divine, which abstract it and
set it apart from mundane experiences'(Gell 1980). In contrast to this, in the
athetoid description the behaviours reported here are not separate from
'mundane' (usual) experiences, but rather, represent the continual engagement
of aberrant motor patterns or develop into other forms of dysfunction. The
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temporal considerations that make such experiences transitory for the Muria
provide a lifelong time scale for the parents of a brain injured child. Gell
argues that a possible common feature to both severe autism (brain injury) and
Muria possession might involve dissociation through vestibular dysfunction or
over stimulation. His suggestion is beyond the scope ofmy discussion here,
but there certainly are pertinent points in his analysis which warrant further
research14, particularly with reference to the possible implications of sustained
vertiginous activity and the consequence of this on an individual over
extended periods of time.
It was shown earlier that in some traditional societies errors are seldom
made in perceiving possession as discrete in nature from mental illness or
epilepsy (see Lewis 1989: 165). As we have mentioned above, transience of
the event may be one possible diagnostic feature of possession15 but epilepsy is
also a transient condition. So there must be other factors involved. Muria
possession occurs during religious festivals, although many other forms of
spirit possession affect those individuals who feel themselves more
permanently marginalised by the dominant and powerful groups within their
society (see footnote no 12). This, in one important sense, is similar to that
14 Certainly the vestibular system, with its cerebellar associations in the cortex,
brainstem and spinal cord, plays a key role in affecting motor behaviour in the cerebral palsied
child as well as its involvement in Muria possession. Although it is intriguing to consider the
possible affinity between childhood autism and possession, our concern here is to ask how
onlookers recognise and interpret these similar motor events. Furthermore, it is probable that
higher cortical (cognitive) association respond to specific stimulation of the cerebellum
(involved with motor behaviour) in particular ways which in turn act to induce alterations in
consciousness that are recognised as the states of dissociation that are here discussed.
15 Once again we can observe that temporal phenomena underscore much of the
experiences that are involved with the interpretation of disorder in physical form (see the
discussion on time in Chapter 6, Coping Strategies).
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view argued by Murphy et al (1988) who suggest that disability gives rise to an
experience of'liminality' for those individuals affected in Western society.
However brain injury, and more specifically the type with which we
are here concerned, can have its onset in the uterus, birth or early infancy and
unlike possession is not, generally at least, influenced by the individual's
status, position or membership of a particular group16. Thus, although the
distortions to physical form are similar in both their expression and in the
alteration of the individual's consciousness that may be suspected to have
taken place, there remains one major difference.
Possession, as we have seen, occupies the individual and manipulates
his or her behaviour in a prescribed manner that acts to both contextualise the
individual's experience and its subsequent interpretation by others. The
resultant corporeal manifestations that are perceived in the brain injured child,
however, reflect a contrasting ideology inasmuch that the child may be
reduced to the state of a virtual automaton. In a way, the brain injured child
may be commonly thought of as being metaphysically dispossessed of his or
her human spirit17 unlike the individual who is possessed by an extra and
external spiritual agent. This notion is empirically attested to by the many
families who express a desire that therapeutic practice might return or reinstate
16 For an interesting account of those who are most vulnerable to demonic intentions
see Stirrat (1992: 79-98). He proposes a van Gennep (1908) 'rites depassage' notion wherein
young women, between puberty and marriage, (marginalised) are more susceptible than are
adult males who are typically more aggregated into the dominant aspects of society.
17
Among the Punan Bah of central Borneo a severely disabled child may be referred to
as being a non-human spirit because the body is believed to be the exact copy of the spiritual
ego. Deformity of the body must now image something other than the reincarnated essence of




their child, lost to them through brain injury. As one mother who recounted
her husband's hopes stated.
(Philip)
He's fighting to get his son back, the one he had before the accident.
You know, when Philip does something now, personality wise, that he did
before the accident he (father) gets more excited because its still there, his
personality is still there.
In cases where the injury occurred in early life, from some traumatic
event, for example, it is common to find parents retaining a photograph of
their child before injury, believing that the child in the photo is not the same
child they brought to the clinic.
(Philip)
In aphotograph its 'still life', its like you know they were there yet they
are not there
Another researcher, working in an intensive care unit, has also noted
the contradiction of the past tense being applied to their child's present state
whilst a photo is retained, once again from before the event, to represent the
child they believe may be now lost to them18.
The altered states that affect the brain injured child, then, are seen as
the result of some very special quality, which the parents readily identify,
being suppressed, obstructed or even lost due to some technical agent
represented by medical terminology. In this light the role of therapy is to help
18 From a personal correspondence with Dr Allison James which refer to an observation
by one of her post graduate students, Bernard Place (1997).
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the family acquire a more positive resolve, and achieve a better outcome for
themselves and their child. The child dispossessed of its spirit is not believed
to have been occupied or taken over by another entity but to have lost his or
her very own identity. The resultant anomalous patterns of behaviour that
disrupt motility are not the manifestations of divine occupation which act to
enrich the experiences of its initiates as can be seen in the Muria example but,
instead, are seen as the consequence of spiritual deprivation. Indeed, it is the
enormous implications of dispossession that lead many, even some
professionals, to the conclusion that there is little to be done.
Finally, here is one of the most pertinent contrasts between spirit
possession and the symbolic dispossession of brain injured children. It has
been shown that in some traditional societies spirit possession can be a device
to negotiate a positive change to the circumstances of the possessed individual
via exorcism, catharsis or healing (Stirrat 1992 and Lewis 1989) or confirm
self identity (Boddy 1988). Here we see the altered states and abnormal motor
patterns that accompany and characterise possession helping to inform the
community that an individual is affected and that he or she requires
appropriate treatment. This is typically achieved with prescribed procedures
that appease the affecting spirit (and often the individual), and heal or cure the
possessed person. Brain injury, too, is often recognised as involving divergent
or abnormal behaviour but this recognition plays but a little, if any, part in
prescribing effective treatment procedures. Indeed, once brain injury is
diagnosed and the child's medical condition is stabilised, the focus of attention
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is, as we have seen, directed largely at management, since a cure tends to be
professionally regarded as implausible.
There are, without doubt, many differences between brain damage and
spirit possession, For example, the organic nature of the former constitutes
precise problems for those who wish to attempt an amelioration of the
condition. But as difficult as this is, organic pathology is not sufficient
evidence for the notion that there is no positive course of action to be taken,
although it can often provide a powerful excuse for such statements. Rather,
corporeal manifestations, (brain injury or spirit possession) are best tackled by
exploring the assumptions on which therapy, exorcism or management are
made. The point I wish to clarify here is that, independent of the nature of the
event, the important issue is how the accompanying social problems are
addressed. Though there may be no final conclusion in terms of therapeutic
success for those who suffer brain injury, it might be more profitable to
recognise the possibility that there are likely to be other options than those
which purely address a symptomology.
This, then, points to a possible explanation of why alternative therapy
is so popular. As in many possession cults, alternative therapy, particularly
that form with which I am presently associated, attempts to address the
problems of brain injury through exploring the child's functioning potential
within the social world of familial enactment, (see chapter 6). That the social
constructs which underpin spirit possession in many traditional societies seem
more sensitive to the embodied enterprise than those structural notions which
address brain injury in orthodox medicine suggests that in the former case they
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provide a rationale for action in a prescribed, and generally accepted, cultural
manner. In the latter case of brain injury the very lack of recognisable
ameliorative procedures is more likely to encourage apathy or frustration with
the medical conventions that exercise control. Furthermore, as we have seen,
this model does little to encourage positive familial strategies, even though
they may prove to be amongst the best available options (see chapter 6 Coping
Strategies). Thus the spirit possessed person, through open and sympathetic
recognition of the event and its exorcism, is 'brought back to the fold', whereas
the classification of a child as brain injured tends to produce an effect to the
contrary.
The fact that the temporal dimension is important as an assessment of
efficacy need not negate the possibility that future changes in both therapeutic
practice and social sensitivity could improve the situation dramatically for
brain injured children. Unfortunately, however, at present many families attest
to the fact that diagnosis of brain injury is often accompanied by social
isolation, wherein the prescribed treatment offers little in the way of enabling
the child and its parents to maintain their relationships with the larger
community.
(Timothy)
After hearing the diagnosis that Timothy was severely brain damaged,
we returned home, sat down andfelt that we had nothing left. Our lives had
changed and the people about us seemed to have changed, we felt alone.
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In this way clinical medicine does little to encourage the techniques of
positive social action that are in many ways similar to those notions advocated
by Illich (1975)19 and are seen, in part, to be a function of spirit possession.
Anthropology and Brain Injury
What, then, has spirit possession to do with the brain injured child?
Does it provide a convincing model to analyse and interpret the common
features ofmotor dysfunction that are diagnostic of both conditions, or even
explain them? The answer to these basic questions must be no. What I have
explored in this chapter, however, is that both phenomena have common
features which, although not structurally related, share interesting behavioural
aspects with one another. Indeed, the issues addressed here concern the
identification and interpretation of specific physical expressions of the human
body, and their implication for the construction of social meaning. Ifmy
account has been clear, then we have seen that particular manifestations of
physical form and behaviour share common features with one another, but are
distinguished by their relevant community members, not so much by technical
skill as by social reasoning. To understand the complex aetiological agents
involved in both spirit possession and brain injury may well require the
sophistication of the shaman or neurologist respectively, but there is yet
another, more basic, reasoning at play here which is more readily available to
those it concerns.
"This statement concerns the notions postulated by Illich which he refers to as
'iatrogenesis' that 'describe the social and physical pathology that originates in medicine and in
the activities of doctors' (Hillier 1982: 180). The affect of this most likely suppresses the
abilities of individuals to take an active role in their own well being.
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The categories most used by those involved with these two phenomena
reflect the contrasting notions of possession and dispossession. In the former
these act to identify man's humanity, as the body is the target of divine
occupation (Gell 1980). Not so for the brain injured child, whose body is, at
the extreme, regarded as the discharged chattel of a lost spirit ousted by gross
physical impairment. It may, however, be true that physical impairment plays
only a small part in such a view, as it is the impact of disability upon the
child's social development that is likely to cause the most concern. Blacking
has noted a similar concern when he states
sense-deprivations such as congenital blindness or deafness may inhibit or change the course
of development, but they do not impair the humanity of the organism as does social
deprivation (1973: 3).
This is, I believe, a major distinction between spirit possession and
brain injury. The behavioural effects of spirit possession are, as we have seen,
not only transitory but as such have not, or do not, affect the individual's
continued social functioning in time. They act rather to punctuate it. The
child with severe brain injury, however, may have lost, or even failed to
acquire the subtle patterns, attitudes, expressions and behaviours that are the
result of continued and effective social interaction. The question I must now
return to is what is the significance of these considerations for anthropology,
and are they relevant to understanding children with brain injury?
My first consideration has been with the body and its experience, more
specifically its social construction, itself a concern of anthropology. This
interest has demonstrated that the body is not just a physical entity; rather it is
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an expressive tool utilised by individuals and groups in communities and
cultures to communicate and express their personal and collective identity in a
myriad of social situations. In this sense the body is a social entity with
private aspects. Indeed, as Ann Becker (1995) argues.
The Western cultivation of the personal body requires that personal excellence and identity
can be represented (or misrepresented) by manipulation of bodily symbols indexing aptitude
and discipline. Moreover, this cultivation presupposes that the self has jurisdiction over the
body for the purpose of communication, and that the body represents a personal as opposed to
a communal resources for expression. On the other hand, in the context of an intensified
degree of embeddedness in social relations (and perhaps less in one's body) cultivation of the
body is not legitimised as an exclusive personal enterprise (1995: 37).
Thus, any phenomenon that can influence the symbolism and social
expression that bodies confer is of interest not just to academic anthropology
but to us all. This is particularly relevant to the families of brain injured
children whose physical impairment orchestrates bodily form in diverse ways
likely to distort perception so that frequently only the negative is perceived.
This will not only affect their social opportunities, but clinical decisions may
also be influenced by such interpretation of physical form.
The second point I wish to establish in favour of an anthropology of
brain injury concerns its possible applied therapeutic benefits. I have briefly
shown that during many cases of spirit possession the resultant procedures
often involve catharsis of some turmoil. Thus, in a very significant way,
personal problems are openly displayed but the individual's responsibility for
his or her actions is often minimised. Consequently, he or she is not held to
account for behaviours that might normally be regarded as antisocial20. That
20 This is not unlike that advocated by the 'radical school of psychiatry' who implicated
the family and other interpersonal relations in the individuals' psychotic episodes. Thereby the
person's 'illness' was a manifestations of some familial or interpersonal pathology which could
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is, personal conflicts or problems are expressed for all to see, and appeasement
is negotiated through prescribed procedures and conduct that all may bear
witness to. Ifwe compare this form of action with that of clinical medicine we
can observe some pertinent contrasts.
For example, medicine often prefers to isolate cases of brain injury to
clinical situations for monitoring and management. Families may be
encouraged to take their children home, but are often cautioned not to expect
too much.
(Philip)
This one doctor said 'just take him home and try to get on with your
life, he's not going to do much. Why don't you have more children'?
Doctors will usually not subscribe to and, even further, often actively
discourage any attempts to secure alternative forms of treatment for the child
in the community, believing that only orthodox medicine should be consulted
in such circumstances, even if it has little to offer in terms of therapy or family
support. The most significant contrast between spirit possession and brain
injury is not that these two states reflect differing aetiologies, in fact, the
difference between these two events is a distinction not of kind but of degree.
The significant difference, therefore, involves the efficacy of treatment
rationales to negotiate a successful conclusion.
In those traditional societies in which it occurs possession is readily
identified and effectively dealt with so that a level of normality is returned to
those affected. In contrast to this, many parents with a brain injured child
be seen to minimise personal responsibility (see Laing 1970, 1971 and Szasz 1994: 1995).
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experience considerable trouble when attempting to elicit recognition for their
child's problems from a professional.
(Fiona and Tony)
They did a chromosome analysis at the local hospital and they couldn't
see anything wrong. But it was obvious there was.
In the past cerebral palsy was often not diagnosed until the child was
four years old and positional deformity had been established (Brown &
Fulford 1984: 734). Even after diagnosis some clinical procedures may work
to the detriment of the child21 (Patrick 1989). Thus unlike the shaman - who is
able to identify the person possessed, the responsible spirit and effect a
prescribed treatment - the clinician may fail in his responsibilities on many
accounts. It is of no surprise, then, that many families seek alternative
therapies that may be more able to effectively relate to the family's concerns
and communicate their procedures to the appropriate level of sophistication
that parents demand. This may also account for the increase in 'holistic'
treatments which are as sensitive to the social as they are to the clinical
procedures, often working to envelop the whole of the patients' experience into
a socially meaningful enterprise. The fact that there exists a common ground
on which the family, community and therapeutic agents interact, be they
shamans or clinicians, indicates a system of belief, independent of relevant
technical knowledge, wherein trauma or possession can be located and
understood. It is the process of bringing the same level of anthropological
21 'The lack of a reliable benefit from surgery has led to empirical or idiosyncratic
treatment regimens that require surgery every year and physiotherapy afterwards for up to a
year until more surgery is undertaken - the so-called birthday syndrome (Patrick 1989 : 1115).
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discernment that explores possession as a social fact to the issues that
underscore brain injury that is, to my mind, long overdue. In this sense brain
injury is not only a clinical description for the orthodox medical profession; it
is also a social fact in the larger society.
Conclusion
In this chapter my purpose has been to incorporate an anthropological
rationale in the understanding of the differing perception of the human body
characterised by processes of abnormal behaviour, be they brain injury or spirit
possession. I have argued that the contrast between these two independent
phenomena may implicitly be recognised as a common schema derived more
from the symbolic expression of the body than scientific rationalism.
Although a possible conflict arises between the parents of a brain injured child
and the medical profession, this may prove useful in analysing an underlying
source of the conflict. That is, parents and doctors subscribe to contrasting
notions of body and its significance to the social world in which it is
cultivated. For the parents it is the shrine of possible future intentionality - the
body to which their child lost to them (see above) will one day return; for the
physician it exists as a mechanism of anatomical integration.
Unlike the skill of the shaman in some traditional societies, which is
developed to be commensurate with the causal notion of possession held by
his or her people, those ofmedical science may seem to arise from a doctrine




I have briefly shown that the way possession is understood and treated
offers a more tangible rationale to the members of those societies in which it
occurs than medicine may do for brain injured children in our communities.
The difference is that the prescriptions, advocated by medicine, do not involve
the traumatised child and his or her family's understanding of the procedures
involved. In this sense while possession has a culture ofwide acceptance, the
clinically rationalised body of the brain injured child is inaccessible to many
people, framed as it is by a medical rhetoric of inexplicable pathology. For an
anthropology of brain injury to make a successful contribution it must start,
however, by considering the contrasting roles played by medicine as 'providers'
and the injured as 'subscribers', and the convergent / divergent belief systems
that support these roles. That perception, as a sociological phenomenon, is
both structurally and functionally entwined in our experience of those whose
bodies are constructed as being in some way afflicted, offers yet another level
for anthropological analysis.
Finally, I have considered the altered states that are induced through
brain injury and spirit possession by exploring the influence anomalous motor
patterns have on the perception of body and, most importantly, the information
that is thereby communicated to others22. The two differing phenomena
presented here share many common features but are interpreted in contrasting
ways. As has been shown, irrespective of the nature or aetiology of such
conditions, efficacy of treatment is measured not so much by cure as by
22 It may be interesting to speculate that the altered states of consciousness that are a
result ofmotor dissociation with cognitive intention in those afflicted by particular forms of
brain injury and possession are equally likely (via perception) to alter an observer's
consciousness in some way.
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procedures which are understood, by those involved, to address the common
experience of those affected. However, whilst shamanism achieves this
criteria, medicine may all too often fail. This may suggest that there is, indeed,
a need for many therapeutic regimens to consolidate much of the
anthropological insight into their working rationales.
For example, both Gell (1980) and Huxley (1977) have demonstrated
that the vestibular mechanism (balance and spatial awareness) is strongly
associated with altered states of consciousness, which is a necessary
prerequisite for certain possession states. It also influences the postural
aspects of the body, which in turn influence perception, and which have been
my concern in this chapter. However, although many therapeutic rationales
that treat brain injury employ techniques that encourage vesitubular awareness
their theoretical aims seem at odds with that identified in the anthropological
literature. Vestibular techniques are intended to provide the afferent system
with appropriate stimuli that can be effectively utilised by the child to affect
sensory-motor integration. Surprisingly, in much of the relevant
anthropological literature, we see such techniques as spinning, swinging and
adopting precarious postures that deliberately discourage correct equilibrium,
used to negate sensory-motor homeostasis and induce the deautomatised state
found in trance and possession. Is it possible, then, that some techniques of
vestibular awareness are counter productive in therapy since they may further
dissociate the child from intentional experience? Indeed, it is Gell's (1980)
postulate that the many stereotyped repetitive behaviours observed in
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childhood autism utilise such inappropriate behaviours in an attempt to
establish 'intelligible proprioceptive feedback'. He continues and suggests that
this is their way of bridging the 'gap' between themselves as the locus of efferent intention and
afferent experience (Gell 1980: 244).
Another possible application of anthropology might also consider
'techniques of the body' (Mauss 1937) in establishing the finer aspects of
behavioural performance which utilise the idiosyncrasies of society and
gender. Of course, before the injured child's behaviour develops to this
specific level of social functioning the basic templates particular to human
co-ordinated and controlled movement must be achieved. For many brain
injured children this level is seldom satisfactorily realised and provides instead
perceptible interest and recognition of the deviated forms of body that
announce dysfunction. However, no matter how severe the motor impairment,
the import of certain socially acquired manners ofmovement may significantly
improve our perception of the presented disability.
Because the ways our boys and girls are brought up we imagine that both acquire the
same manners and postures and receive the same training everywhere. The idea is already
erroneous about ourselves and is totally false in the so-called primitive countries (Mauss
1937).
Indeed, therapy that is cognisant of such detail, no matter how
rudimentary in its application, may enhance the child's behaviour in as yet
unforeseen ways that actually improve not only motor performance, but also
the way in which the child is considered and perceived by its peers.
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To conclude, then, anthropology does not have the expertise to
investigate the clinical detail of neurology and its application to the medical
treatment of brain injury. However, it can legitimately investigate the social
consequences of clinical practice on those who are forced, through necessity,
to subscribe to a doctrine ofwhich they may understand but little. Making
these events more understandable to those it affects is not merely of
anthropological interest, but also has the applied benefit ofmaking therapeutic
common sense.
My analysis so far has concerned the image of the body, a body in
which interpretation and social meaning have a cultural currency to both the
individuals and societies which retain the corporeal self as an emblem of
personhood. That this interpretation requires the encultured perception of
others, acts in a way to minimise personal agency in the embodied expression
of brain injured children. In the next, and final chapter, I shall outline the
concern that orchestrations of the body are not only the result of the operations
of others but that the self too, is an indivisible part of the orchestrations that




Neurons, Spirit and Physical Form.
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to argue that brain injury
cannot be solely reduced to clinical notions of neurological dysfunction and
pathology. Indeed, such models ofmedically inspired rationalism serve as
little more than management guidelines that plot a course for clinical dogma
on the chart of human distress, without ever exploring the continents of hope
that so many parents attempt to reach. I have suggested that brain injured
children have had their identity shaped through professional / public
discourses with little, if any, account taken of the child's own view of the
world. However, as mentioned in the Introduction, accounting for the injured
child's own experiences and embodied expression is difficult when, due to
gross impairment, the child is unable to engage in discussions that might serve
to 'colour-in' the detail of their personal enterprise in life. Therefore, almost
the entirety of this work has had to be informed by the observations,
speculations and beliefs of parents. These have, I hope, given an impression
of the form to which brain injured children's constructs of the world might be
homologous.
The problems, then, of interpreting the dialogue that gives the parents'
observations meaning is essentially the problem of deconstructing the
professional and lay 'myths' that negate the personal potentials of these
children. This has, in fact, been the main theme throughout this work.
The process by which the experiences of the brain injured child have
been reconstructed has involved, however, animating parental observations
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into pertinent accounts of individual phenomenology; in the attempt to find
greater meaning in those events that punctuate the family's and child's life.
However, there remains one account that has been omitted so far, and this
concerns those meaningful performances that children enact to enrich their
experiential embodiment and orchestrate potentiality.
In this final chapter I shall try to show that orchestrations are conducted
not only on the body but also on those experiences of selfwhich may help to
reveal a wider phenomenology of disabled children. The fact that these
orchestrations derive from medical practice, social reason and even self
performance (as we shall discover) is as methodologically challenging to
anthropology as is the construction of a specific identity (brain injured) that
serves to label the child as the sole referent to a dysfunctional body. As I have
shown, many of the notions which affect our understanding of these children,
and their subsequent therapeutic options, originate from disparate beliefs
concerning the very nature of a child and his or her organic condition. We
must therefore begin this analysis with how these children are constructed, in
the social sense (see James and Prout 1990), by those who are, to varying
degrees, responsible for their well being. I will begin by revisiting the diverse
landscapes which detail some of the components typically used to negotiate
the categories that serve as the defining characters of brain injured children
and their resultant experiences of embodiment.
With the recent advances in the sociology of childhood, 'new
paradigms' (James & Prout 1990) have emerged that rightfully decentre
children from the traditional doctrines of biology and psychology. These
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reduced childhood to no more than a maturational unfolding to adulthood.
Moreover, these 'reconstructionists ofchildhood' have been equally engaged
with the central question of'what is the child'? (See Chapter 1). Indeed, this
is the question with which we are here concerned, but my focus is on what is
the brain injured child? For purposes of analysis I hope to demonstrate that
there exist intriguing conceptual extensions to those child-centred postulates
already influencing the study of childhood in which children are seen as social
actors. Those critical of theories that propose that children can be regarded as
actively constructing their own social worlds are often professional adults who
consider their own rational wisdom as superior to the believed 'naive' or
'immature' capacities of children. It seems, to many at least, that the
diagnosed pathological dysfunction of the brain injured child lends support to
this type of intellectual reductionism by adult over child. Once again, the body
and its biological workings, a legitimate study for science, not only
investigates its subject but also, in fact, socially constructs it (Foucault 1973
and Armstrong 1983: see Chapter 1).
I would like to argue that clinical descriptions which propose a
passivity for the brain injured child, inspired by pathology, help establish a
conceptual location of children. Flowever, that this is incomplete in its tracing
of the full dimensions that constitute children, particularly injured ones,
identifies a conspicuous lack of detail which may serve to elucidate a 'hidden
landscape' rarely explored by adults; indeed, a landscape which has only
recently been perceived, let alone explored. I have already discussed much of
the detail which I will now analyse, but my purpose here is to draw the threads
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together so that a fuller account of the orchestrations that alter these children's
experience of disability may be understood in their social sense. An
important point to consider is that these orchestrations obtain their social
meaning from the experiences of embodiment that not only affect brain injured
children, but also those who encounter them. I wish to suggest, then, that there
are three common frames of reference or templates used, typically by adults, to
discern, articulate and orchestrate the embodied experiential world of the brain
injured child. The three templates of analysis are identified by their central
tenets of observation and refer to, in an abstract sense, 'neurons' for the
medico-physiological approach, 'spirit' as the feature of parental concern, and
'physical form' as the most overt mediator between parent, clinician and the
larger community of observers1.
Neurons
It is not my intention to examine neurological principles here but to
suggest that notions relating to this physical architecture and function on the
child's brain influence the gaze adopted by the medical profession. This
perspective views non-progressive brain injured children as dysfunctional
bodies of pathology. The clinical gaze ofmedicine has been argued (see
Chapters 1 & 3) to have not only described and constructed the human body in
a medically appropriate form, but also to have established a method of control
over it. This 'political anatomy' (Foucault 1979) forms the substrate on which
every parent with a brain injured child is forced to make their appeals to
1 The terms used, 'neurons', 'spirit' and 'physical form', are my own and I will
endeavour to clarify the semantics in the following pages.
290
Chapter 8
medical orthodoxy. Unfortunately, as we have seen, in many cases the parent's
views concerning their injured child lack credibility in such consultations, and
have little or no negotiative power.
Doctors and teachers frequently gave opinions we knew to be incorrect and we would
just have to sit there and express gratitude. The fact is that we knew more about her condition
than any of them. But whenever we started to give information in the hope that they would be
able to use it to help Jenny, they just turned off or dismissed what we said with opinions of
their own which were intended to show us that only professional opinions have any worth. It
was all very frustrating (Baxter 1986, cited in Cummins 1988: 18)
This frustration with doctors may encourage a parental obstinacy
towards the clinical rationale.
(Cindy)
So over the years I've just gradually made up my own mind. I listen to
what they have got to say to me and think, right, I've listened to the medical
side of it but I know my instincts as aparent and I know Cindy better that they
do, and I know what she can do 'indoors'. Just because she doesn'tperform
like a seal when we go down to the hospital, I know what she can actually do.
So I do listen to what they say, (but) I don't take a lot ofnotice of it.
Why is it that parents' understanding of their child's condition is
ignored? Is it that they have no contribution to make to the habilitation
programme or is it because they are subordinate in a power game of health
and, as such, are expected to be passively informed, not actively informing? If
'the needs of the physically disabled child', as we have indeed seen, are 'to
some extent independent of his medical condition' (Brown 1984: 705), are not
parents' observations valuable to medically inspired regimens? But we are
forgetting the office ofmedicine and its control over the body as distinguished
by pathology (Hillier 1986: 175-84), a body that can be truly identified as
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deviant by its failure to conform to the norms of health established through
medical enquiry (Scambler 1986: 185-93) and its policing (Turner 1987:
212-26).
There is, however, yet another feature of deviance to be discerned here.
This is expressed by the resistance brain injury has shown to treatment
protocols. The notion that medicine is a curative discipline is seriously eroded
by the dysfunctions that are present in psychiatry, geriatrics, community
medicine and of course, the treatment of brain injury. Not only are such
specialities often regarded as low status by the profession in general but they
are also more then likely disadvantaged in terms of resources (Hillier 1986:
177). Indeed, in such cases the lack ofmedical efficacy highlights the
shortcomings of the discipline. The fact that the professional cannot effect a
cure, and in so doing maintain his or her superiority over that of the patient, is
likely implicated in the dogmatic approach adopted by many of the profession
during their consultation with parents (see Chapter 4).
The point I am attempting to clarity here, then, is that the theories and
postulates of neurology establish the intellectual and professional tenets for
understanding brain injury without reference to what Turner (1987: 219-21)
describes as the 'phenomenology of sickness'. That is, brain injury is
considered without the important references obtained from those who actually
suffer, or those immediately related to the patient (Radley 1993). This
suggests, then, that 'sickness' is negotiated between doctor and patient.
Scientific medicine concerns itselfmore with the 'hardware' implications of
neurological impairment than with the experienced consequences of such
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dysfunction to the social realities that establish the embodied world of the
injured child. This 'objective'/'subjective' dichotomy which can be seen in the
different positions adopted by the orthodox and alternative therapy settings
plays a major role in determining options. As noted by Sharma
Orthodox medicine has become even more technological in its approach, favouring
interventions based on 'objective' knowledge about the patient, or rather his/her body, which
take no account of the subjective and social experience of illness (1992: 201)
A possible source of conflict between parent and doctor can now be
identified as their failure to share a common conception ofwhat the significant
features of brain injury really involve.
Spirit
This brings us to the next view of the terrain on which brain injured
children are mapped. Once again this is orchestrated by those professionals
and individuals with whom the child has contact. The family perspective
decentres from the mechanics of neurology and instead focuses on the myriad
social relations that exist between child and parent. Whereas the impulses of
neural activity at the micro-level constitute a human condition for neurology,
parents are likely to be more concerned with the macro-level of their child's
own experience of injury, and its ramifications for both the child's and the
family's future. Thus I use the term 'spirit' to help with my identification of
that entity that parents may feel is embedded and subdued, due to injury,
somewhere in their child's body. Occasionally parents refer to their child as
being 'there' but not in an apparent way. This becomes intelligible only when
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the child does something, i.e., expresses a mood or action, that serves to
register a glimpse of recognition that there is indeed a commonality between
the present injured child and the one they wish would return. The fact that
these 'visions' appear, as would a spectre to those who can remember and
interpret such actions, convinces me that 'spirit' is an appropriate general term
for this phenomena.
(Philip)
Ifa certain song comes on the radio my husbandwill say Philip used
to like that before his accident, and I say yeah, he likes music and he does
remember thingsfrom before. When John (father) sees things that remind him
ofhow Philip was he finds that very encouraging, he thinks, you know, he did
that before the accident, its still there.
Spirit, then, is that essence that many parents believe to be suspended
from their child during the 'marginal state' of brain injury. As we have already
seen in the previous chapter, parents may often regard the injured child as little
more than a facsimile of the child it was before the tragedy. It is important to
remember, however, that this child in his or her present condition is, at the
same time, the only tangible link to the one now lost to them. We have also
seen that there exist many interesting analogies between brain injury and spirit
possession (see Chapter 6). Moreover, not only are the physical manifestations
of the body, orchestrated by the specificity of both conditions, remarkably
similar at times (see Gell 1980), but the very notion of spirit, as identified in
this study, is also likely to be implicated. That is, since occupation by a
spiritual entity is regarded by many as the aetiological feature of possession
(Lewis 1989, Obeyesekere 1981) dispossession of the injured child's spirit
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may, for some, establish the notion that confirms brain damage. The
anomalous behaviour of the body during ecstatic religious events of spirit
possession reveals spiritual occupancy. In a comparable way, abnormality of
posture and spasticity indicates a dispossessed child. Though I do not believe
that those who care for the injured child would ever articulate spiritual
dispossession as a feature of concern, elements in their behaviour would
perhaps confirm such a notion. Through careful observation by those who
socially interact with the child, anomalies can be perceived in behaviour which
demonstrate a conceptual discontinuity between their child as it was before the
trauma, and that impaired being which it is now. As I have shown in the
previous chapter, parents often retain a photograph of their child before the
injury as a reminder of that child they believe is now lost to them2. However,
because the child's external physical characteristics seem to attract greater
attention than his or her internal potential, social interactions tend to be
targeted at a level appropriate to the child's projected disability. In such
circumstances it is common to find adults over simplifying their social
communications, with both dialogue and mannerisms directed only at the
child's gross impairments. The possible harm such behaviours can do to the
child's cognitive development is likely to confirm intellectual disability and
frustrate his or her emerging personality. Therefore overt disability, and not
the child's capacity, becomes the stadium for social communications and
contact.
2The continuity between these events (before and after injury) is maintained through a
temporal displacement wherein the present loses its forward dynamism and the past is fixed
(retaining photos and particular memories) until it returns almost full circle to that future




That the child's physical impairments play such an important role in
informing both professionals and other individuals' relations to the brain
injured child is something that has been discussed throughout this thesis, and
many scholars, not least anthropologists, have been concerned with the
physical forms that contextualise embodiment and the impact these features
have on interpretation of the human body as a social entity (Becker 1995;
Douglas 1984; Gell 1980; Blacking et al 1977; Merleau-Ponty 1963; Mauss
1936; and Hertz 1909). However, whereas the interest of these scholars has
been, largely with the functional body and its expression, my concern is for the
body characterised primarily by its dysfunctional attitude. That all bodies
confer social meaning is neither a new nor novel idea but the notion that the
deviated form and behaviour of the brain injured child represents a chaotic
state, wherein the aesthetics of behaviour are suspended, may well illuminate
new insights. Most importantly, it may help to understand why the child in
desperate need of the normalising routines of appropriate interaction does not,
in fact, receive them. Can it be that the projection of overt disability in
children overwhelms sensibility to the exclusion of appropriate ('normal')
stimulation? Unfortunately, it appears that the injured child's physical form
acts as the most conspicuous social statement requiring others to develop
strategies, often inappropriately, in their attempt to effect communication.
One explanation for this may be that these strategies have another
purpose and may help maintain a safe distance from a tragedy too close for
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comfort. In this sense they may be analogous to what Frazer (1912, in
Douglas 1984:20) might well have identified as 'rites of hygiene' which give
protection from some form of contamination, certainly not physically but
perhaps conceptually. The danger perceived here is not to one's own physical
being but to one's classificatory system. In Douglas's terms, the injured child
may be thought of as polluting because its physical impairment is in conflict
with those notions which maintain that children are most favoured for their
aesthetic appeal.
In short, our pollution behaviour (in our case this might well be oversimplified or
inappropriate communication skill) is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to
confuse or contradict cherished classifications (Douglas 1984: 36).
In this sense physical form plays a key role in our interpretation of the
brain injured child. But what is most significant about physical form is that,
unlike those perceptions visualised with reference to neurons and spirit and
largely restricted to doctors and parents, it establishes a public perspective.
This is a perspective that situates the parents between the 'inside' (child's
capacities) and the 'outside' (his or her physical manifestations of injury),
between the medical and the public. Unlike the more private statements,
where neurons and spirit reflect differing competencies of observation, the
public dimension rests more on the character of physical form than on an
intimate personal knowledge. As such it is likely to form that substrate which





Having identified three of the most overt themes which structure the
conceptual landscape that locates brain injured children, I shall now explore
the invisible details which lie in the interstices of such features. In one sense
the material most overlooked by professionals, parents and the interacting
community is those notions derived from children themselves. It seems that
considering children's own internal rationales and beliefs has merited little
concern until relatively recently (see James and Prout 1990). I have already
made more than passing reference to the importance of adopting a more child
centred position in order to better understand the realities that children
themselves are responsible for creating. In fairness, more and more of those
whose interest rests with the phenomena of childhood are attempting now to
explore this world of the child as it is personally experienced. Indeed,
Qvortrup argues for a voice to be given to children in statistical and social
accounting and suggests that
there may be a reality which is common for children irrespective of their parents' background.
This reality might furthermore be one which in principle differs from the reality of adults
(Qvortrup 1990: 83).
Is it really possible that children might be experiencing a different
world from that occupied by their parents, a world in which adult interests are
projected onto children in a manner which, due to their very nature, reflect
concerns and beliefs that have little substance in the internalised world of the
child? Although many researchers are now beginning to identify some of the
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parameters that are likely to be involved in children's self constructions of
reality, there are few studies which have addressed these issues for the brain
injured child. However, until we have a more concrete understanding of those
details which are at the forefront of the brain injured child's concerns, studies
derived from non injured children themselves may prove valuable..
James (1993) has researched into children's notions of what may be
termed embodiment, and discovered some very pertinent facts about the
meanings that bodies may express to children. Indeed, she has demonstrated
that what children find significant about their bodies is height, shape, gender
and use (1993). However, for children such defining categories are not fixed
but are dynamically expressed by a 'subtle interplay between physical
appearance, morality and social skills' (James 1993). Changes in physical
competencies, behaviour and appearances affect the child's social image and
can be used by children to negotiate differing personal identities for
themselves. Unfortunately, for the brain injured child the possession of
appropriate bodily skills by which to express themselves in a stereotypical
fashion, which seem so important to children's own construction of identity, is
rarely acquired. Indeed, the failure ofmany brain injured children to develop
such skills to an acceptable level of sophistication may, as I have shown,
account for the marginal status they are accorded by other, more competent,





Betty willplay with him (Timothy, her mentally disabled younger brother) but
only ifshe's on her own. She prefers the company ofother (non-injured)
children.
If James (1993) is correct in assuming that 'the way the body is used
has more significance and power to confer identity than simply how the body
appears' then therapeutic programmes need to be aware of such detail in their
ameliorative attempts. This requires that function, in terms ofmotor capacity,
is far more significant than solely providing mobility, for it gives rise also to
personal identity, a feature that is, in itself, all too often embedded in, and
synonymous with, the child's disability. Here we can see the significance of
Marcel Mauss's (1936) notions concerning the 'techniques of bodies'. Not only
are such techniques specific to the societies and individuals in which they
arise, but also, for children, the subtle features of physical skill categorise its
possessor in socially important ways. Is it now possible that adults, in the
guise of parents and professionals, are so concerned with what they believe to
be the targets of therapy (restoring the lost child, for example) that any other
feature, even that which has the power to confer identity, merits but little
consideration? Although it is likely to be true that many of the parents' and
doctors' wishes are commensurate with those of the injured child (wishing to
develop a level of independence) the question is, however, whether our
expectations of those techniques (therapy) that attempt to achieve this entirely
concur with those of the child in practice3.
3
Many children, particularly those new to home based therapy and those who have
experienced several years of therapeutic routine, resent the sessions and rarely subscribe to
them with the same enthusiasm as do their parents.
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One may ask whether or not adopting a child centred view to therapy is
practicable, or indeed necessary, since, surely, the concerned and informed
adult is in a much better position than the injured child to decide upon the
most appropriate strategy to be taken in terms of therapy? Certainly
stereotypes, in the form of behavioural competencies, are important social
constructs in both the child's and adult's world realities. Therefore, the idea
that the injured child should be assisted to acquire the skills ofwalking,
dressing, washing and language, etc, seems natural enough. Indeed, these are
very often the aims of therapy. Shilling's (1993) perceptive thesis on 'The
Body and Social Theory' argues that the body is born as an unfinished
biological entity and subsequently only completed through social action.
Brain injured children offer a pertinent example of this, for injury can often
reduce the child to a biological rather than a social functioning entity. In this
sense, brain injured children certainly are, in Shilling's terms, 'unfinished'.
However therapy, particularly that employed by the alternativists, introduces
the child to a series of social actions and manipulations which attempt to
restart the processes that are hoped to eventually complete the child's body.
The question is, however, in the attempt to establish these milestones
of competence is it possible that a hidden landscape, vital to the acquisition of
these skills, and much more in the child's own experience of reality, is being
overlooked? The fact is, many children simply do not like subscribing to their
therapy programmes but prefer instead to practice their own social actions of




She likes to feel it ( hair) on her back, she sits there and does this
(mother imitates child rolling her head backwards so as to brush the hair over
her shoulders) I ask, do you want to go to the toilet? Because she sometimes
does that when she wants to use the toilet and she says, no, I'm doing my hair,
I'm feeling my hair.
She also likes to feel her skirt, the material, on her legs, as ifshe was
walking and would tap the sole's ofher shoes with a pencil as if to make
the sound that shoes make when walking.
Could such experiences, the movement of hair on the shoulders, the
feel of a dress caressing the legs, and the sound of shoes stepping on the
pavement all contribute in helping the child approximate some of the sensation
that would occur ifwalking was possible? Is it possible that the child is
constructing kinaesthetic experiences to accentuate motoric imagery, or are
such practices purely the result of pathological development?
I can see that such a sociological account of personal dysfunction
would produce few tenets to impress the neurologist, for whom disability is
purely an organic matter. Some brain injured children have indeed recovered
functioning to such a level that personal identity, as an ability of body use
(James 1993), is established even though the professionals have been at a loss
to explain or account for it in satisfactory medical terms. The question now so
fundamental to the therapeutics that orchestrate the bodies of these children in
both the clinic and the home is, then, how can the potential for 'recovery' be
enhanced and optimised without our sentience of the reality within which the
disabled child is embodied? What clues may there be in the child's own
experience of disability that may point to novel solutions to old problems?
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The hidden landscape, then, can here be identified as that detail -
reality and experience - that uniquely encapsulates the individual child within
a larger and perhaps myopic4 social context. Ifwe assume that this reality is
internal and reflective of only the child's personal experiences, is it ever
possible for us to obtain any meaningful insight into these private worlds that
the suffering child constructs? I believe it is, but only if as adults we are
prepared to accept, unconditionally, their statements, expressions, fears and
beliefs as being truly descriptive and not merely infantile metaphors of the
world in which they must really exist. Furthermore, we should attempt to
understand that these 'idiosyncratic' behaviours which typically get dismissed
may well be operational performances that provide a 'concrete' (somatic)
expression to an active imagination.
There is, of course, no certainty. Self deception is probably as
common as the more deliberate type we use against others, and there is no
reason to believe that children too, even injured ones, may not practice it.
More importantly, however, it may prove beneficial to assume that children's
statements5, however expressed, contain many pertinent facts and provide a
more representative view of the injured child's world, if only we can decipher
them.
As I have already shown, such a sentiment is visibly encountered in the
statements ofmany parents who wish that the medical profession could
41 use the term 'myopic' with reference to the adult interpretations of a childhood
reality that seem largely based on expectation rather than perceptive insight.
5 For brevity I use the term statements: this in fact relates to those articulations of
words, vocal sounds, actions, moods and aspects of sociality that the child may employ in
response to other people or events that he or she encounters. They are, of course, not always
interpretable but this may be equally due to the lack of an acceptable child-sensitive schema in
which to reference the observations as it is to be a total incapacity of the child to express some
issue of his or her experience.
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decentre from their own esteemed position for just long enough to consider the
parents' statements and feelings. To consider children, whether disabled or
not, as constructors of their own reality requests no greater favour. Both child
and parent have their own important contributions to make to the way others
perceive and regard them.
Robert Coles (1990), a child psychoanalyst, became shrewdly aware
of this fact when he recounted his experience of an eight year old girl attending
a psychiatric clinic. Her religiosity was initially regarded as a smoke screen
for the 'bad habits' which he presumed arose from the sexual feelings 'she had
and possibly acted on' (Coles 1990 :11). Coles continues and states that
the heart of the matter for me and my psychiatric kind (is) our conviction that there is an
ultimate bedrock psychological reality to whose depths and contours we are specifically privy.
Sometimes we have good reason for our claims. But conquistadors (Freud called himself one)
have a way ofbecoming wanton imperialists at times. I wasn't letting Connie tell me about an
important part of her life (I would eventually realise) because in my mind and in my manner I
was pressing her to hurry up, let me get (with her cooperation) to what was far more important,
the "truth" underneath, "disguised" in the child's life by a Catholic fastidiousness that had
already broken down in school and put her in our clinic (Coles 1990: 13).
But it is not just the professionals that make such mistakes and
wrongly assume that intellectual reductionism is the only way to interpret the
discourse of others, especially children. The process that articulates 'adults
know better' is but one of the responsible agents that underscore the world in
which children live. It may not be the inability of children to account for their
reality that rests at the heart of the problem, then, but rather our unwillingness
to really listen. If infants as young as three months have the capacity to initiate
communicative channels for the mutual exchange of information (Bruner
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1975: Trevarthen 1979) with their mothers, then even severely brain injured
children may plausibly have developed some communication systems. The
question is, how well are these processes recognised as communicative
attempts? We know that disability is a problem, but in whom is it observed?
Abberley (1995) suggests that Occupational Therapy, as perhaps for the other
'service providers'
perpetuates the notion that disability is an individual problem to which professional
intervention can provide a solution, and to ascribe responsibility for any perceived failure in
therapy to the client rather than the practitioner (1996: 221).
Even in the most brain injured child there is likely to be some
undiscovered personal world, rich in opportunities for contact and
understanding which might well suggest that our inability to perceive their
embedded potential is as disabling to the child as is their own impairment (see
Oliver 1996).
The Orchestrated Body
However, the very fact that we have yet to identify the realities that
they construct may go some way to helping us accept that the world in which
they live may have little consort with the world in which we perceive our
interactions with these children to take place. The notion that all bodies are to
some extent orchestrated by ourselves and by others plays a critical part in the
phenomenology of human existence. Brain injured children are also required
to account for their actions. However, the fluid use of socially gendered and
culturally determined bodies makes their attempts at personhood both
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conspicuous and suspicious. As I have shown, the 'failings' of the brain
injured child are identified, located, diagnosed and labelled with specific
reference to the body. This is not just because the body is the material artefact
of pathology but because it is also the semiological substrate on which social
dysfunction is contextualised and discussed. Bodies are, by intent, the
arbitrators of social conduct. Moreover, the fact that bodies are defined in
such ways extends our collective consciousness of these integral entities with
regard to the 'normal and pathological' (Durkheim 1938) which further acts to
both determine acceptability and define sensitivity. That is, the dysfunctional
bodies of brain injured children not only kindle an interest in 'objective'
medical science due to their deviation from the norm - and thereby establish
the boundaries whereon the typical is replaced by the untypical - but more
importantly, and in the classical anthropological sense, these bodies, 'bad' in
the sense of normal, are good in the ways in which they enrich and impinge on
the human imagination. Emile Durkheim well understood the importance of
deviation from the norm when comparing the method of biological reduction
to that of social systems to discover the 'Rulesfor Distinguishing Between the
Normal and the Pathological'.
Disease does not always leave us helpless or in a state of irremediable maladaption: it
only constrains us to adapt ourselves differently from most of our fellows (1964: 52).
Indeed, Durkheim continues and argues that as disease is a function of
the healthy so, too, is crime part of normal society.
Let us make no mistake. To classify crime among the phenomena of normal
sociology is not to say merely that it is an inevitable, although regrettable phenomenon, due to
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the incorrigible wickedness ofmen: it is to affirm that it is a factor in public health, an integral
part of all healthy societies (1964: 67)
In a similar way the disabled body of the brain injured child is,
conceptually speaking, equally a part of the same healthy collective in which
all other bodies are located. As crime for Durkheim sensitises society to
confirm a better moral and more enlightened consciousness on its members, so
too the distorted physical forms that we may perceive in our brain injured
children affirm the dimensions of possibility in embodiment. Moreover, an
embodiment that is both natural and cultural is part of that essential human
experience. It is little wonder, then, that these children are orchestrated by the
disciplines ofmedicine, therapeutics, education and social work, but 'to what
effect?' we must ask ourselves. Is it really to make accessible pathways into
that 'normal' experienced embodied world, as such practitioners would have us
believe, or is their purpose purely to define its limits, the very boundaries at
which function is termed dysfunctional and consequently perceived as
abnormal? As Durkheim shows with criminality, absence of crime arouses a
greater sensitivity to perceive failings in the actions of others that would not
have been previously regarded as criminal.
Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes,
properly so called, will there be unknown: but faults which appear venial to the layman will
create there the same scandal that the ordinary offences does in ordinary consciousness
(Durkheim 1964: 69)
So, too, if all injured bodies were to be homogenised, would not now
any deviation from the accepted typical physical form, no matter how small, be
regarded as violating the rules of normality? That the bodies of brain injured
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children are conceived of as peripheral distracts social gaze from those others
whose physical form would, if not for these children, transgress the limits of
acceptability. Might these children, with their overt disability, kindle a
tolerance for other less than 'perfect' bodies that create an industry of
consumerism for physical appeal and pleasure (see Featherstone 1982;
Featherstone et al. 1991) which might not exist but for the position brain
injured children occupy in our collective consciousness? Thus in establishing
the 'forms' which demarcate normality, control, in almost every conceivable
way, must be exercised over them. These children are the orchestrated and
disempowered bodies of 'normal' society's institutions, institutions that, by
their very purpose, act more to desensitise our tolerance of disability by
manipulating the bodies and minds of brain injured children at the periphery of
social engagement than by reaffirming that these children are truly part of the
whole and complete range of embodied enterprise and, as such, a major
contributor to it.
Distinctions are the very genesis of this enterprise, and the 'special'
placements these children attract in the institutions of our society affirm
discontinuity from the universals that we are ready and willing to perceive in
those of us who live outside their reasonability. The one inescapable
conclusion, ifwe were to be really sentient of our own embodiment, is that no
matter how we conceptualise disability there must surely be some
commonality in the experiences that arise from the endeavours of all bodies,
be they disabled or abled ones. Of course there will also be differences,
particularly in the utility of action and perhaps purpose, but this does not in
308
Chapter 8
itself preclude the fact that there are likely to be certain universals
underscoring our collective and individual embodiment.
Anthropologists, in studying other people in cultures and societies
vastly different from our own, are realising that there are indeed processes of
every day life that are not entirely unfamiliar. These universals do not only
account for a commonality of interpretation of particular social phenomena,
but also the physical conditions (embodiment) in which such phenomena will
inevitably arise. Donald Brown (1991) has provided a good account of this in
his book Human Universals.
Steadman had to learn the Hewa language in the field, but long before he was
conversant in it he discovered - somewhat to his surprise, because it didn't jibe with his
assumptions about the influence of differing world views - that he and the Hewa "could
understand each other well enough to live together" (1971: 26-27). As time went by, and he
learnt more about the ways in which the world is put together differently in Hewa than in
English, he was led to observe that the differences were largely superficial: "The fact of
experiencing the world in a similar way," in spite of its being carved up differently in different
languages," became increasingly obvious as I acquired greater proficiency in the language"
(1971: 27, cited in Brown 1991: 3).
This essential human background, in which the anthropologist, the
people he or she studies and 'the readers of ethnography share, is a vast
reservoir of interpretative principles' (Brown 1991: 5) and is also likely to be
shared by children. The point I am making is that disability is itself an
involuntary dimension of that common ability that children's bodies possess.
The difference is therefore not one of kind, which would then be more likely to
make it incomprehensible, but in fact, yet again, one of degree. For there are
many actions and moods that ensue from the brain injured child that are
understood by the parent or carer ifwe accept, as we must inevitably do, that
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the injured body before them is still that inalienable body of a child even if he
or she now appears different. I shall now attempt to clarify this important
point by using examples taken from my fieldwork with parents and their brain
injured children that will demonstrate the shared common elements of
childhood that are likely to be part of all children's experiences.
Case Studies
(Cindy)
Cindy is an intelligent seven year old girl who lives in the West
Country with her mother, father and younger brother. At thirty one weeks
doctors suspected 'placentaprevia', mum was given a scan and Cindy was
born one week later after three and a half hours in labour during which mother
experienced no contractions. Cindy was 3lbs 4ozs at birth and showed signs
of distress, she was given a blood transfusion and lumbar puncture which
confirmed meningitis. Cindy developed hydrocephalus nineteen days later
when a 'shunt' was subsequently fitted. Cindy is diagnosed as having cerebral
palsy with athetoid spasticity. She attends a special school and is doing very
well; her mother's main concerns are for Cindy to develop walking, toileting
and independence.
Cindy's favourite games tend to involve role play in which she is often
the princess or other good character whilst her mum is inevitably the witch or
wicked step mother. Cindy thinks all step mothers are cruel and Cindy, being
the good princess, is the one going to be saved. The family spend some time
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each day on their therapy programme6 which Cindy does not like and she will
regularly engage the helpers in conversation to distract them from
administering her exercises. She prefers younger children, particularly babies,
to play with and wants to teach young children when she grows up. She will
often say to her mother 'look I can walk on my own, do babies do that?' Cindy
has few friends who are the same age as herself. She is very concerned about
her development and likes to keep a record of her achievements, always
wanting to know how far along the line she is at any particular time. The line
is a type ofmetaphor she has constructed with what babies do at one end and
adults at the other. She feels herself to be about halfway along it at the
present and believes (perhaps because she has been told it) that her exercises
will help her move along this line. Cindy often tells her mother that she will
be glad when she doesn't have to do them any more but persists for fear of the
therapists finding out that she hasn't done them. Being perceived as good by
everyone is very important for her.
Some of Cindy's friends in school, who are also disabled, often make
comments that upset her. For example, she asked one boy if he liked her
dress, he said he didn't and she came home crying that night from school.
Cindy likes to be considered a good girl at all times and worries that her
mother might say something negative about her7. Generally, she behaves
better when in the company of strangers as she likes to give them the
6 This involves a modified regimen based on the Doman-Delacato method which entail
passive manipulation of the limbs in order to teach the child the co-ordinated movements of
purposeful motility.
7 She was very concerned that I would be seeing her mother whilst she was in school
in case her mother told me that she had been 'playing up' and promised her mother that she
would do her exercises.
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impression that she is good all the time. Cindy has become very interested in
the recollections of her mother and grandmother, especially when they were
little girls, wanting to know everything they did. She then uses these stories
and recollections to construct her games, creating present scenarios from
other's past events and peopled with the characters and experiences recalled by
others.
Cindy has often commented to her mother that 'you don't know what it
is like to be disabled'. Cindy has an imaginary husband called Kelly, a
daughter Michele and a son named Graham.
This brief description is full of understandable relief; it is of course,
much more meaningful for Cindy's parents than the interested reader but both
are likely to be able to make sense of some of the issues that are a concern to
Cindy. Being disabled (diplegic) Cindy prefers younger children, particularly
babies, perhaps because they have less motor ability than herself. Older
children, however are more problematic as she feels compromised when
engaging in games with those children who demonstrate greater physical
competence. In this case her disability is accentuated. In her role play games,
the notion of good and bad are meaningfully understood as a metaphor for able
and disabled. Her character, the princess, is good and therefore able to
compensate for the possible bad elements that are associated with her
disability. Her mother is considered the witch or wicked step mother, able to
walk and command an influence over the pitiful plight of the princess who
cannot escape her situation. When Cindy informs her mother that 'you don't
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know what it's like to be disabled' she is not posing a question but is, in fact,
making a statement that challengers her mother's, and perhaps her own,
acceptance of this disability.
Because of the implications of her disability her own experiences of
the childhood she is presently encountering are minimised, to some extent
confined to the living room floor and tiled hall8, thus Cindy must find
alternatives to improve this situation. But not just any fantasy will do; it must
be as real as possible, constructed with the real events that occurred to the real
people she knows and loves. These games or performances, so developed, are
no longer the fancy of an imagination; they are an extension to physical
actuality, an experiencing of those routines and events that created real people
and which will confer on her disabled body an enriched encounter with an
eventful childhood. Through utilising these actual occurrences Cindy has
established a method for re-experiencing her mother's and grandmother's
accounts from childhood. The events that made their childhood so typical of
the able bodied can now be accessed to provide Cindy with insight and
meaning of those behaviours and events from which she would normally be
excluded. In this way her own childhood phenomenology is enhanced by
understandable detail commensurate with the people she knows best, loves and
identifies with.
8






Timothy is a nine year old boy who was born after a normal birth but
developed viral encephalitis at the age of twelve months. He was hospitalised
and had more than one hundred fits during two weeks. A lumbar puncture was
administered, which proved negative9, however a positive EEG was
confirmed10. One week prior to this Timothy had a high temperature and fever
and fell down two steps onto concrete. His mother's and father's concerns are
to improve his general abilities so that he will one day attend high school.
Timothy is about to start a mainstream junior school but is not looking
forward to it, neither is he dreading it but rather he just knows he going. His
mother recalls when he seemed unemotional and disinterested but now he'll
'throw a paddy and that's great to see all this emotion' as his mother recounts.
These tantrums arise when people attempt to take things away from him.
Timothy has reasonable language skills, especially since he has started playing
with other children. His sister Kate occasionally plays with him when she has
none of her own friends to play with, preferring the company of her own
friends. Although Timothy seems to enjoy playing with other children he
rarely gets involved; even when other children are present he remains
somewhat a loner, watching and only participating to spoil their games on
purpose. Timothy's mother says that when he spoils their games he has a
9A negative result from a lumbar puncture would confirm that the cerebrospinal fluid
is not contaminated. This procedure is carried out for many reasons but in this case to
illuminate the presence ofmeningitis and encephalitis.
10Although paediatric EEG's are difficult to read in this case 'spike' activity was




malicious look in his eyes; she believes he does this because he is not getting
the attention.
Timothy will often talk to himself, for example if he has done
something wrong he will tell himself off, saying 'you've been a very naughty
boy and I'm going to smack your bottom'. Jenny, Timothy's mother, recounted
a time when she felt he had no or little self awareness but now he never stops
looking at himself in the mirror, or when riding his cycle in the back yard he
seems fascinated with his own reflection in the patio doors as he rides by. He
enjoys being outdoors and when out shopping he's starting to choose the items
he prefers. Jenny feels 'he's starting to know his own mind'. When meeting
people he will now ask their names as way of an introduction but this can be
very repetitive, repeating the same question until his mother stops him. At
times he has a slight stutter but will happily carry on until he gets it right or
gives up with pure fatigue. Interestingly he never gets frustrated by this
problem. He's also become much more aware of the names and parts of his
body and will tell his mother if he has a tummy ache. This is one of the great
improvements for his mother because his inability to inform her when he felt
ill or in pain was very distressing to her.
Timothy also seems to recognise his mother's emotional state. If Jenny
is tense or a little anxious Timothy will frustrate everything she attempts to do.
Mother believes that he senses when she is having trouble coping with him
and if he catches her crying will ask, 'why are you crying mummy'? Timothy's
mother believes that he does many things just to frustrate or aggravate ('wind
her up'). His memory has lately improved, especially his recall. For example,
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he not only remembers items of interest but they also appear to act as
mnemonics for particular associations and characters.
Once again the experiences that Timothy's mother encounters from
being with her child are not uninterpretable in the sense of a mother caring for
her son. As we have seen, Timothy's behaviour provides meanings which are
relevant to the child he is. As many mothers know, particularly at his age,
boys will get up to mischief and inevitably cause some level of anxiety,
deliberate or not. In this sense Timothy's behaviour is little different from that
of any other active nine year old. He can be disruptive, spoiling the games of
the other children, perceptive, able to recognise his mother's anxiety and be
naughty enough to increase it and finally, sensitive as when asking his mother
why she is crying. In fact, Timothy's behaviour reflects that which is typical of
other children of similar gender and age.
However, although elements of his behaviour are embedded in that
common repertoire of childhood there are without doubt absences of action
and sociality which make Timothy's behaviour conspicuous. In this way it is
not what Timothy does that highlights this little boy's problems, but more what
he doesn't do that has far more implications for our interpretation and
understanding of his existence. For example, when Timothy's mother informs
us that he senses when she is having trouble coping with him and will
seemingly aggravate the problem this may not, in fact, be done purposely to
make things worse due to Timothy's total insensitivity to the situation. On the
contrary, Timothy recognises quite well changes in mood and timing of
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situations as demonstrated by his ability to interrupt games, show concern and
even recognise when he has done something wrong and chastise himself with
the threat of punishment such as a smack on the bottom. Thus it is far more
likely that Timothy's behaviour is not the pure belligerence of a brain injured
child who knows no better but is, in fact, the result of a self discernment that is
advantaging his personal situation when an appropriate opportunity arises. We
must remember that although Timothy has no serious motor problems, unlike
Cindy's diplegia for example, his disability derives from the fact that his
cognitive skills are in some way affected. The meaning behind his aggravating
and frustrating actions may now be understood as (1) a possible way of
extending personal opportunities that serve to enrich his embodied enterprise,
i.e. his mother becoming even more distracted allows him the opportunity to
get away with behaviour he would normally not be able to experience, or (2) a
way of demonstrating his anger or resentment at his mother's inability to pay
the level of attention he likes or needs to receive. Either way, his mother and
myself are convinced that what may appear as belligerence on the surface to
other less intimate observers, in fact, performs a much more meaningful role,
for both himself and his family, it is a manifestation of some personal
expression relating to his childhood experiences and which would otherwise





Because of the detail in this case I have decided to draw my description
of Tom, and his experiences of the reality which he is in the process of
constructing, directly from my field work notes with his parents.
Tom was born by emergency caesarean after a pregnancy of thirty six
weeks. He was in distress and his birth weight was 51bs. He was subsequently
incubated for six days with a lung infection and murmur of the heart. Tom
was allowed home after three weeks and later diagnosed as having cerebral
palsy. He is seven years old, has one older sister, and lives with his family in
the South East of England.
Interviewer : At what level do you see Tom's consciousness focused,
or perhaps how does he conceive of himself?
Mother : I don't think he sees himselfas being different to anybody
else, I think he knows he can't do things like everybody else but he doesn't
think ofhimselfas being any different to them.
Interviewer : Does he ever mention his disability (walking)?
Mother : He's quite interested in walking, what he has never been
interested in is sitting. That's given us a realproblem because up until about
three days ago we couldn't get him to sit by himselfbecause I think he had a
fear offalling, that's all it was. He's been able to do itfor two to three years
and suddenly he's decided he can sit and he's got his own special chair.
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Interviewer : What type of things or people does Tom show an
interest in?
Mother : He's certainly happier having me to handle him than
anybody else and at school he's got one welfare helper that he's happy with.
He knows which people are happy (comfortable) handling him, I think.
Interviewer: How sensitive do you feel he is to non-verbal
communications?
Mother : Oh he's very tuned in.
Interviewer : He responds to changes in people's mood and to their
lack of confidence with him?
Mother : Yes rightfrom the start, his first reception class teacher,
when he was five, didn't want him in her class. Well he knew that and he
really didn't help himselfat all that term because he knew that she really
didn't want him. And with people like educational psychologists, he can spot
them a mile off. I always have to make the point to them that he doesn't suffer
fools gladly, I'm afraid. He knows when somebody comes in and doesn't
expect him to achieve what he is capable of.
Interviewer : How does he respond to this ?
Mother : He plays them up for all he's worth, ifthey don't want him to
do something he will do exactly the opposite or he'll play dumb, he won't do
anything. You know, like I don't understand that or I can't do it. Which in
certain circumstances is extremelyfrustrating. That's why we never had an
assessment in the hospitals.
Interviewer : What level of language does Tom at present use?
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Mother : He's got extremely good verbal communication skills but
very poor diction. So ifyou can tune in to the way he talks, Imean,
vocabulary and everything is up to normalfor his age but his diction is poor.
We are working on it and it's coming.
Interviewer : So Tom will engage conversation?
Mother : At home you can't shut him up. He's notforthcoming out of
doors, particularly ifhe thinks people aren't going to understand him but he's
capable ofrephrasing things now, so ifthey don't understand him the first
time, words he says he can think ofanother way to say orput it. Invariably he
gets through to them.
Interviewer : You have, presumably, become very sensitive to his
diction problems?
Mother : Oh yes, I can understand small babies now even when their
mothers can't; its reallyfunny ifthere's 13 to 14 month olds just starting to
talk I can invariably understand them when their mothers can't. I've tuned
into his way of talking.
Interviewer : You mentioned that he doesn't see his lack ofmobility
as a problem, if it isn't a problem how does he reconcile himself to the fact that
other children are doing things that he can't?
Mother : He gets them to do thingsfor him, he's not daft. He won't,
or is not motivated, to do thingsfor himselfbecause he knows damn well ifhe
bucks his eye lashes one ofthe girls will run around and do itfor him.
Interviewer : So he's learnt that?
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Mother : Oh yes, he learnt that very early on and he's got his
entourage at school.
Interviewer : So would you say that this is almost like learned
helplessness?
Mother : Oh yeah, but there is an awful lot he can do for himselfbut
he won't, (a) because its quicker and easier to get somebody else to do itfor
him and (b) its hard work and he's not going to put himselfout. He's never
been a very highly motivatedperson lets face it, even when he was tiny and
that's been his problem.
Interviewer : Does he like adult company or does he prefer children?
Mother : He likes adult company, he probably does prefer adults but
he's gotfriends, they tend to be girls because they can play more on the sort of
level that he can play, whereas boys tend to want to run around and do active
things. You can sit a girl down with a board game, but he's got one little
friend, Peter, he will get out a game he knows Tom can play he's gone past the
stage oftrying to get Tom to do the things he would normally do.
Interviewer : So his games tend to be of a more static kind, verbal
types for example?
Mother : Yes, he is into verbal games, mainly 'Neighbours' everybody
has to be a character from 'Neighbours'. Particularly when something is
happening like a holiday, he wants to play the holiday so you have to go
through all the things that you are going to do, especially if it's somethingyou
haven't done before. I think it helps him get into context what he's learnt.
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Interviewer : Are you saying that if you are going on holiday Tom
wants to rehearse the things you are going to do before they happen?
Mother : Well, it tends to be the getting there.
Interviewer : What type of information does he ask for when you are
playing these games?
Mother : I can't think of things that he would want, he doesn't
normally want to play the journey bit, little by little he just wants to get there.
Its more the getting there and once you're there actually meeting the people
who are there. He always likes to know who's going to be there.
Interviewer : For example, if you were going to a hotel would he be
interested in who was the manager and other staff or characters?
Mother : Yeah, he knows the hotel we go to and he knows all the
people there, I think he likes to guess who's going to be on reception and
who's going to be around when we arrive.
Interviewer : How long as he been constructing these scenarios?
Mother : For years, it started offwhen we were 'patterning' (therapy)
when we used to do the respiratorypattern and we would have a halfhour of
really boring. and he would get all his 'patterners' (helpers) to play these
games. All sorts ofweird games and he was young without a lot ofverbal
communication, but he used to direct what they were doing and get them to
play all the different characters to entertain him.
Interviewer : How would he do that?
Mother : I'm not sure it was a long while ago, Imust have been around
because one or two ofthem would be able to communicate with him, not all of
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them but I knew he had them allplaying. Playing different charactersfrom
different games, either different things on the television or ... he never made
up characters they were always people he knew or charactersfrom the
television.
Interviewer : Did he construct scenarios for them?
Mother : Yes.
Interviewer : Do you think that this could have been a way for him to
expand his experiences?
Mother : It could be, yes, and I think in his mind whenplaying he was
not confined to his wheelchair. He's got one little friend, Jane, and he's
always playing, right, tonight I'm going to take Jane outfor a meal or I'm
going to take Jane on holiday, you know, he's driving the car taking her away
for the weekend.
Interviewer : So in the scenarios his disability is suspended, they are
not limited by his lack ofmobility?
Mother : That's right.
Interviewer : I wonder if these games may act like dreams with an
extended reality, because the people who engage in his scenarios are real
people. Do you think it is possible that these games or interactive scenarios
are a way of experiencing action and routines of life, that due to his disability,
he may feel he is missing out on?
Mother : I don'tfeel that he thinks he's been left out of things, he's
always trying new things even ifhe can't do them. He's tried skiing, you know
he sits down on his seat and the person standing at the back steers, he doesn't
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have to do anything, but he can ifhe wants to. Ifhe's capable he could direct
himself. There isn 7 anything we wouldn 7 let him try and I don 7 think it
particularly bothers him that he can'tplay sport and those sorts ofthings 11.
Interviewer : Do you feel that he does certain things in an attempt to
replace those things that he finds too difficult to do?
Mother : He does like board games but that is only because he can
play a board game on a mental level.
Mother : When he's grown up he's going to open a restaurant, that's
one ofhisfavourite games, the restaurant. In his imagination he owns a
restaurant, we have to make up menus on the computer. He's getting to the
stage now where he's very interested in cooking and actually knows recipes.
He watches me cooking, in fact, he was telling his welfare worker in school
how to make something that I was making and got it exactly right. He also
likes to know what's going to happen and he doesn't like it ifthings change at
the last minute. Tom's veryparticular about time, he could tell the time very
early on and watches the clock. Ifyou say to him call me in two or five
minutes he can do that, it's as ifhe has an in-built clock.
Interviewer : Do you feel that he places himself into different points
in time. That is, take experiences from a present situation and compare or
utilise it into a past event or one in the future?
Mother : He's not very concerned with what's gone on in the past he's
more concerned with the future. He doesn't mention the past very much. I
think in his mind he is grown up already.
" I had the impression that my question might have inadvertently caused Tom's mother
to take up a defensive posture.
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Interviewer : What makes you think, 'in his mind', how do you get
such inferences?
Mother : Because when we play these games he is never Tom as he is
now, its always Tom driving a car and things like that.
Interviewer : Doing things on his own, independently? Is he still
living with your family when playing these games?
Mother : Oh no, it's him going by himself.
Interviewer : Does he make references to coming back to see you in
these future games?
Mother : Yes, we invariably end up back here at the end of the game.
Interviewer : Is he a little boy when he's back here or still in his adult
persona?
Mother : I don't know, I think he's still an adult, certainly when we're
playing the restaurant game he's in charge and asks me can Iworkfor him in
the restaurant.
Interviewer : Does he tell you how much he intends paying you?
Mother : He'll draw up contracts ofemployment, that was John
(father) he got him into that.
Interviewer : Does he tell you about Jane, his friend?
Mother : He tells me what Jane has done, they had a big argument as
to whether they are going to get married at the moment. He wants to marry
her but she's not sure. A couple ofmonths ago she was allfor it and whenever
she came around to play they would have a wedding and Iwould have to
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produce a dollfrom somewhere for the baby. It was always touch and go
which one would come first.
Interviewer : Does Tom throw tantrums and if so what is likely to
start them?
Mother : It tends to be ifI want him to do somethingphysically that he
doesn't think he can do. When he throws a tantrum he just goes stiffthen it is
counter productive to try and get him to do anything.
Interviewer : How do you interpret that?
Mother : Well I suppose there are just some days when he just can't do
it, I don't always know whether he really can't do it or whether he is just being
bolshi.
In reading the above parents could identify the games that Tom plays
as being, in nature, the same imaginative constructions that they have
encountered in their own children's play. Are these elements adapted
extensions of those 'human universals' that Brown (1991) discerns as being
largely suppressed from the mainframe anthropological enterprise?
As Sperber (1982: 179-80) notes, anthropologists routinely conduct research that can
only be done because in crucial ways the differences between us and the people we study are
not in fact not very great; yet because everybody likes to hear that 'they' are different from 'us'
anthropologists dwell on the difference (cited in Brown 1991: 5).
In similar ways the children with brain injuries, who are the concern of
this thesis, are believed to be quite different from those uninjured children who
inform our interpretation of the norms we use to characterise childhood.
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However, as there are differing levels of expectation and attainment for
different children in adulthood, so too are these universals (which serve to
dictate inequalities of opportunity) also incorporated into the injured child's
expectations. Unfortunately, the prevalent discriminations that arise from
social, economic and educational factors which affect children's attainment are
further aggravated by the social construction that disability unloads on our
speculations about the physical frame within which the injured child lives.
The bodies of these children are not just those material aspects of a
dysfunctional childhood, as some would have us believe, but are, in fact, that
essential dynamic that springboards the expectancies of otherwise confined
children into potentiality. This potentiality with, hopefully, real alternative
futures is provided by the self therapeutic practices of a performance that is
aimed not at an amorphous and desensitised public, but is constructed to
enrich one's own personal embodiment. The 'scenarios' that these children
perform are not intended to inform or project to an audience some experience
or awareness, like that of a character actor portraying a script, rather they are
the child's way ofpersonally encountering these scripts in a 'real' experiential
way. These 'performances', then, are not for public presentation but for
personal enrichment. They are the creative experiential products of brain
injured children who, due to general incapacity, have but few other alternatives
to explore, as other children do, the world of experience and potential.
The case studies outlined above could now have much greater
analytical meaning ifwe consider the role play of these children not as mere
games but performances, conferring therapeutic benefit to the central character
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(self) around whom disability is no longer orchestrated to frustrate
embodiment but, instead, to achieve new levels of enactment.
Performance for Self
Over the decades anthropologists have become much more concerned
with the notion of performance as a cultural way of behaving. Medical
anthropology has played a large part in understanding the possible efficacy that
can be conferred by performance in the mediation which socially locates a
dynamic for illness and health (Kleinman 1980; Good 1977 and Frankenberg
1986). What Singer (1955, 1968) termed collectively as 'cultural
performances' - that is, locally recognisable ritual manipulations of phenomena
- no doubt form a substrate for the detail I shall explore here. I shall
nevertheless, need to make several shifts in the theoretical framework in which
performances are presently contextualised. In 'The Performance ofHealing'
Laderman and Roseman state in their introduction that the
shift from viewing such enactments primarily in terms of structures of representation to seeing
them also as processes of practice and performance (1996: 2)
This seems appropriate to the present analysis. As I intend to argue,
performance may well be a 'practice', primarily targeting the self, even so, it
can also be utilised as a narrative for children's experiential encounters.
Moreover, this is not the only shift that will be required if I am to adequately
explain the performances exemplified in this text.
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Thomas Csordas (1996) has reconstructed the theoretical tenets that
underpin performance as healing by taking into account that important, and
perhaps crucial, information obtained from the patients themselves. He has
demonstrated that there are four approaches to performance, (1)
cultural-performance, (2) performance centred, (3) performative-utterance
and (4) the rhetorical-persuasive, these derive from interpretative
anthropology, sociolinguistics, both these and the therapeutic process
respectively.
All share a hermeneutic sense of the importance of context, but complement one another in
that the first formulates performance as event, the second as genre, the third as act, and the
fourth as rhetoric (Csordas 1996: 91).
He goes on to suggest that the convergence of all four of these
approaches 'offers the opportunity for something that has been markedly
absent from anthropological accounts of religious healing, namely a way to
grasp and formulate the experiential specificity of participants' (Csordas 1996:
94). In a similar way we must attempt to understand that experiential
specificity, which is responsible for the phenomenology also likely to be
accounted for in the brain injured child. For Csordas our perception has
tended to focus on what is being done to the participants more than what it
actually means for the individuals it concerns. Imagery, then, is not merely the
structural elements of the performance but is, in Csordas' words 'performances
in their own right, a kind of performance within a performance that may not
even be observable' (1996: 94). The point of interest, then, for Csordas, is that
patients elaborate an 'imaginal performance' (1996: 95) involving themselves,
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their healer and other important characters which helps them to confront the
problems that are believed aetiologic to their illness. This form of charismatic
healing in the Catholic tradition posits Jesus and the Virgin Mary as key
instigators in the efficacy process. Furthermore, it combines with the
psychoanalytic position proposed by Melanie Klein's concept of'splitting' in
which the individual's selfmay be a compound of several personas occupying
the self with differing biographies. For Csordas the process of imaginal
performances and memory during the charismatic healing sessions provides
the opportunity for traumatic and contented episodes of the self in past, present
and future situations to be juxtaposed and synthesised into an embodied
encounter with Christ and the community of God.
The specific efficacy within this complementarity lies in the juxtaposition of the
divine world of the purely possible and the struggling human world of traumatic
autobiographical memory, and the experiential superimposition of the divine imagination
upon human memory in imaginal performance (Csordas 1996: 107).
What Csordas offers us here, then, is a way to make sense of the
imaginal performances that many brain injured children enact. Unlike those
healers in the religio-charismatic tradition who manipulate symbols of the
divine in order to effect healing, the disabled children encountered above
manipulate television characters or events taken from the past experiences of
close kin to extend their experiences into real situations of embodied
phenomena. The self performing evocations of brain injured children and the
charismatic tradition not only share similar procedures for healing processes
(imaginal performance) but the common feature is of embodiment as the
genesis for action and efficacy. As Csordas so eloquently argues
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Imagery is a bodily practice insofar as it engages multiple sensory modalities. In addition, the
experience of immediacy and self-presence in imaginal performances are reinforced by both
patient and healer in the process of autobiographical transformation. Finally, it is relevant that
a principal component of imaginal performance is the manipulation of the actors' bodies.
Imaginal bodies though they may be, there is an essential kinaesthetic and proprioceptive
element in sitting on the lap of the Virgin, holding ones disintegrating mother, merging with
one's childhood self, or walking in a imaginal garden (Csordas 1996: 102).
This is equally true for the children presented here. Cindy's utilisation
of actual childhood events from her mother and grandmother, Timothy's
sanctioning self rhetoric and Tom's restaurant business are not just the
imaginary flight of childhood fancy. They are performances of potential
within which the imagination and body are exercised to the full. Children can,
of course, imagine themselves as animals, Batman or aeroplanes but the
important difference lies in the physical actuality of their own bodies.
Imagining to be a mouse or a bat (as we saw earlier in Nagel's (1979)
discussion, see Chapter 2) would merely be fantasy because the capacity
derived from the structure and function of their unique human forms makes
behaving as human (in the physical sense) the only real and pragmatic
possibility. We can not actually know what it is like to be a bat, or anything
else for that matter, because everything that informs a bat about its capacity is
derived from the fact that it is a bat, with a bat's body. The difference now for
brain injured children is that although their bodies may deviate from normal
expression, their imagined activities, evolved from other human experiences,
are ultimately commensurate to that genre of human operations that would be
available to them if not for a lesion in CNS functioning. The actuality of
driving a car, playing limitless games with friends and growing up and having
a family are not transpositions into other existencies, they are confirmations of
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a shared humanity. These imagined performances are not only
psychologically fulfilling but also provide vital afferent and efferent input to a
normally incapacitated body12. These performances proprioceptively13 and
kinaesthetically enrich the child's body for, as the streams of imaginative detail
flow into their minds, their bodies sensitively engage in motoric and sensory
adjustments encompassing the whole child and his or her enacted reality.
Jesus and the Virgin Mary, who form the spiritual entity in the charismatic
healing process, are replaced by the occupancy of tangible and accountable
characters from television or the childhood events of others, in ways that make
a juxtaposition from present disability to imaginal or future potentiality not
only possible but experientially real. I believe this is what Csordas means
when he states
I would suggest that imaginal performances can be understood as a manipulation in fantasy of
internal objects in order to resolve developmental stalemates. In other words, internal objects
are objectified as the actors in imaginal performances (1996: 102).
As the community of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal provides the
bedrock for ritual healers, so too the family serves in inspiring the self
performances of enactment that many brain injured children develop as a
means of extending their experiences. The role of healer may be played by an
unsuspecting parent or sibling whilst that of the of the divinity may, for the
children presented here, be some character which occurred in someone else's
12 Afferent pathways are involved with bringing information into the body, especially
the brain whilst efferent processes send information from out of the brain to the body.
"Proprioceptors, sometimes referred to as mechanoreceptors, are located throughout
the body in muscles, tendons and joints and respond to changes in the tissues where they are




childhood or in a television soap opera. The important point, however, is that
the patient in the former and the child in the latter are themselves the main
agents of action and enactment. It is only from within themselves that the real
opportunities are ever expressed or made possible, be they the healing of some
past trauma or the future development of a brain injured child's independence.
Conclusion
My analysis above may offer one way to consider the play which
occupies much of the personal time many of these children spend with their
family at home. If I have got some of the detail correct then these
performances are primarily for the self to exercise a body and mind into a
meaningful campaign that confers ability to disability. The real emphasis of
this work was to attempt to account for that phenomenology within which the
child with a brain injury was enveloped. That personal embodiment and
experience exist as the tenable capacities of brain injured children which can
be further developed through both an alternative therapeutic method and the
child's own performances has been argued throughout this thesis. The fact that
orthodox medical enquiry has yet to properly acknowledge this
phenomenology of the disabled does not disprove its existence. They may
have simply, through a myopic conviction in scientific rationalism, lost sight
of all the components that regulate health and illness in their patients. As
Sharma states
The contest between orthodox and unorthodox medicine may be between forms of
knowledge, but the prize is, in the last analysis the patient. If patients are not convinced that a
form of treatment works, intellectual arguments about the validity of the knowledge on which
it is based will be of little avail (1992: 123).
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The body, then, may well be born as a biological entity (mechanism for
medical exploration) but it requires social action not only to transform it
within the context of society but also to enable it to have meaning in social
relations (Shilling 1993: 199). In this way personal phenomenology is made
by, and at the same time contributes to, the embodied experience of all those
with whom the individual interacts. Brain injured children differ little from
other children in their basic enactments of embodiment. It is in the
interpretation of these bodily experiences that differentiation is to be
encountered.
I hope to have shown that these children are indeed the orchestrated
bodies of institutions that in every aspect regulate both their behaviour and our
expectancy of a potential believed to be confined by disability. As in
Csordas's analysis of the invisible elements that occur in the 'imaginal'
encounters of patients during their ritual healing sessions, so too is there a
great deal of the invisible in my study of brain injured children attending
alternative therapy. In my attempt to make apparent these children's essential
phenomenology I am aware that I have offered few solutions, but sought
instead to define the operational parameters used by professionals and other
adults to consider these children by largely dismissing their potential. What
this thesis has shown, therefore, is that as far as those children who suffer
brain injury are concerned they have yet to be sympathetically accounted for as
children in their own right.
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I am aware that I, too, have given but little voice to their expressions,
but I hope that my account may have suggested more attentive ways of
listening to the murmur of childhood disability Furthermore, I am equally
aware that I have offered no more than rhetoric, be it sensitised rhetoric, as a
way of articulating the many issues that are the primary concern of parents.
Unless we are willing to explore the invisible worlds that brain injured
children are responsible for constructing, we will in fact fail to chart that vital
source of human experience which these children's components inevitably
enrich. Indeed, ignorance of such detail is not only inexcusable from the point
of view of epistemology, but also unthinkingly arrogant to all those confined
by their dysfunctional bodies and who are only ever considered in terms of
their impairment.
Orchestrated as these children's bodies are, one cannot assume that the
manipulations that take place are solely the expression of an institutionalised
society acting negatively to dismiss their submerged potential. The fact that
many brain injured children's self performances engage with those real world
encounters of others, via the assimilation of extra-personal experience, to
extend embodiment may suggest that the real orchestrators of these children
are perhaps themselves. Learning how to encourage and recognise these
processes may not only provide new levels of therapeutic efficacy to
traditional treatment programmes, but perhaps more importantly also provide
essential biographical information to explore the constructions of reality from
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Victims or Beneficiaries? 'Magical Thinking' Reconsidered and
some general notes on the patterning method of therapy.
Robert Cummins has argued that the Doman-Delacato method of
stimulation is unscientific and that parents and professionals who subscribe to
this procedure are naively following the 'belief in irrational thinking' or
'magical thinking' even though there is 'not one shred of reliable scientific data
to support the existence of such phenomena' (Cummins 1989). The following
offers a critique of Cummins' argument, and a personal account of one
particular alternative therapeutic setting of which I have some experience, in
the attempt to clarify some of the misconceptions that I feel are common to
many orthodox professionals.
Scientific Method
Cummins' critique of the Doman-Delacato method postulates that the
one science, according to his own rationalism has championed over all other
considerations. It is not my intention to assess the full implications for a
scientific method and its philosophical postulates here, but rather to suggest
that the definition of 'scientific' is not restricted to the rationalist's tenet which
accompanies Cummins' critique and those ofmany others in the profession.
This philosophy considers that there exists a single universal criterion
which assesses all rival theories. The distinction between a scientific and
non-scientific approach for the rationalists is now straightforward. That is to
say any theory whose merits can be clearly assessed by this universal criterion,
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and which subsequently pass the test of the criterion, are scientific.
Knowledge developed by this method will tend to be regarded towards both
scientific rationalism and truth.
Science, most basically, often involves two distinct but necessary
procedures. The first of these requires that the right questions be asked. The
second concerns the problem, where do we look for the answers? Cummins'
(1988) work 'The Neurologically Impaired Child: Doman-Delacato
Techniques Reappraised' addresses the former concern but, unfortunately, fails
to find the answers to the latter. That is, he asks the right questions, but in the
wrong places. The responsibility for this simple, but important, mistake may
well be found in his rationalistic approach to science. Cummins is absolutely
correct to point out the disparity that exists between the theory and practice of
the Doman-Delacato techniques. Furthermore, there can be little justification,
either scientifically or otherwise, for the excessive daily routines of'patterning'
which they advocate. However, my agreement with the two statements
presented above does not contradict the notion that (1) theory and practice,
although frequently forming a unified approach, nevertheless need not be
indjvisibly part of the same phenomenon and (2) 'patterning' (specific
programmes involving passive stimulation) can help develop valuable
strategies for the remedial treatment of brain injured individuals. Although
there may be a tendency to agree with many of the criticisms levelled at the
Doman-Delacato method, it is nevertheless felt that the underlying rationalism
of the Cummins' argument fails to perceive the real beneficiaries of a
moderated approach. That is, this methodology is unable to assess the
341
Appendix 2
multidimensional nature of its 'true' subject. Such dimensions involve the
subjective and objective feelings, experiences, anxieties and hopes that both
the child and his or her parents have with regard to their predicament. The
scientific tenets which underpin Cummins' reappraisal find it difficult to
measure these factors so, instead, they submerge such detail under the
drowning dogma of rational scientific superiority. It is simply not good
enough to regard the scientific assessments as more important than the
sophisticated judgements of the people involved. Generally speaking, parents
understand more about their child's problems than do the so called 'specialists'.
This knowledge may not be scientifically formulated, but it does involve
critical assessments with regard to their child's essential developmental
requirements. Parents are not easily tricked, since surely any initial
vulnerability, to which they might be predisposed considering their plight,
would be eroded away if results on their terms were not achieved. With these
considerations in mind, Cummins' reappraisal may well have profited from a
'relativists' standpoint. This approach denies a universal rationality for
science, and posits instead that the scientific enterprise should adopt a set of
criteria that are more relative to the requirements of the individuals who
subscribe to them than to the more scientific method which measures them.
There can be little doubt that much of the theory which underscores the
Doman-Delacato techniques is speculative, if not unsound, by any criteria.
However, such a disparity between theory and techniques need not always
render the techniques obsolete, even when the theory for it is obviously
inadequate. For example, science and technology are often seen as being part
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of the same thing. However, they can in fact be totally independent of one
another. Consider the technology of the steam engine, which was developed
before any consistent theory of thermodynamics was imagined, let alone
postulated. Thus, although theory and practice are usually in consort with one
another this is not an essential requirement. Cummins' attack on the
Doman-Delacato theory with the legion of rationalism may secure a victory for
the orthodoxy within the medical community, but he has by no means, won the
war.
The problem is that many of the people who are personally involved
with the remedial treatment of brain injured children are unaware that a
challenge to their beliefs has been made, let alone suffered defeat. This is
because they tend not to be convinced by argument alone, especially when it is
contradictory to their experience. Many alternative therapists, like Robert
Cummins himself, are not convinced by some of the theoretical notions
proposed to account for the techniques' application. Several of these
techniques, however, have been found to be effective in promoting strategies
of positive and purposeful interactions between the child's functioning, his or
her family and the environment. These patterns of encouraged motility
provide the substrate on which self development (cognitive and physical) can
be promoted.
Effective Strategies.
Many of the techniques advocated by Doman-Delacato have been
empirically demonstrated to make a valuable contribution in aiding the child to
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gain a relative autonomy over motor control. That is, they provide direct
stimulation to both the muscles and their corresponding motor neurons that are
responsible for controlled function. Enhancing motor function is also an
important stimulant for cognitive and social development. The use of passive
limb and body movements is designed to help the child experience where the
muscles are, what they do and how this can affect motility. This is achieved
by firstly assessing the child's ability and subsequently designing an
individually tailored programme of therapy to the child's unique requirements.
In this sense these specific techniques have a particular responsibility for the
mediation of input from limb to motor areas in the brain. This, in essence is
the 'programme'. However, an indirect result of these techniques is that they
also help to establish purposeful and positive interpersonal contact between
the child, his or her parents and helpers, and the external world. Consider for
a moment how enriching these procedures can be to a child so incapacitated
that even basic reflexes are distorted and mal-adaptive. The parent's
expectations are not, in my experience, unrealistic but positive, and all help is
directed at that which the child can do to master that which he or she cannot.
During these regular situations of directive contact parents and helpers talk,
sing and touch their child, while at all other times the normalising routines that
establish family life take precedent. These procedures transform the child's
personal environment from one with low expectations, and the often attendant
deprivations, to one which is enriched socially and physically. It is also
important to consider that the use of volunteers (patterners) in a controlled
fashion promotes sociality by providing 'first hand' experience of other people.
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I think the biggest plus factor, besides her improved development, is
the social development. ... you know the interaction with all those people
(patterners) I don't think any child has the opportunity to see thirty adults a
week and to become close to her. Giving their almost undivided attention to
her, she loves being the centre ofattention.
These encouraged relationships between child and 'patterners' are
important since the child must attempt the appropriate social responses during
the interactive periods. A failure to acquire these basic social skills could
affect not only the helpers' commitment to the child and programme, but also
the child's future social development. Another point worthy of consideration
is the need for the parents to feel that they are doing something about their
child's problems (see Chapter 5). Such techniques not only encourage the
child to develop, but also fulfil the need of parents to do all that is possible to
help their child increase personal functioning.
One of the major distinctions between the modified approach exampled
here and the original method developed by the Institute for the Achievement of
Human Potential in Philadelphia is the excessive programme regimes
prescribed by the latter. I would suggest that twelve to fourteen hour per day,
spent delivering an intensive programme of stimulation, is incommensurate
with regards to familial requirements, let alone those of the child. The
adoption of such an extreme regime would do little to provide the child with
enough personal time to process and assimilate the information being provided
from continual stimulation. Furthermore, it is not difficult to imagine the
extent of familial stress that is likely to be the result of this intensive
programme. Instead, the system of therapy with which I have had experience
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advocates no more that fifteen hours per week. This is, in itself, a
considerable commitment of time and effort, but far more realistic than that
proposed by Doman-Delacato.
Conclusion
Although Robert Cummins' reappraisal on the techniques of
Doman-Delacato has highlighted the inadequacies of their theory, the adoption
of a single minded 'rationalism' is neither appropriate nor constructive in
assessing the humanistic ramifications of brain injury. The problem of
therapeutic efficacy is not measured by validating the theoretical tenets, but by
assessing the objective benefit derived from a particular approach to
ameliorate, at various levels, the symptomology ofbrain injury. That fact that
highly efficacious therapies are frequently rejected in medicine because they
do not align themselves to current therapeutic trends does much to explain
Cummins' criticism of the general 'patterning' approach. This phenomenon,
termed the 'tomato effect' has been given much consideration by Goodwin &
Goodwin (1984) who suggest that it most likely occurs
when an efficacious treatment for a certain disease is ignored because it does not "make sense"
in the light of accepted theories of disease mechanism and drug action' (1984: 2387)
Indeed, the history of medicine is replete with examples where
'tomatoes' such as colchine for acute gout, and gold and high dose aspirin for
rheumatoid arthritis (Goodwin & Goodwin 1984), were discouraged even
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though they were known to benefit patients. Likewise, many alternative
therapies are ignored or criticised simply because the ideas ofmainstream
clinical practice do not correspond with those empirical beliefs derived from
the alternativists' therapeutic encounters with brain injured children.
It is suggested that if a position involving the relativists approach were
to be employed, one would assess more personally the effects therapy has on
those who subscribe to it. After all, the beneficiaries of this approach are
intended to be the brain injured and their parents, not the scientific community.
This is not to argue that scientific validity is not important, but it should
attempt to measure the human experiences, behaviour and development of
those involved, more than concerning itselfwith the poorly developed theory
that attempts to support a unified methodology with that of medicine. It is also
suggested that the techniques developed, initially by Doman and Delacato, and
especially those modified by other committed practitioners, can offer an
effective alternative to that which even Cummins' himself refers to as
'traditional and outmoded professional thought' (1988: 17). This approach is
by no means a panacea for brain injury, however it can help effect positive
changes in personal functioning for the injured child while helping to resolve
much of the parental isolation and feelings of helplessness that often
accompany these situations. Many of the techniques employed can assist the
child to develop primary skills that aid not only motor functions but perhaps
also those of cognition and social development. 'Magical thinking' may now
be reconsidered to be not that naive and unrealistic beliefwhich organises
parents to seek an 'alternative' for their brain injured child, but in fact the
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process by which compliance to the medical orthodoxy frustrates the
aspirations ofboth child and family.
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